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Summary
In Switzerland, since the 1940s the widespread and dynamic development of settlement has been per-
ceived as a problem. There is general agreement that spatial planning instruments, which were intro-
duced in 1979 with the first Federal Act on Spatial Planning and amended since, are inadequate to 
combat the unsustainable growth of land use and urban sprawl. The adoption of the recent popular 
initiative on second homes and the adoption of the revised federal planning law – amongst others –
highlight the widespread claim for stricter legal enforcement, further regulations, and innovative in-
struments to tackle these problems. Among such instruments are 'transferable development rights' 
(TDR).
The main objective of this thesis is to propose a TDR market program for Switzerland, and to explore 
its possible impacts and implications. The thesis is presented as a collection of three chronologically 
and thematically linked scientific papers. 
The first paper (chapter 2) presents a design for a TDR market in Switzerland, and based on that an 
agent-based model (ABM) for simulating the TDR market (TDR-ABM). The concept for the market 
design was defined and elaborated together with spatial planning and real estate experts and takes into 
account both the particular Swiss situation and experience in other countries. The TDR-ABM distin-
guishes three main types of agents: two agent types representing landowners who submit bids and asks 
(requests) for TDR, and an agent type representing a TDR exchange platform. The model simulates 
the trading of multiple units of TDR at fixed package sizes (TDR bundles) according to the rules of a 
multi-unit double auction with a uniform price. 
The second paper (chapter 3) presents a questionnaire survey that was specifically designed to cali-
brate the TDR-ABM. A total of 1,976 spatial planning and real estate professionals – divided into four 
landowner categories – throughout Switzerland were contacted. Each person represented either a po-
tential seller or potential buyer of TDR and received a questionnaire confronting her/him with a 
unique realistic planning situation. The approach to collect data with a participant-specific survey to 
directly calibrate the ABM proved successful, despite the quite low response rate (16.75%). Various 
results (e.g. probabilities to participate in the TDR market, regression models for TDR price (ask, bid) 
determination and adaptation) were calculated to be integrated into the TDR-ABM.
The third paper (chapter 4) is based on the work and findings of the previous two papers and presents 
the empirically calibrated agent-based model (TDR-ABM) and the detailed simulation results. The 
simulation was run with five different model settings which allowed an analysis of relevant political 
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and economic questions for Switzerland. For example, it could be shown that the TDR prices were 
comparable with existing land prices in Switzerland, i.e. prices to develop land would not rise. In addi-
tion, it could be demonstrated that with the trade of TDR, it would be possible to downzone 11.4 km2
of building zone land (residential zone) for which there is no demand and to develop 7.4 km2 of new 
building zone land up to the year 2018 without any financial burden for public bodies. As a conse-
quence, the defined building zone area would decrease. Finally, it could be shown that the popular 
initiative on second homes might only slightly reduce the building zone prices and thus had only a 
small effect on the TDR market price.
To sum up, this thesis presents the first agent-based model that simulates a TDR market. The simula-
tion results demonstrated that in Switzerland the market-based instrument of transferable development 
rights could be a useful instrument to both reduce the building zone area and address the problem of
the spatial imbalances in supply and demand for these zones. However, it should not be forgotten, that 
the TDR market is ‘supplementary to planning’, e.g. already the designation of the sending and receiv-
ing areas needs planning criteria.
Keywords: Transferable development rights (TDR), TDR market, Agent Based Modeling (ABM), 
ABM-calibration, market simulation, multi-unit double auction, participant-specific questionnaires, 
urban sprawl, building zones trade, undeveloped building zones, spatial imbalances of building zones
vZusammenfassung
Seit den 1940er Jahren wird in der Schweiz die ausgedehnte und dynamische Siedlungsentwicklung
als Problem betrachtet. Es besteht generelle Einigkeit darüber, dass die Raumplanungsinstrumente, die 
im Jahre 1979 mit dem Raumplanungsgesetz eingeführt und seitdem mehrmals novelliert wurden, 
inadäquat für die Bekämpfung der anhaltenden Landnutzung und Zersiedelung sind. Die kürzlich an-
genommene Zweitwohnungsinitiative ("Schluss mit uferlosem Bau von Zweitwohnungen“) sowie die 
Annahme des revidierten Raumplanungsgesetzes stehen u.a. für die verbreitete Forderung nach einer 
strengeren rechtlichen Durchsetzung, weiteren Regulierungen sowie innovativer Instrumente zur Be-
wältigung dieser Probleme. Ein solches innovatives Instrument stellen “Handelbare Flächennutzungs-
zertifikate” (FNZ) dar.
Das Hauptziel dieser Dissertation ist es, einen Vorschlag für einen FNZ-Markt für die Schweiz vorzu-
stellen, und die dabei resultierenden Folgen und Auswirkungen zu untersuchen. Die Dissertation be-
steht aus drei thematisch verknüpften und chronologisch aufeinanderfolgenden wissenschaftlichen 
Artikeln.
Der erste Artikel (Kapitel 2) stellt ein Konzept für einen FNZ-Markt in der Schweiz vor, und auf 
Grundlage dessen ein agentenbasiertes Modell (ABM) zur Simulation dieses Marktes (FNZ-ABM). 
Das Konzept wurde zusammen mit Raumplanungs- und Immobilienexperten definiert und erarbeitet, 
und dies unter Berücksichtigung der speziellen Schweizer Situation sowie der Erfahrungen in anderen 
Ländern. Im FNZ-ABM werden drei generelle Agententypen unterschieden: Zwei Agententypen rep-
räsentieren Landeigentümer, die Gebote (Käufer) und Offerten (Verkäufer) für FNZ abgeben, und ein 
Agententyp stellt die FNZ-Handelsplattform dar. Das Modell simuliert den Handel von mehreren 
FNZ-Einheiten zu festen Paketgrössen nach den Regeln einer Mehrgüter-Doppelauktion mit einem 
einheitlichen Preis. 
Im zweiten Artikel (Kapitel 3) wird eine Befragung vorgestellt, die speziell für die Kalibrierung des 
FNZ-ABM konzipiert wurde. Es wurden gesamthaft 1‘976 Raumplanungs- und Immobilienexperten –
aufgeteilt in vier Landeigentümer-Kategorien – in der ganzen Schweiz kontaktiert. Jede Person reprä-
sentierte einen potentiellen Käufer oder einen potentiellen Verkäufer von FNZ und erhielt einen Fra-
gebogen mit einer einzigartigen und realistischen Situationsbeschreibung. Der Ansatz, Daten mit einer 
Teilnehmer-spezifischen Befragung zu erheben und damit das ABM direkt zu kalibrieren, erwies sich,
trotz der relativ geringen Rücklaufquote (16.75%), als zweckmässig. Es wurden verschiedene Ergeb-
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nisse (z. B. Wahrscheinlichkeiten für die Teilnahme am FNZ-Markt, Regressionsmodelle für die Be-
stimmung und Anpassung des FNZ-Preises (Offerten, Gebote)) für die Integration ins FNZ-ABM be-
rechnet.
Der dritte Artikel (Kapitel 4) basiert auf den Arbeiten und Ergebnissen der vorherigen zwei Kapiteln
und stellt das empirisch kalibrierte agentenbasierte Modell (FNZ-ABM), sowie die detaillierten Simu-
lationsresultate vor. Um politisch und ökonomisch relevante Fragen für die Schweiz zu analysieren, 
wurden bei den Simulationsdurchläufen fünf verschiedene Modell-Einstellungen unterschieden. So
konnte beispielsweise gezeigt werden, dass die FNZ-Preise mit bestehenden Landpreisen in der 
Schweiz vergleichbar sind, d.h. die Preise fürs Bebauen von Land würden nicht steigen. Darüber hin-
aus konnte dargelegt werden, dass durch den Handel von FNZ bis ins Jahr 2018 11.4 km2 nicht-
nachgefragtes Bauland (Wohnzone) ausgezont sowie 7.4 km2 neues Bauland entwickelt werden könn-
te. Als Folge davon würde die absolute Bauzonenfläche verringert werden. Schliesslich konnte gezeigt 
werden, dass die Zweitwohnungsinitiative lediglich einen geringfügigen negativen Einfluss auf die 
Bauzonenpreise haben wird und dass die Effekte auf den FNZ-Marktpreis demzufolge gering wären.
Die vorliegende Arbeit stellt das erste agentenbasierte Modell vor, das einen Markt für FNZ simuliert. 
Die Simulationsergebnisse konnten darlegen, dass das marktbasierte Instrument der handelbaren Flä-
chennutzungszertifikate ein nützliches Instrument sowohl für die Reduktion der Bauzonenfläche als 
auch zur Entschärfung des Problems der räumlichen Ungleichheiten im Angebot und der Nachfrage 
nach Bauzonen sein kann. Es sollte jedoch beachtet werden, dass FNZ als Ergänzung bisheriger 
Raumplanungsinstrumente zu verstehen sind, z.B. sollte das Ausweisen von Sender- und Empfänger-
gebieten nach Planungskriterien erfolgen. 
Schlagworte: Handelbare Flächennutzungszertifikate (FNZ), FNZ-Markt, Agentenbasierte Modellie-
rung (ABM), ABM-Kalibrierung, Marktsimulation, Mehrgüter-Doppelauktion, Teilnehmer-
spezifische Befragung, Zersiedelung, Handel mit Bauzonen, unüberbaute Bauzonen, räumliche Dispa-
ritäten von Bauzonen
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Résumé
Depuis les années 1940, le développement urbain, étendu et dynamique, est jugé problématique en 
Suisse. Il est généralement admis que les instruments d’aménagement du territoire, introduits en 1979 
avec la loi sur l’aménagement du territoire, et modifiés à plusieurs reprises depuis lors, ne sont pas 
adaptés à la lutte contre l’utilisation croissante des sols et la progression de l’étalement urbain. 
L’initiative sur les résidences secondaires acceptée récemment ("Pour en finir avec les constructions 
envahissantes de résidences secondaires“), ainsi que l’acceptation de la révision de la loi sur 
l’aménagement du territoire, reflètent entre autres des exigences croissantes: celle d’une application 
plus stricte de la législation en vigueur, celle aussi de réglementations supplémentaires et 
d’instruments novateurs à même de résoudre ces problèmes. Les “certificats d’utilisation du sol 
négociables” (CUS) sont l’un de ces instruments.
Proposer un marché de CUS pour la Suisse et en rechercher les répercussions et implications possibles 
constitue l’objectif principal de cette thèse. Celle-ci se compose de trois articles thématiquement liés 
qui se suivent chronologiquement. 
Le premier article (chapitre 2) présente le concept mis au point pour un marché de CUS en Suisse et, à 
partir de celui-ci, un modèle à base d’agents (ABM) visant à simuler ce marché (CUS-ABM). Ce con-
cept a été défini et élaboré de concert avec des experts en aménagement du territoire et en immobilier. 
Il prend en considération la situation spécifique de la Suisse, de même que les expériences d’autres 
pays. Le CUS-ABM distingue trois principaux types d’agents: les propriétaires de terrain qui 
participent aux enchères (acheteurs) et soumettent des offres (vendeurs) pour des CUS constituent les 
deux premiers, la plate-forme de négoce des CUS représentant le troisième type d’agents. Le modèle 
simule le négoce de plusieurs unités de CUS relevant de paquets de tailles fixes selon les règles d’une 
double vente aux enchères multi-unités avec un prix uniforme.
Le deuxième article (chapitre 3) présente une enquête par questionnaire spécialement conçu pour 
l’étalonnage du CUS-ABM. Pour toute la Suisse, 1996 experts en aménagement du territoire et en 
immobilier – répartis en quatre catégories de propriétaires de terrain – furent contactés. Chacun d’eux 
figurait un acheteur ou vendeur potentiel de CUS et reçut un questionnaire avec une description unique 
et réaliste de la situation. Cette démarche qui consiste à collecter des données au moyen d’une enquête 
spécifique aux participants, et ainsi à étalonner directement l’ABM, a fait ses preuves, et ce malgré le 
taux de réponse relativement faible (16.75 %). Différents paramètres ont été estimés en vue de leur 
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intégration dans le CUS-ABM: probabilités de participer au marché de CUS, modèles de régression 
pour la fixation et l’adaptation du prix des CUS (offres, enchères) notamment.
Le troisième article (chapitre 4) se fonde sur les travaux et les résultats des deux chapitres précédents 
et expose le modèle à base d’agents étalonné empiriquement (CUS-ABM), ainsi que les résultats 
détaillés des simulations. Celles-ci s’appuient sur cinq paramètres de modélisation différents afin de 
favoriser l’analyse, pour la Suisse, de questions pertinentes d’ordre économique et politique. Il fut 
ainsi possible de montrer entre autres que les prix des CUS étaient comparables aux prix fonciers
prévalant dans le pays, ce qui signifie que les prix pour l’aménagement de surfaces à bâtir 
n’augmenteraient pas. On put aussi mettre en évidence le fait que le négoce de CUS permettrait, d’ici à 
2018, de classer hors zone à bâtir une surface de 11.4 km2 de terrain pour laquelle aucune demande 
n’existe (zone résidentielle) et d’aménager 7.4 km2 de nouveaux terrains à bâtir. Avec pour 
conséquence la réduction de la surface absolue de zones à bâtir. Il fut enfin possible de souligner que 
l’initiative sur les résidences secondaires n’aurait qu’un effet négatif restreint sur les prix des zones à 
bâtir, et que l’impact sur le prix de marché des CUS serait de ce fait limité.
Cette thèse présente ainsi le premier modèle à base d’agents qui simule un marché pour les CUS. Les 
résultats des simulations démontrent que l’instrument des certificats d’utilisation du sol négociables, 
instrument basé sur le marché, peut s’avérer utile non seulement pour réduire la surface de la zone à 
bâtir, mais aussi pour remédier au problème du déséquilibre spatial entre l’offre et la demande des 
zones à bâtir. Il faut toutefois ne voir dans les CUS que des compléments aux instruments 
d’aménagement du territoire existants; la délimitation des zones émettrices et réceptrices doit par 
exemple avoir lieu conformément aux critères de planification.
Mots-clés: Certificats d’utilisation du sol négociables (CUS), marché de CUS, modélisation à base 
d’agents (ABM), étalonnage ABM, simulation du marché, double vente aux enchères multi-unités, 
questionnaires spécifiques aux participants, étalement urbain, échange de zones à bâtir, zones à bâtir 
non construites, disparités spatiales des zones à bâtir
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11 Introduction
The Swiss population is concerned about the development of its landscape. This is not only highlight-
ed by the success of the recently adopted ‘popular initiative on second homes’ (adopted on 11 March 
2012) and the adopted revision of the federal planning law (adopted on 3 March 2013). A recently 
conducted representative survey2 among the Swiss population has shown that a large number (65%) of 
the respondents would approve limiting the settlement area to the present amount. Indeed 80% of the 
respondents would like to restrict development activities in particularly beautiful landscapes. These 
high levels are not a coincidence; the survey has been conducted annually since 2006 and has shown 
consistently similar results.
The concern of the population is supported by the most recent results of the Swiss land use statistics 
(German: “Arealstatistik”, French: “statistique de la superficie”): The settlement area increased by 
23.5%3 between the monitoring periods 1979/85 and 2004/09. Regarding the settlement area in rela-
tion to the population, in 1979/85 each person required 375 sqm, while in 2004/09 the settlement area 
per person increased to 395 sqm. Yet, the Swiss Government claimed in the ‘Sustainable Development 
Strategy 2012-2015‘4 that the settlement area should be stabilized at 400 sqm per capita. Hence, if the 
present trend of land development continues, it is highly doubtful whether this claimed stabilization 
will be achieved. In addition, the population is predicted (medium scenario) to grow from the current 8 
million to 9 million by 2055 (SFSO, 2010c).
The expansion of the settlement area has mostly occurred on the Swiss Plateau with a corresponding 
loss of farmland as a result (IRL, 2003; SFSO, 2010a). The expansion is mainly related to economic 
growth and changes in lifestyle. Economic growth has led to an expansion of various areas, including 
residential, industrial, commercial and traffic areas (SFSO, 2010b). Moreover, in peripheral areas, 
location marketing additionally stimulates the land use (Avenir Suisse, 2012). Changes in lifestyle, for 
example, have led to significantly more one-person households and single-family housing (IRL, 
2003), and a greater demand for living space per person. It has been shown that in particular urban 
sprawl, i.e. development outside high-density areas, has many negative consequences for the environ-
2 The survey was conducted between 22 February and 5 March 2012 by the research institute „gfs-zürich“, on behalf of Pro 
Natura. For more information see: http://www.pronatura.ch/landschaften or  http://www.gfs-zh.ch, accessed: 11-27-2012.
3 Results of the Areal Statistics 1979/85 – 2004/09 (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/02/03.html, ac-
cessed: 2012-11-02). In the results of the year 2004/2009, the Canton of Graubünden has not yet been included.
4 For more information see: www.are.admin.ch/themen/nachhaltig/00262/00528, accessed: 11-27-2012.
2ment, causes higher infrastructure costs, and leads to greater energy consumption (Baumgartner, 2005; 
Brownstone and Golob, 2009; Ewing, 2008).
The described land-use problem is reinforced by the location of the building zones (Germ.: 
“Bauzonen”; French: “zones à bâtir”). According to ARE (2008) and Fahrländer Partner (2008), be-
tween 38,000 and 53,000 hectares (17% to 24%) of the building zone areas have not yet been devel-
oped, and more importantly, there is a severe spatial imbalance in supply and demand for undeveloped 
building zones. In urban areas the expected demand for the next twenty years exceeds the supply (cur-
rent reserves on building zone land), yet in areas far away from the centers the supply exceeds the 
demand. In addition, only 30% of the building zones (both developed and undeveloped) are well or 
very well connected with public transport and almost half of the building zones are not or only mar-
ginally connected. The building zones in major centers are significantly better connected with the pub-
lic transport network than areas that are largely agricultural and/or used for tourism (ARE, 2008).
The concern of the population and the need for new policies and innovative methods to reduce the land 
use problems have been recognized by the Swiss Confederation. On 3 March 2013 the Swiss popula-
tion has accepted the revision of the Federal Act of 22 June 1979 on Spatial Planning. This revision 
includes, among other things, measures for the mobilization of hoarded building zone land in suitable 
areas according to Swiss spatial planning principles, the introduction of a nationwide tax on planning 
gains (German: “Mehrwertabgabe”, French: ”Prélèvement de la plus-value”), and, the obligation of 
downzoning5 too large building zones for which there is no predicted demand in the next 15 years. 
According to Swiss law downzoning the status of building zones to agricultural land for instance, in 
general means expropriating the owner (material expropriation), who would then have to be fully 
compensated6. 
From a spatial planning perspective, the revision is decidedly desirable, however, for many municipal-
ities (e.g. municipalities in the canton of Valais or Vaud, cf. BSS, 2011), the compensation of the 
landowners will be almost impossible to finance. Therefore, it is doubtful whether the measures of the 
revision of the Federal Act can be put into practice. 
A possible or additional solution to reduce the above-mentioned land-use problems are transferable 
development rights (TDR). TDR are a market-based instrument which allows transferring develop-
ment rights. The result of such transfers may be seen as a form of rezoning. In a TDR market, land-
owners in so-called 'sending areas' can sell their right to build on a parcel of land, to landowners in 
'receiving areas'. This results in less land consumption in the former and increased density in the latter, 
5 The practice of reducing the zoning of land from building to agricultural zone.
6 For more information about recent judgments of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court concerning material expropriation see 
e.g., VLP-ASPAN (2011, 2012). For a deeper judicial explanation see Häfelin et. al. (2010).    
3since in the receiving area there might be denser development compared to the ordinary density in the 
sending area. 
The sending area comprises undeveloped building zone parcels, which are not in demand and/or which 
should be downzoned according to Swiss spatial planning principles. The receiving area consists of 
parcels not yet designated as building zones, which – in line with and respecting the Swiss spatial 
planning principles – should be developed in the future because of high demand. 
In Switzerland, TDR programs have not yet been brought to practice, and only a few conceptual stud-
ies (cf. ARE, 2006; Gmünder, 2004, 2010; Süess and Gmünder, 2005; Zollinger and Seidl, 2005; 
Zollinger, 2006) have been conducted. In these studies, some authors even worked with the unjustified 
assumption that TDR could be used for increasing the building density on already developed building 
zone parcels. This is hardly possible, because the lawful allowable gross floor (living) area is often not 
used and therefore, in such situations, no TDRs would be demanded. In addition, no study has exam-
ined what the needed trading area would be to have a ‘balance’ in the supply and demand of TDRs. 
Overall, the main disadvantage of the studies on TDR conducted so far is that no simulations have 
been done, but merely simple calculations. They lack specifying details, such as the trading mecha-
nism (e.g. bilateral trading, auction etc.), and no land-related data (e.g. cadastral data) have been used 
to test the feasibility of their proposals. 
Currently, none of the proposals would be suitable for a practical implementation in Switzerland. 
None examines the influence of primary allocation mechanisms or of trading mechanisms on the de-
mand and supply of TDR, although trading mechanisms play a central role in TDR programs (cf. 
Kopits et al., 2005). Due to this lack of theoretical and empirical investigation, knowledge about TDR 
and the implications of their application is limited. Meanwhile, TDR are being controversially dis-
cussed by politicians, spatial planners, environmental organizations, landowner lobbies, and scientists, 
while also attracting considerable public interest (e.g. ARE, 2006; NZZ, 2007a, 2007b; Schläpfer, 
2007; Süess & Gmünder, 2005; Zollinger, 2006). 
This thesis aims to fill these identified research gaps. This will be done by drawing on both different 
disciplines and knowledge of local stakeholders and spatial planners, and by linking and further devel-
oping these bodies of knowledge. The aim is to develop an empirically calibrated agent-based simula-
tion for a TDR market, which – to my knowledge – is the first one developed. Therewith, the thesis 
may also contribute to the discussion of the TDRs’ suitability towards a sustainable development of 
settlements in Switzerland or any comparable country.
41.1 Objectives and main steps of the thesis
The objective of this thesis is to propose a TDR market program for Switzerland, and to explore its 
possible implications and impacts. The research process covered the following four main steps (cf. 
also Fig. 1-1):
1) creating a theoretically sound concept of a TDR market program for Switzerland (incl. auction 
and TDR market design);
2) building a suitable agent-based simulation model for a TDR market (TDR-ABM);
3) designing and realizing of a survey among spatial planning and real estate experts, and analyzing 
the survey data to be used for calibrating the TDR-ABM;
4) running the agent-based simulation and discussing the simulation results.
The results are summarized as recommendations for a potential implementation of such a program in 
Switzerland and thereby contributing to the public, and expert debates. 
Fig. 1-1: Main steps of the PhD-thesis (the numbers show the working step).
1.2 Structure and content of the thesis
The thesis is presented as a collection of three papers, which offers the possibility to consider each 
paper (chapter) independently. At the same time, the order of the papers logically follows the research 
process and progress, and hence each builds upon the other. The publication status is as follows: Paper 
1 has been submitted to the Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation and is currently ‘un-
der review’. Paper 2 has been submitted to the Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning and is 
currently ‘under review’. Paper 3 has been submitted to the Journal Environment and Planning B: 
Planning and Design and is currently ‘under review’.
5The first paper of the thesis, titled “TDR market concept and agent-based model” (chapter 2), pre-
sents both a TDR market concept for Switzerland and an agent-based model (ABM) for simulating the 
proposed TDR market (steps 1 and 2). The definition and elaboration of the presented market concept 
included a literature research of such programs, the investigation of relevant judicial and spatial situa-
tion in Switzerland, as well as two expert workshops. One of the workshops was with spatial planning 
and real estate experts7 and one with auction design specialists8. 
Based on the developed TDR market concept, the paper also presents an agent-based model for simu-
lating the TDR market (TDR-ABM). The advantage of an agent-based model – compared to e.g., a 
pure analytical method – is that it is possible to model individual decision-making and human behav-
ior (e.g. the degree of rationality, risk aversion, learning abilities etc.) which is essential to reflect the 
participation of heterogeneous participants in the TDR market.
The TDR-ABM9 distinguishes three general agent-types. Two agent-types represent landowners who 
can submit asks (sender agents) and bids (receiver agents) for TDR. The behavior of these agents de-
pends on the landowner category (e.g. enterprises, private persons etc.), though, in the first paper the 
behavior of the agents is not yet calibrated with empirical data (empirical calibration follows in paper 
3). The third agent-type stands for the TDR exchange platform. This agent is responsible for the com-
munication between the supply (sender agents) and demand (receiver agents) side of the market, and 
calculates the market clearing price according to the rules of a multi-unit (fixed TDR bundles) double 
auction with a uniform price. 
The performance of the developed model was tested with empirical data which was derived from ex-
isting studies on supply (cf. ARE, 2008) and future demand (cf. Fahrländer Partner, 2008) for building 
zones. Moreover, the same data were also used for a sensitivity analysis of selected parameters (prob-
ability to participate in the TDR market). However, in this first paper, the behavior (e.g. price determi-
nation and adaptation) of the agents was not calibrated with empirical data.
The second paper (chapter 3) titled “A survey of market participants to inform the TDR-ABM” pre-
sents the results of a questionnaire survey (mail and web based) for calibrating the TDR-ABM (step 
3). The survey was conducted to gather data for the calibration of the TDR-ABM. No other data were
available to draw on.
7 The workshop took place at ETH Zurich on 18 March 2010. Participants were experts from local authorities (Confedera-
tion/Canton/Municipality), banks, real estate companies, a planning association and academics. 
8 The auction design for the proposed TDR market has been elaborated in a small workshop at Karlsruhe Institute of Tech-
nology (KIT) on 30 September 2010. The auction design experts were: Prof. Stefan Seifert and Dr. Jens Müller (KIT).
9 The simulation has been programmed in Java with use of the free, and open source agent-based modeling and simulation 
platform Repast Simphony (http://repast.sourceforge.net, accessed: 2011-09-15).
6Because of the complex topic of transferable development rights and the lack of any public infor-
mation and debate about this instrument, it was decided to contact persons qualified in the field of 
spatial planning and real estate (called ‘professionals’ in what follows), instead of a random sample of 
all existing and potential landowners. Among the contacted persons four different landowner catego-
ries (e.g. enterprises, non-profit institutions, representatives of private persons, cooperatives) were 
distinguished, and each person addressed with a questionnaire represented either a potential seller or 
potential buyer of TDR. A special approach for this survey was that each single questionnaire stated a 
unique realistic situation description that suited the contacted landowner category. The numbers and 
details (e.g. parcel area, location etc.) for these descriptions were derived from existing land registry 
data and transaction data of undeveloped land parcels (building and agricultural zones). 
In order to obtain realistic and reliable data to inform the TDR-ABM, a plausibility test based on the 
theoretical TDR value was performed. These data were then analyzed with descriptive and analytical 
statistical methods in order to generate the parameters for the direct calibration of the TDR-ABM.
The third paper (chapter 4), titled “Results of the TDR market simulation” (step 4) presents the em-
pirically calibrated agent-based model (TDR-ABM) and the detailed simulation results. This paper is 
based on the work and findings of the other two papers (chapters 2 and 3), and as it discusses the ap-
plication of the proposed TDR market, it is the most interesting paper.
To get valuable economic and political results, five different model settings were simulated. This al-
lowed a number of economic values to be examined. It enabled showing the potential TDR supply and 
demand, the traded TDR quantity, as well as the TDR prices and overall financial volume under the 
different model settings. Moreover, it was – among other variants/issues – possible to investigate the 
impact of uncertainties, e.g., the uncertainties in the estimation of the participation probability parame-
ters.
As TDR trading period it was chosen to analyze the period 2013-2018 (end of 2017). No longer peri-
ods of time were analyzed due to potentially significant and unpredictable socio-economic changes 
(e.g. population growth) in the future.
In order to validate the simulation results, the obtained TDR prices were compared with current land 
prices. Moreover, it was analyzed how much land could be downzoned in the sending area, respective-
ly developed in the receiving area. By comparing these areas, it was possible to investigate the devel-
opment (increase, decrease) of the absolute building zone area in Switzerland, as well as in the canton 
of Valais. 
7On the basis of the findings of the three papers, chapter 5 provides general conclusions, proposes 
ideas for further research, and summarizes general recommendations and factors of success for a 
potential implementation of a TDR market in Switzerland.
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92 TDR market concept and agent-based model
Abstract: In Switzerland, since the 1940s the development of settlement has been perceived as an important 
problem in geospatial planning. There is general agreement that current spatial planning instruments are inade-
quate to combat the unsustainable growth of land use and urban sprawl. A recent public initiative (‘landscape
initiative’) and the plan to revise the federal planning law also highlight the need for regulations and innovative 
instruments to tackle these problems. Among such instruments are 'transferable development rights' (TDR).
The aim of this paper is to present both a TDR market design for Switzerland and an agent-based model (ABM) 
for simulating the proposed TDR market. We distinguish three types of agents in our model: two agent types 
representing landowners who submit bids and asks (requests) for TDR, and an agent type representing a TDR 
exchange platform. The ABM simulates the trading of multiple units of TDR at fixed package sizes (TDR bun-
dles) according to the rules of a multi-unit double auction with a uniform price. 
In order to evaluate the performance of the developed model and the sensitivity of selected parameters, we 
tested it with empirical data from Switzerland. The results of a performance analysis show that the model works 
well with a high number of agents and the sensitivity analysis show that the resulting prices do not over- or 
undershoot, even with low participation rates.
Keywords: Transferable development rights (TDR), TDR market, Agent Based Modeling (ABM), market sim-
ulation, multi-unit double auction, market clearing price
*This chapter is a slightly amended version of the paper “Simulating a market for transferable development rights (TDR) with 
agent-based modeling” written by Gianluca Menghini, Fabian Gemperle and Irmi Seidl. The paper has been submitted to the 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation and is currently ‘under review’. The authors would like to thank the 
Swiss National Science Foundation for funding the project (K-21K1-1224), Wüest und Partner AG, the Cantons of Zurich, 
Thurgau and Fribourg for providing various data sets on building and agricultural land, and Veronika Killer from the Institute 
for Transport Planning and Systems (IVT) at ETH Zurich for the assistance in data preparation. Moreover, we thank Prof. 
K.W. Axhausen, also from IVT at ETH Zurich for his valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
*
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2.1 Introduction
In Switzerland, between 1979 and 2009 the settlement area has increased by 23.5%10. Most of the 
expansion occurs in the form of urban sprawl and takes place on the Swiss Plateau, where it has re-
sulted in a large loss of farmland (IRL 2003). This expansion is mainly due to economic growth and 
changes in lifestyle. It has been shown that urban sprawl has negative consequences in at least three 
areas: for the environment, infrastructure costs, and energy consumption (Baumgartner 2005; Brown-
stone and Golob 2009; Ewing 2008).
Particularly problematic is the extent of the building zones: of the approximately 227,000 hectares 
(developed and undeveloped; cf. Fig. 2-1), 38,000 to 53,000 hectares (17 to 24%) have in fact not been 
developed (ARE 2008). These undeveloped building zone areas that are mostly located in working and 
residential areas could provide space for about two million additional inhabitants according to 
Fahrländer Partner (2008) and ARE (2005). Switzerland has a present population of approximately 8 
million inhabitants.
Fig. 2-1: Situation of the building zones in Switzerland (own figure, data: ARE, 2008).
10 Results of the Areal Statistics 1979/85 – 2004/09 (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/02/03.html, ac-
cessed: 2012-11-02). In the results of the year 2004/2009, the Canton of Graubünden has not yet been included.
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Besides their extent, the location of these undeveloped zones is a problem. As Fig. 2-2 shows, there 
are significant differences in supply and demand for these zones, with high demand in the major cen-
ters and along major transport routes, which is expected to significantly exceed the current reserves. At 
the same time, municipalities far away from the centers dispose of areas of undeveloped building 
zones that significantly exceed the expected demand for the next twenty years. Another problematic 
aspect is that only 30% of the building zones (both developed and undeveloped) are well connected to 
public transport (ARE 2008).
Fig. 2-2: Location and size of undeveloped building zones (green) and future demand of building 
zones (residential zones) (red) for 2005 – 2030 as modeled by Fahrländer Partner (2008).
The major reasons for the large building zones are twofold: first, in Switzerland each of the approxi-
mately 2,500 municipalities has the right to designate the building zones within its area. The incentive 
to increase the area of these zones is strong as new settlements promise new tax revenues. Second, the 
Swiss Federal Act of 22 June 1979 on Spatial Planning has not been followed as it requires that unde-
veloped building zones should not be greater than the anticipated demand for the next 15 years (Art. 
15) (ARE, 2006; Gmünder, 2004).
The high rate of land usage and the extent of still undeveloped building zones clearly goes against the 
principles for economical land use as specified in Art. 1 of the Swiss Federal Act of 22 June 1979 on 
Spatial Planning. Hence, there is general agreement that the current spatial planning instruments are 
12
insufficient and that innovative methods to reduce land usage and urban sprawl are needed (ARE,
2006; Süess and Gmünder, 2005; Zollinger, 2006). Various incentive-based tools are currently being 
discussed (cf. e.g. Gmünder 2004, 2010) of which ‘transferable development rights’ (TDR) appear 
quite promising, given the problems to be solved.
The TDR instrument is not well-known in Switzerland and there is little political willingness to im-
plement such an instrument without research proving its worth, both in how it functions and the effects 
it has (Gmünder, 2010). A simulation based on a reflected TDR program for Switzerland and explor-
ing the possible impacts can provide very useful information and inform the political discussion about 
TDR implementation in Switzerland. 
Spatial modeling and simulation have recently become standard approaches in land-use change re-
search (cf. e.g. Lesschen et al., 2005; Parker et al., 2002; Torrens, 2010). However, the modelers have 
generally not considered the human behavioral component when establishing their models. As a result, 
these models do not clarify the human component resulting only in the identification of land develop-
ment patterns rather than suggesting guidelines for political measures. Both aspects - individual deci-
sion-making and human behavior - are considered in agent-based models. Hence, this kind of model is 
suitable for modeling a TDR market.
In the first section of this chapter we briefly explain the concept of Transferable Development Rights 
(TDR). We describe where and how TDR have been used so far and how they could be used in Swit-
zerland11. We then discuss agent-based modeling concepts and in particular agent-based land-use 
models. Next, we illustrate the details of the proposed agent-based model for simulating a TDR market 
in Switzerland. In order to evaluate the model, we present results of a performance and sensitivity 
analysis with selected empirical data and parameters. We conclude with a discussion of the proposed 
TDR market and the corresponding agent-based model, with a summary of the most important find-
ings and suggestions for future work. 
11 However, it is not the aim of the paper to explain the advantages and disadvantages of a TDR program. Information about 
TDR programs can be found e.g. in Kaplowitz et al. (2008) or Pruetz (2003). More information on spatial planning in Swit-
zerland can be found in VLP-ASPAN (n.s.).
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2.2 TDR: application, markets and modeling
2.2.1 Definition and the basic concept of TDR 
Definition
Transferable development rights (TDR)12 are a quantity-controlling, economic instrument based on the 
concept of tradable usable resources (or emissions). Overall, environmental economic instruments can 
be divided into two kinds: fiscal (taxes, fees) and quantity-control (tradable permits, rights, quotas). 
The latter aims to reduce the environmental impact by only allowing a pre-determined amount of usa-
ble resources (or emissions, land etc.). The price of the permits depends on supply and demand in the 
corresponding market.
Another basis of TDR is the bundle-of-rights theory, which maintains that ownership of a parcel of 
real estate may entail many different rights, including the right to its occupancy and use, the right to 
sell it in whole or in part, or the right to transfer it by contract for specified periods of time (Mann and 
Barber, 2007). These rights, subject to government limitations and private restrictions, can be sold, 
leased, transferred, or otherwise disposed of individually.
Basic TDR concept
A TDR program can be designed as a so-called single-zone or dual-zone program. In a single-zone 
program, anyone within the program area can - after the initial allocation - buy or sell rights. In con-
trast, in a dual-zone program, both sending and receiving zones are defined. Rights/permits can be sold 
from the sending zone and bought within the receiving zone (Chomitz, 2004; Johnston and Madison,
1997).
A possible TDR dual-zone program is illustrated in Fig. 2-3. Landowners in so-called ‘sending areas’ 
(here: municipality A) can sell their rights to develop a parcel to landowners in ‘receiving areas’ (here: 
municipality B). The former are areas in which development is not demanded or should be prevented; 
the latter are areas in which development is desired. The TDR market price represents a compensation 
for the loss of benefits (being able to develop) caused by the downzoning (reducing the zoning of land 
from building to agricultural zone) of parcels in the sending area. TDR trade may be managed by 
‘credit banks’, which act as buying and selling mediators and provide market platforms (Kopits et al.,
2005).
12 In the scientific literature also known as ‘Tradable Development Rights’, ‘Transferable Development Credits’ (TDC) or 
‘Transferable Title Rights’ (TTR) (Pruetz, 2003).
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Source: (ARE, 2008) (assumption: 17% undeveloped)
Fig. 2-3: The concept of transferable development rights (TDR); Gmünder (2010), modified figure.
2.2.2 TDR programs in various countries
The application of transferable development rights is widespread in the United States. According to 
Pruetz (2003), in early 2000, there were 142 TDR programs of all sizes in 32 different States. The 
goals of these programs range from the conservation of agricultural land, the protection of ecologically 
valuable regions to the limitation of the heights of buildings or the preservation of sites of historic 
interest in urban areas.
TDR programs can be designed to involve compulsory or voluntarily participation. The programs in 
the USA have shown that compulsory programs tend to be more successful in reaching the stated ob-
jectives. However, the voluntary programs had fewer problems gaining political acceptance (Johnston 
and Madison, 1997). 
The most successful program in the USA is in Montgomery County, Maryland (Janssen-Jansen et al.,
2008; Kopits et al., 2005; Pruetz, 2003). The main goal of the program was to preserve Montgomery 
County’s primary rural character and farmland, and 110,000 acres were designated as a ‘sending area’ 
for that purpose. This area, called the Agricultural Reserve, makes up more than one third of the Coun-
ty’s total land area. The farmers in the Reserve were able to sell TDR as compensation for discontinu-
ing some potential development. Likewise, a ‘receiving area’ with higher development potential was 
identified. The landowners in this area could increase the original development potential by purchas-
ing TDR. As a result, 17,000 acres of cultivated and uncultivated land was saved and received long 
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term protection. Yet, not all TDR programs have been as successful as the one in Maryland (Kopits et 
al., 2005; Pruetz, 2003). There are five possible reasons for some programs failing: voluntary partici-
pation (no obligation), not enough demand in the receiving area, lack of a TDR bank guaranteeing 
transparency, mismanagement of the program, and insufficient knowledge of the land market while 
designing the program (Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002).
Outside the USA, TDR programs have been designed and partly applied in Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Latin America, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain and New Zealand. 
Yet, the instrument is still not very widespread in these countries and it has been used for a range of 
purposes: in cities to increase the building density and to protect monuments; in rural areas to control 
land use, to compensate reduced development possibilities, and to preserve natural areas (Chomitz,
2004; de Kam and Lubach, 2007; Gibson, 1996; Henger and Bizer, 2010; Janssen-Jansen, 2008; 
Kaplowitz et al., 2008; Micelli, 2002; Radermacher et al., 2004; Renard, 1999).
2.2.3 Proposal: TDR market design for Switzerland
This section shows what a TDR market design for Switzerland could look like and how data for its 
implementation and modeling could be prepared.
Swiss peculiarities to be considered in a TDR market
TDR programs originally devised for the US or other countries are not applicable because in Switzer-
land there are a specific spatial planning system and situations resulting from that. One peculiarity is 
the existence of large, still undeveloped building zones, most of which could be developed immediate-
ly (ARE, 2008). However, these zones typically lie in regions with no or little demand for develop-
ment (cf. Fig. 2-2). According to Swiss law downzoning the status of such building zones into agricul-
tural land for instance, would mean expropriating the owner, who would then have to be fully com-
pensated. Hardly any municipality in Switzerland would have the financial means to do this. 
Another peculiarity is that landowners typically do not achieve the development density permitted by 
law. For example, in the Canton of Zurich, it is only 66% of the currently permitted gross floor area 
(Kanton Zürich, 2009). Thus, there is potential to build much more densely, and increasing density to 
the legal limit would not require TDR programs. 
These specifically Swiss features suggest that TDR could be applied to allow for an exchange of exist-
ing reserves with areas where there is a high demand for building zones. Such an exchange would 
prevent designating new additional building zones. Consequently, with the support of spatial planning 
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and real estate experts13 we recommend implementing the TDR instrument as a dual-zone program, 
specifying both a ‘sending’ and a ‘receiving area’, and capping the existing building zones (following 
the cap-and-trade principle). 
Note that the TDR described here involve trading a development opportunity (construction right), 
which can be transferred from one parcel of land to another. Before doing so, the sending and receiv-
ing areas have to be designated. In contrast, tradable planning permits (TPP), e.g. in Germany, involve 
trading permits to designate new building zones. Municipalities have to buy TPP, allocated by the 
planning authority, in order to be able to designate new building zones (Henger and Bizer, 2010; Seidl 
et al., 2009).
The aim of a Swiss TDR program is to sell as many TDR as possible and to have land costs that are 
close to the existing costs (prices) for building land (before TDR introduction).
Characteristics of the sending and receiving area
The sending area consists of undeveloped building zone parcels, which can then be downzoned in 
accordance with existing Swiss spatial planning principles. Parcels in sending areas are characterized 
by the following characteristics. They are:
- without or with only limited infrastructure (e.g. streets, electricity, water); 
- without good public transport connections;
- close to protected natural areas;
- parcels that spatially separate two or more nearby conservation areas.
The receiving area consists of land parcels not designated as building zones, which, however should 
be developed in the future, in accordance with Swiss spatial planning principles. Parcels in the receiv-
ing area have one or more of the following characteristics. They are:
- adjacent to existing building zones;
- unbuilt sections between settled areas, provided they are not yet building zones;
- parcels that can be easily provided with infrastructure (e.g. streets, electricity, water) at low 
cost;
- parcels with good or potentially easily established public transport connections.
13 The TDR concept was presented and discussed at an expert workshop in Zurich (ETH Zurich) on March 18, 2010. The 
goal of the workshop was to present the concept to experts (local authorities (Confederation/Canton/Municipality), banks, 
real estate companies etc.) and to implement their ideas and suggestions.
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Designating the sending and receiving area
Ideally, the decision on the extent and location of the sending and receiving parcels will be derived 
from digital cadastral data and based on planning considerations. Unfortunately, digital cadastral data 
at parcel level does not exist for the whole of Switzerland. Furthermore, at this point of time it is not 
possible to consider all required characteristics of sending and receiving areas (cf. section above) in 
their designation due to incomplete data. Instead, in our modeling the results of the study of 
Fahrländer Partner (2008) are used. Fahrländer Partner (2008) calculated the future demand for build-
ing zones based on different scenarios and gathered information on the current reserves of undevel-
oped building zones at municipality level in Switzerland. Based on their data, it is possible to define 
the quantity of sending and receiving areas for each municipality until 2020. Those areas are then di-
vided into smaller parts, so that the resultant parts represent realistic parcel sizes. This division is done 
by using a database on building zone parcels (based on 91,000 transactions over the last 20 years) as 
an empirical example (Wüest und Partner AG, 2011) and digital cadastral data from the Cantons of 
Zurich and Thurgau.
The above mentioned database is also used to statistically estimate the utilization factor per parcel. In 
Switzerland, the utilization factor UF determines – together with the parcel area – the legally allowed 
floor area per building zone parcel and thus the quantity of TDR per parcel. The values for the UF lie 
between approximately 0.1 for rural areas and 1.3 for urban areas. In order to calculate the allowed 
gross floor area on a building zone parcel, this factor has to be multiplied with the parcel area (cf. eq.
2-1)
Additionally, we assign to the individual parcels different landowner categories. This is done by using 
land registry data of various municipalities in the Canton of Grisons, as well as transaction data of 
undeveloped land parcels (building and agricultural zones) of the Cantons of Zurich and Fribourg.
Designing a TDR, allocation and trading principles
The equation used to define the number of TDR per parcel is:
q = A * UF (2-1)
where q is the quantity of TDR per parcel, A is the parcel area, and UF the utilization factor.
There is a primary free allocation for the landowners in the sending area (called ‘senders’ or ‘sender 
agents’)14. The senders may choose to sell their awarded TDR.
14 The free allocation of the TDR to the present landowners is known as ‚grandfathering principle‘.
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The landowners in the receiving area (called ‘receivers’ or ‘receiver agents’) need to buy a certain 
number of TDR to be allowed to develop their parcel. The number of TDR they need will depend on 
the parcels’ size and the utilization factor (cf. eq. 2-1). 
In order to promote high density development in the receiving area and full compensation of the loss 
of the development possibility in the sending area, both the receivers and senders can only sell/buy the 
TDR per parcel as a whole (called ‘TDR bundle’)15. This restriction has the additional advantage of 
reducing the number of transactions, which in turn reduces the overall transaction costs16. The chosen 
auction mechanism will be described in the next section and section 2.3.4.
Trading mechanism and trading process
The trading of the TDR will take place on a TDR platform (called ‘TDR bank’) according to the rules 
of a multi-unit double auction (MDA) with a uniform price17. MDAs are frequently employed in stock 
markets and also for auctioning emission permits (cf. e.g. trading mechanism in the European Energy 
Exchange EEX18). 
Here, the choice of MDA shall not be explained by discussing the various forms of auctions19, howev-
er, one important reason for applying a MDA with a uniform price and not e.g. a two-sided Vickrey 
auction may be mentioned: as the market players (here: senders and receivers) can own more than one 
parcel of land and therefore participate with more than one order (asks and bids) in the market, a two-
sided Vickrey auction would not be efficient20. This is because in Vickrey’s (1961) considerations, the 
market players are only allowed to make one order for the sake of truthfulness. In the case of TDR and 
for the society as a whole, efficiency is one of the key goals and more important than maximizing the 
individual revenue. If the latter is a goal, other auction would be applied (Krishna, 2002). 
Applied to the TDR market, the trading works as follows (cf. Fig. 2-4): the senders who want to par-
ticipate in the market, post an ask (request) with their desired price per TDR, and the receivers who 
15 The receivers have to buy TDR for the maximum allowable gross floor area. This is an incentive for high density develop-
ment. The rules have been elaborated and defined in a workshop with spatial planning and real estate experts (cf. also foot-
note 35).
16 We mean costs associated with the exchange of goods or services, including information, negotiation, communication and
control costs.
17 One-sided auctions (e.g. English auction, Dutch auction etc.) would not be suitable for the trade of TDR, because both 
sellers (senders) and buyers (receivers) should have the opportunity to submit their price expectations through asks and bids, 
as in a MDA (multi-unit double auction which is a two-sided auction).
18 http://www.eex.com, accessed: 2011-10-13.
19 Further information on auction theory and applications can be found e.g. in Huang et al., 2002; Klemperer, 2004; Krishna, 
2002; McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Vickrey, 1961.
20 According to Krishna (2002), ‘efficiency‘ in an auction means that the object (here: TDR) ends up in the hands of the 
person who values it the most.
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want to participate in the market, post a bid with the price they are willing to pay for the TDR they 
need. Then, at the end of the trading period (representing one year, explanation follows), the asks are 
sorted by price in ascending, the bids in descending order, and the market clearing price is calculated: 
it is the price at the intersection of the ask- respectively bid-curve (cf. Fig. 2-4 and Fig. 2-7). The 
senders with an ask price below or equal the market clearing price and the receivers with a bid price 
above or equal the market clearing price are successful traders. All the other market participants are 
unsuccessful and have the opportunity to participate in the next auction with probably adapted ask-
respectively bid-prices (cf. adaptation in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). 
Fig. 2-4: TDR auction.
For an implementation of a TDR program, we propose running two rounds of five auctions each, with 
one year between each auction. The total time required to action five auctions should be sufficient for 
the municipalities to adapt their zoning plans for the next round. Furthermore, it is proposed that the 
municipalities designate sending and receiving areas by parcels and in given intervals. This should 
prevent a rampant building boom in the receiving area, and hence the supply and demand should be 
kept in balance. 
Fig. 2-5 summarizes and illustrates the main steps and the procedure involved in a TDR program in 
Switzerland.
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Fig. 2-5: Main steps and procedure of the TDR program in Switzerland.
2.2.4 Agent-based modeling
The following paragraph will briefly introduce agent-based modeling and in particular it will discuss 
relevant applications of agent-based land-use models.
Agent-based modeling is a simulation instrument which has raised strong interest in the last two dec-
ades (cf. e.g. Batty, 2005; Berger et al., 2002; Gilbert, 2007; Hurtubia, 2012; North and Macal, 2007; 
Parker et al., 2002). ABM, as applied to social processes, uses concepts and tools from both the social 
and computer sciences. It represents a methodological approach that permits advancement in two im-
portant scientific endeavors: 1) the testing, refinement, and extension of existing theories that have 
proved to be difficult to formulate and evaluate using standard statistics and mathematics; and 2) a 
deeper understanding of fundamental causal mechanisms in multi-agent systems (MAS), the study of 
which is currently separated by artificial disciplinary boundaries (North and Macal, 2007; Parker et al.,
2002). The multi-agent systems facilitate the consideration of inter-agent linkages as well as linkages 
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between agents and the environment, thus allowing for the modeling of highly dynamic and complex 
processes. This high complexity is due to the fact that each agent (representing e.g. a landowner) is an 
individual entity who shares information and negotiates with the other agents in a defined scenario. 
Contrary to the traditional top-down modeling approaches, ABM is bottom-up, and the researcher 
defines behavioral rules at the agent level (cf. e.g. Deadman et al., 2004). Such rules often refer to the 
utility-function of agents (cf. North and Macal, 2007). When the simulation runs, the researchers ob-
serve the agents’ behavior over time and its effect for instance on the agents environment. This ap-
proach provides an improved understanding of the interplay between individual decision-making and 
aggregated outcomes. 
The simulation of a TDR market can be classified as ABM related to land use. According to Matthews 
et al. (2007) the ABLUMs (Agent-based land-use models) can be categorized in five broad areas of 
application: 1) policy analysis and planning (cf. e.g. Happe et al., 2006), 2) participatory modeling (cf. 
e.g. D'Aquino et al., 2003), 3) explaining spatial patterns of land use or settlement (cf. e.g. Parker and 
Meretsky, 2004), 4) testing social and economic science concepts (cf. e.g. Polhill et al., 2001), and 5) 
modeling land use functions (cf. e.g. An et al., 2005).
Our model, which simulates a land market21, belongs to the third and fourth categories. A model that 
captures a similar topic to ours is the ALMA (Agent-based Land MArket) model developed by 
Filatova et al. (2009). These authors link the advantage of geographic cellular land use models with 
the strengths of economic models such as bid and ask price formation models. There are several aims, 
of which four are particularly relevant: modeling the behavioral drivers of land-market transactions 
and the ensuing formation of bid and ask prices, the analysis of the relative gains from trade resulting 
from the market transactions, and of outputs with macro-scale economic and landscape patterns. 
The model that we develop is different as the spatial component is – instead of a regular grid of cells –
implicitly implemented in the model through geographically assigned data (e.g. cf. section 2.2.3). Fur-
thermore, it uses empirical data regarding willingness to pay (WTP) resp. willingness to accept (WTA) 
instead of theoretical assumptions about prices. Finally, the price negotiation is not bilateral, it is ra-
ther based on a multi-unit double auction price mechanism with a uniform price.
Besides the abovementioned examples of application areas of ABLUMs, there exist several further 
models for examining the influence of agents on urban land-use dynamics and land markets (cf. e.g. 
Brown and Robinson, 2006; Magliocca et al., 2011; Parker and Filatova, 2008; Polhill et al., 2008 or 
21 The reasons for modeling markets, particularly land markets, are explained at length by Parker and Filatova (2008). Further 
and more detailed information about overall market design for ABM can be found in Marks (2006), general information on 
agent-based models can be found in Gilbert (2007) or North and Macal (2007).
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Robinson and Brown, 2009). However, such models have not been used to simulate a TDR market and 
to analyze the economic and land use impact. Our proposed model is designed so that it can fill this 
gap by producing an ABM simulating those markets in Switzerland. 
2.3 Agent-based model for a Swiss TDR market 
In this section we will describe the details involved with properties, initialization, behavior and adapta-
tion of the agent-based model for simulating a TDR market in Switzerland (abbreviated ‘TDR-ABM’). 
No particular agent based model description template has been used.
2.3.1 Types of agents, their properties and their interplay
In the simulation model22 there are three basic types of agents, which are specified separately in sub-
sequent sections: senders, representing landowners in the sending area, receivers, representing land-
owners in the receiving area, and one trading agent, representing the market platform.
The properties of each agent are stored in state variables during the simulation in discrete time steps t 
= 1, 2, …, n. In the first step t = 1 the state variables are initialized. Then, in each iteration t ( includ-
ing the first) the agents behave according to the currently stored values in their state variables, that is, 
they take an appropriate action. After acting, each agent adapts its state variables and thus its behavior 
for the subsequent iteration.
The agent interplay and main actions have been outlined conceptually in section 2.2.3 and are illustrat-
ed as a concrete ABM in Fig. 2-6 along with:
- all agent states23 (agent-internal memory to remember what to do subsequently, i.e. in t+1);
- transitions between the states;
- schedule (indicated by ‘wait until t + 1’).
Note that ‘offerers’ are sender agents having decided to send, and ‘bidders’ are receiver agents having 
decided to receive. Furthermore, ‘market clearing’ means determining the price and quantity at the 
intersection of the cumulated ask- and bid-curve. Since sender and receiver agents do not depend di-
rectly on each other within one iteration t, each of their ‘initialization’, ‘decision’, ‘action’ and ‘adap-
tation’ can be scheduled arbitrarily, for instance in random order.
22 The simulation has been programmed in Java with use of the free, and open source agent-based modeling and simulation 
platform Repast Simphony (http://repast.sourceforge.net, accessed: 2012-09-15). The code can be obtained by contacting 
Gianluca Menghini. For a screenshot of the programmed simulation see: Fig. A-1.
23 Not to be confused with state variables as a general term. The ‘agent state’ is one of the agent’s state variables.
23
Fig. 2-6: Agent’s states and transitions, actions and communication for some iteration t.
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2.3.2 Sender agents
In sections 2.3.2 to 2.3.4 information relevant for the simulation is presented in detail. This presenta-
tion follows the three agent types and includes the four categories ‘state variables’, ‘initialization’, 
‘behavior’ and ‘adaptation’.
State variables 
Sender and receiver agents are characterized by the following state variables (properties displayed in
Table 2-1):
Table 2-1: State variables of sender and receiver agents (differing variables of sender and receiver 
agents are highlighted in grey).
Sender agents Receiver agents
Parcel-ID: ID ∈ ℕ Parcel-ID: ID ∈ ℕ
Landowner category: C ∈ {„Corporation/Limited Liability 
Partnership”, “Bank/Insurance Company”, “Confedera-
tion/Canton/Municipality”, “Individual/Married Cou-
ple/Simple Partnership”, “Coopera-
tive/Association/Foundation/Pension Fund”, “Others/rest”}
Landowner category: C ∈ {„Corporation/Limited Liability 
Partnership”, “Bank/Insurance Company”, “Confedera-
tion/Canton/Municipality”, “Individual/Married Cou-
ple/Simple Partnership”, “Coopera-
tive/Association/Foundation/Pension Fund”, “Others/rest”}
Parcel area: A ∈ ℝ  Parcel area: A ∈ ℝ 
Utilization factor: UF ∈ ℝ  Utilization factor: UF ∈ ℝ 
Building land price per square meter (in municipality): 
BLP ∈ ℝ 
Building land price per square meter (in municipality): 
BLP ∈ ℝ 
Agricultural land price per square meter (in municipality): 
ALP ∈ ℝ 
Agricultural land price per square meter (in municipality): 
ALP ∈ ℝ 
Willingness to accept (minimum price per TDR): 
WTA ∈ ℝ 
Willingness to pay (maximum price per TDR): 
WTP ∈ ℝ 
Current Agent state:
s ∈ {„notyetsending“, „sending“, „sent“}
Current Agent state: 
s ∈ {„notyetreceiving“, „receiving“, „received“}
Quantity of TDR to sell: q ∈ ℕ  Quantity of TDR to buy: q ∈ ℕ 
Probability to enter into the sending and trading process: 
psend ∈ [0,1] ⊂ ℝ   Probability to enter into the receiving and trading process: preceive ∈ [0,1] ⊂ ℝ  
Current ask price per TDR:
pask∈ ℝ , where pask ≥ WTA
Current bid price per TDR: 
pbid∈ ℝ , where pbid ≤ WTP 
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Ask price initialization factor: i ∈ ℝ  Bid price initialization factor: i ∈ ℝ 
Ask price adaptation factor: a ∈ ℝ  Bid price adaptation factor: a ∈ ℝ 
Note the distinction between variable names in upper and lower case: the former (upper case) point to 
a constant property (initialized once and unchanged during the simulation) and the latter denote either 
working variables (changed throughout the simulation) or model parameters (fixed or subject to sensi-
tivity analysis within this paper).
Initialization 
Note that paragraph titles within the following sub-sections (up to section 2.4) refer to the ‘key ac-
tions’ highlighted in Fig. 2-6.
initialize (cf. Fig. 2-6)
In the very first iteration sender agents’ state variables need to be initialized. Data for variables ID, C, 
A, UF, BLP and ALP are imported directly from a text file24 which essentially contains the data de-
scribed in section 2.2.3 in the format as illustrated in Table A-1 (cf. appendix A; each row represents 
one agent with its properties). The remaining state variables are calculated endogenously in the simu-
lation or proposed for sensitivity analysis. 
s :=„notyetsending“ (2-2)
All the sender agents start in the state „notyetsending“: the quantity of TDR initially allocated to a 
parcel and thus to a sender (cf. section 2.2.3) is determined by:
q := A * UF (2-3)
with given parcel area A and utilization factor UF. 
WTA represents the minimum compensation, that a sender wants to receive for the loss of the devel-
opment opportunity on its parcel and is calculated (as a price per TDR) by: 
WTA := (BLP – ALP) * A / q (2-4)
using the difference in the value of a building zone (before TDR sale; BLP) and an agricultural zone 
parcel (after TDR sale; ALP) in the corresponding municipality (cf. also eq. 3-1). Note that in a further 
version this calculation will be adapted with the results obtained by an empirical study25. 
For the sake of simplicity and assuming all landowners seek to make some profit, the initial ask price 
is set to 110 percent of WTA: 
24 We choose to store all agent data row-wise in text files for the sake of software independence and in order to spatially 
connect them in a straight-forward way using a Geographic Information System – e.g. by joining through the parcel-ID.
26
pask := WTA * (1+i) (2-5)
i := 0.1 (2-6)
where i is assumed equal for all senders in this article, but could be specified for each landowner cate-
gory separately25. If a sender agent is not successful with its initial ask price, it is decreased using a 
random ask price adaptation factor (further specified in sub-section adaptation):
a ∈ [0.02, 0.04] (2-7)
So far there is no empirical experience or data about the probability psend to enter the sending and trad-
ing process (for each landowner category). Its variation is part of the parameter sensitivity analysis in 
section 2.4.2 (cf. also Fig. A-3 in the appendix A) and is initialized as follows:
psend ∈ [0, 1] (2-8)
Behavior 
decide (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Before each auction, all sender agents in the state of ‘notyetsending’ decide whether to enter in the 
sending process or not. In the present implementation this decision is based on a simple random mod-
el: with probability psend an agent starts sending in the current iteration t (state transition to ‘sending’), 
otherwise it repeats deciding in t+1.
offer (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Once a sender agent has decided to enter into the sending process and thus is in state ‘sending’, it
submits an offer for a bundle of q TDR with a price pask per TDR in every iteration until successful. 
finalize (cf. Fig. 2-6)
After having made an offer, sender agents wait for the answer of the trading agent in the same itera-
tion. If the TDR bundle has not been traded (or just partly in the special case of a split, cf. section
2.3.4), the agent continues offering in the next iteration with an adapted ask price. However, in case of 
success it finalizes, that is, changes its state to ‘sent’ and calculates its surplus according to (cf. also
Fig. 2-7):
sur := (pclear – WTA) * q (2-9)
where pclear is the market clearing price (cf. section 2.3.4) and WTA the minimum price per TDR re-
quired by the landowner.
25 At this point of the work, the initialization of these values is set; empirical values will be collected through a survey (cf. 
chapter 3).
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Note that in the present model each landowner category behaves (and initializes and adapts) the same 
way. However, in later versions of the TDR-ABM it is intended to define individual sender behavior 
rules for each landowner category C, which we model using inheritance in object-oriented fashion: 
every sender agent gets a subtype according to C – with its own category-specific definition of the 
initialization, decision and adaptation model (other behavior is identical among all landowners). 
Adaptation
adapt (cf. Fig. 2-6)
If a sender agent’s offer has not been traded successfully (ask price is too high or TDR are just partly 
sold in the special case of a split, cf. section 2.3.4), it recalculates the current ask price pask according 
to the following adaptation model:
pask := max(pask * (1 - a) , WTA) (2-10)
where a corresponds to the ask price adaptation factor introduced in equation 2-7 and is allocated a 
random number based on the real interval between 2 and 4 percent (sampled anew in every iteration). 
When an agent decided to send and thus is in state ‘sending’, it participates in the whole auction pro-
cess and adapts its ask price until the agent’s specific WTA is reached. For the sake of simplicity, the 
values for a are chosen so that the adapted ask prices lie close to WTA after 5 auctions. 
2.3.3 Receiver agents
State variables 
The state variables of the receiver agents are listed in Table 2-1. 
Initialization
initialize (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Similar to the sender case, data for the receiver agents’ variables ID, C, A, UF, BLP and ALP are im-
ported directly from the same text file (cf. Table A-1 in the appendix A) into the TDR-ABM, and the 
remaining state variables are calculated endogenously in the simulation or proposed for the sensitivity 
analysis:
s :=„notyetreceiving“ (2-11)
q := A * UF (2-12)
WTP := (BLP - ALP) * A / q (2-13)
pbid := WTP * (1 - i) (2-14)
i := 0.1 (2-15)
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a ∈ [0.02, 0.04] (2-16)
preceive ∈ [0, 1] (2-17)
The willingness to pay WTP is calculated in the same way and with the same considerations as for the 
sender agents. In equations 14 and 15 it is assumed that the receiver agents start with a price equal to 
90 percent of their WTP. If a receiver agent is not successful with its initial bid price, it is randomly 
increased via a random bid price adaptation factor, which is further specified in section 2.3.3 (sub-
section adaptation).
The initial value of all other state variables like preceive are chosen in the same way as for the sender 
agents.
Behavior
decide (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Before each auction, all receiver agents in state ‘notyetreceiving’ decide whether to enter in the receiv-
ing process or not. In the present implementation this decision is based on a simple random model: 
with probability preceive an agent starts sending in current iteration t (state transition to ‘sending’), oth-
erwise it repeats deciding in t+1.
bid (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Once a receiver agent has decided to enter into the receiving process and thus is in state ‘receiving’, it 
submits a bid for a bundle of q TDR with a price pbid per TDR in every iteration until successful.
finalize (cf. Fig. 2-6)
After having made a bid, receiver agents wait for the answer of the trading agent in the same iteration. 
If the TDR bundle has not been traded (or just partly in the special case of a split, cf. section 2.3.4), the 
agent repeats bidding in the next iteration with an adapted bid price. However, in the case of success it 
finalizes, that is, changes its state to ‘received’ and calculates its surplus according to (cf. also Fig. 
2-7):
sur := (WTP - pclear) * q (2-18)
where pclear is the market clearing price (cf. section 2.3.4) and WTP the maximum price per TDR the 
landowner is willing to pay. 
Note that also the receiver agents so far behave all the same (but could be specified individually for 
instance depending on landowner category C). 
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Adaptation
adapt (cf. Fig. 2-6)
If a receiver agent’s bid has not been traded successfully (the price is too low or TDR are just partly 
bought in the special case of a split, cf. section 2.3.4), it recalculates the current bid price pbid according 
to the following adaptation model:
pbid := min(pbid * (1+ a) , WTP) (2-19)
where a corresponds to the bid price adaptation factor introduced in equation 16 and is allocated a 
random number based on the real interval between 2 and 4 percent (sampled anew in every iteration). 
When an agent has decided to receive and thus is in state ‘receiving’, it participates in the whole auc-
tion process and adapts its bid price until the agent’s specific WTP is reached. For the sake of simplici-
ty, the values for a are chosen so that the adapted bid prices lie close to WTP after 5 auctions. 
2.3.4 Trading agent – the auctioneer
State variables
The trading agent is characterized by various state variables which are mostly used for intermediate 
calculation steps. However, four variables are of particular importance since they represent the macro-
economic outcome of each trading cycle and provide an aggregated view of all offering and bidding 
agents:
- Market clearing price: pclear ∈ ℝ 
- Total quantity of TDR supply: qsupply ∈ ℕ 
- Total quantity of TDR demand: qdemand ∈ ℕ 
- Total quantity of TDR sold: qtrade ∈ ℕ 
Initialization 
initialize (cf. Fig. 2-6)
The state variables of the trading agent are all initialized with zero. 
Behavior 
In accordance with the principle of an MDA, the trading agent calculates the market clearing price (cf. 
Fig. 2-6 and Fig. 2-7) and ensures the communication between the supply (sender agents) and demand 
side (receiver agents). The following processes are repeated in each auction:
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sort asks and bids (cf. Fig. 2-6)
After submission of all asks and bids (hereinafter also referred to as ‘orders’), the trading agent sorts 
the orders according to their price. Asks are sorted ascending, bids descending. 
market clearing (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Then the trading agent calculates the market clearing price pclear. It is the price at the intersection of the 
demand and supply curve (cf. Fig. 2-7). 
In the majority of cases, the calculation of the market clearing price is not possible without splitting up 
the last successful order. The reason for this fact is the different sizes of the traded TDR bundles. Fig. 
2-7 illustrates the situation of splitting up the last successful order of a sender agent. In such a case, the 
affected agent participates automatically in the subsequent auction with the part of its TDR bundle 
being left and with an adapted ask/bid price. If the ‘split’ occurs in the last auction, the split part of the 
TDR bundle is bought/sold by the operator of the TDR bank (e.g. government). 
All possible configurations for calculating the market clearing price are listed in Fig. A-2 (appendix A) 
along with the implemented solutions which are not further discussed here. 
Moreover, Fig. 2-7 illustrates graphically all receiver and sender surpluses. The surplus for the ‘socie-
ty’ can be seen as the sum of the receiver and sender agents’ surpluses. However, the aim of the TDR-
ABM is not to maximize the surpluses, rather to identify the resulting prices and TDR quantities trad-
ed with the chosen auction mechanism.
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Fig. 2-7: Calculation of the market clearing price.
inform offerers/bidders and transfer money/TDR (cf. Fig. 2-6)
Finally, the trading agent informs each successful sender and receiver about its trading result, that is, 
the clearing price pclear and traded quantity qtransfer. Success occurs when sender agents have pask ≤ pclear
and receiver agents pbid ≥ pclear. All the successful sender agents get the same (uniform) price pclear per 
TDR and all the successful receiver agents have to pay pclear respectively. 
Adaptation
There is no adaptation process for the trading agent. Nevertheless, adaption would be conceivable, if 
one wants to change the ‘trading rules’ – e.g. in order to receive better model outcomes – during the 
trading process.
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2.4 Evaluation of the model
The program code of the TDR-ABM has been verified through testing random simple data. These 
results have been compared with manually calculated values by face validation (cf. e.g. Klügl, 2008; 
North and Macal, 2007). Beside the face validation, a computational performance analysis and a sensi-
tivity analysis of selected parameters have been done.
2.4.1 Computational performance of the TDR-ABM
In order to test the computational performance of the TDR-ABM, datasets with an increasing number 
of agents (1,000 – 1,000,000) were created and stepwise tested in the simulation. The TDR-ABM was 
run for each dataset on an ordinary computer (Core Duo Processor with 2.66 GHz and 2.96 GB RAM) 
and the total computing time was recorded. 
Fig. 2-8 illustrates the results of the analysis with the following specifications for all sender as well as 
receiver agents:
- participation probability psend = prerceive = 100 percent; 
- price adaptation factor a = uniform random number between 2 and 4 percent;
- price initialization factor i = 10 percent;
- n = 10 consecutive auctions;
- TDR-ABM has been run 1,000 times and the computational time has been averaged for each 
dataset tested. 
As Fig. 2-8 shows, the computational time increases in a strong linear form and the model works well, 
even for 1 million agents (computational time of approximately 150 seconds).
33
0Fig. 2-8: TDR-ABM performance analysis.
2.4.2 Sensitivity analysis of psend and preceive
There exist a number of reasons for conducting sensitivity analyses and there are many different ways 
to do it. According to Hamby (1994), one possible reason is to analyze which parameters contribute 
most to the output variability and therefore require additional research. Another reason is to examine 
the consequences of the change of one parameter on the model results. The latter is a goal of this sec-
tion and it is tested for the two parameters psend and prerceive which seem to be the most interesting and 
uncertain, because of highly varying participation rates in existing TDR programs (Pruetz (2003) iden-
tified failing and quite successful TDR programs). 
A straight-forward method to do the intended analysis is called ‘one-at-a-time sensitivity measure’ and 
it is conducted by repeatedly varying one parameter at a time while holding the others fixed (Hamby, 
1994)26. 
One-at-a-time sensitivity analysis
To test the influence of psend and preceive, the measure for success of the TDR program must be defined. 
This could be done through the total quantity of traded TDR or the market clearing price either aggre-
gated over time (sum, average) or per single instance (qtrade, pclear). A TDR program is successful if as 
26 It should be noted that this method is likely to miss non-linear interactions.
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many TDR as possible are sold at a reasonable price. In this context, reasonable means that the total 
cost for obtaining the right to develop a building zone parcel should remain about the same as before 
introducing the TDR program.
The sensitivity analysis was performed with the following settings:
- 100 different combinations of the two variables psend and preceive, while holding all the others 
constant;
- Parameter i = 10 percent;
- Parameter a = uniform random number between 2 and 4 percent;
- Approximately 45,000 agents;
- n = 5 consecutive auctions;
- Each combination was run 1,000 times and the results were then averaged over all runs.
Fig. 2-9 shows the effect of different psend and preceive values on the total quantity of TDR traded over 5 
auctions. Fig. 2-10 shows the average clearing price, and Fig. 2-11 shows the variance of the clearing 
price. 
Note that the illustrated effects are the cumulated results of 5 consecutive auctions, which means that 
the ‘time-dimension’ is not considered. This was done in a further analysis, in which the development 
of the clearing price during the 5 auctions was analyzed. A selection of the obtained results is shown 
in Fig. 2-12. For the latter analysis as well, the simulation was run 1,000 times and the values were 
averaged over all the runs.
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Fig. 2-9: Effect of parameters psend and preceive on the total quantity of TDR traded over 5 auctions.
Fig. 2-10: Effect of parameters psend and preceive on the average clearing price over 5 auctions in CHF.
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Fig. 2-11: Effect of parameters psend and preceive on the variance of the clearing price over 5 auctions.
Fig. 2-12: Variation per auction of the clearing price at changing psend and constant preceive values – left: 
preceive = 50%; right: preceive = 100%.
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Fig. 2-9 illustrates a potentially crucial fact: The total quantity of traded TDR (cumulated over 5 auc-
tions) increases with an increasing supply and demand only up to psend = 60% and preceive = 70% (cf. 
dark red colored regions in Fig. 2-9). This is particularly interesting because it could have been ex-
pected that the TDR quantity traded would increase up to full participation with psend = preceive = 100%. 
This phenomenon might be caused by our decision model in its temporally repetitive application (cf. 
sub-section Behavior in 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) in which probabilities psend and preceive increase like a geomet-
rical series. Lower values of psend resp. preceive increase faster than high values of psend resp. preceive, and 
the ask and bid prices are stepwise adapted for unsuccessful agents. 
The results presented in Fig. 2-10 show clearly that the clearing price increases with an increasing 
demand (high values of preceive) and that it decreases with an increasing supply (high values of psend). 
This is how a ‘normal’ market usually reacts and it underlines that the TDR-ABM reflects empirically 
observable situations. 
Furthermore, in Fig. 2-10 it can be seen that the clearing price is stable at balanced supply and demand 
(values on the diagonal of the matrix). Possible reasons for this fact are the symmetric assumptions of 
our model (WTA resp. WTP and adaption assumptions) and similar initialization (cf. sub-section Ini-
tialization in 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).
Fig. 2-11 shows considerably higher variance values at high preceive and low psend values. This means 
that the clearing price varies most with high demand and low supply. In contrast, high supply and low 
demand seem not to result in such a high variance of the clearing price. The least variance can be ob-
served with balanced psend and preceive values. 
The development of the clearing price over 5 auctions can be observed in Fig. 2-1227. The two exam-
ples demonstrate that the clearing price varies quite strongly in case of low psend and high preceive, and 
vice versa. Additionally, it appears that if psend is larger than preceive, the clearing price increases during 
the 5 auctions, otherwise it decreases. It can also be seen that the clearing price remains quite stable 
with balanced values of psend and preceive. This trend supports the findings in Fig. 2-10 and Fig. 2-11 in 
which the averaged clearing price over 5 auctions varies only in a narrow band whenever psend and 
preceive have similar values.
Concerning the results of the sensitivity analysis, it can be concluded that the two parameters psend and 
preceive are sensitive indeed and thus care needs to be taken with them. In addition, the TDR-ABM 
seems to produce reasonable and useful results. 
As already mentioned, in a later version of the TDR-ABM, various assumptions (e.g. a decision mod-
el) will be adapted to the results of an expert survey, and therefore differing effects or trends may 
emerge. For this reason, we have not discussed these initial findings in more detail. 
27 All psend and preceive combinations are illustrated in the appendix (Fig. A-3).
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2.5 Discussion, conclusion and outlook
2.5.1 TDR specific discussion
In this paper we suggest a TDR program in Switzerland which is the basis for the TDR-ABM. The 
suggested program was elaborated in detail with Swiss planning experts by taking into consideration 
both the unique Swiss situation and experience in other countries. However, the conceptual design 
alone cannot assess the consequences of a practical implementation. This motivated us to develop a 
simulation framework in order to explore possible impacts of a TDR program in Switzerland. The 
simulation output aims to provide useful information to facilitate the political discussion of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the implementation of a TDR program in Switzerland. 
An important step in our TDR program is the designation of appropriate sending and receiving areas. 
In section 2.2.3 we outline the characteristics of these areas and explain the empirical data base to be 
employed. Using this data, it was possible to prepare suitable (first) input data sets for the simulation.
In our market design we did not allow speculation or banking and borrowing – following a suggestion 
by Swiss planning experts (to keep the market fluid, avoid prices being distorted). This exclusion also 
had the advantage of a simplification of the model. These considerations may increase public confi-
dence in a TDR program and reduce strategic behavior (e.g. market power, rent-seeking) that could 
have a negative impact on cost-effectiveness (Henger and Bizer, 2010), and market fluidity. 
We have not placed any emphasis on the monitoring system, trading rules, the need of a market maker 
or the transaction costs (cf. footnote 16). However, in practice these considerations are important. In 
Switzerland, most likely the Federal Office for Spatial Development would monitor the system, define 
the detailed trading rules and also act as market maker to enable entering the market. The transaction 
costs could be limited by providing easily accessible public information and through the reduction of 
the number of transactions. The latter was implemented in the TDR-ABM by restricting the trade to 
TDR bundles.
There is one more specific economic characteristic of the TDR we did not consider. A part of the TDR 
can have a so-called complementary character. This can occur when the value of the TDR of a parcel
is linked to one’s own possession of TDR of another parcel. Such a situation could arise when a large 
development project is realized which involves several parcels and a buyer/seller is interested in the 
TDRs of an additional parcel. In such a case, complementarities can lead to high prices for the addi-
tional parcel (Berninghaus et al., 2006). Although complementarities are not specifically taken into 
account in our model, the first model outcomes have shown that the price determination method is 
quite robust at high prices (cf. section 2.4.2). Therefore, problems due to complementarity should have 
little impact.
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Furthermore, we do not explain what happens at the end of the TDR program, that is when most of the 
TDR are sold (e.g. 90% of the total TDR quantity). Even though this is not the topic of this paper, at 
the end of the TDR program, we suggest replacing it with a TPP program (Tradable Planning Permits) 
(cf. section 2.2.3). In such a follow-up program, the Federal Office for Spatial Development would 
define a predetermined total permit quantity of TPP for designating new building zones. This total 
quantity could be distributed – according to a certain distribution formula – to the municipalities 
which could then trade the TPP amongst each other. 
To conclude, the proposed TDR program can be implemented in a ABM (TDR-ABM) so that the sim-
ulation can provide information (TDR prices and quantities) for the political discussion in Switzerland. 
However, it should not be forgotten, that a TDR program is only ‘supplementary to planning’ and it 
should always be accompanied by other planning instruments.
2.5.2 ABM specific discussion
In this paper we have outlined a plausible agent-based model in order to simulate a TDR market in 
Switzerland. Our model simulates a ‘true order book’ in which agents submit asks and bids for a spe-
cific good (here TDR). According to LeBaron (2006) the implemented method of price determination 
(cf. sections 2.2.3 (sub-section Trading mechanism and trading process) and 2.3.4) is the most realis-
tic from a market microstructure perspective. 
The advantage of the ABM is that rational behavior of the agents need not to be assumed as is usually 
the case in economic models28. It is possible to define bounded rationalities which means that different 
agents can have different rationalities. In our model we implemented three different agent types with 
specific state variables, behavior and adaptation rules (cf. section 2.3). Because of missing empirical 
data (e.g. behavior differences of the landowner categories), we introduced randomness (e.g. the deci-
sion to enter in the sending/receiving process) and applied several simplifications (e.g. landowner cat-
egories behave identically). Despite these simplifications, the evaluation of the model (cf. section 2.4) 
demonstrates that the model produces reasonable outcomes and that it can be used for further analyses. 
The implemented concept of trading multiple units of a good at fixed package sizes (TDR bundles) is 
quite unique as the price determination is solved through splitting the last successful order at the inter-
section of the supply and demand curve. In each auction, a maximum of one TDR bundle has to be 
split. This is most acceptable in the opinion of the authors and given the fact that thousands of agents 
may participate in the market. The caused efficiency loss is much lower than it would be by imple-
menting another option e.g. a two-sided Vickrey auction. As far as we know, the proposed ABM is the 
first to include such a special auction form.
28 Further reasons and advantages for modeling markets with ABM can be found e.g. in Bousquet and Le Page (2004) or 
Parker and Filatova (2008).
40
The implemented provisional solution of subtracting/adding a random value to the WTA resp. WTP is 
similar to the one suggested by Gode and Sunder (1993). However, the criticism of Parker and 
Filatova (2008) that with such an assumption location-specific amenities are not considered, does not 
hold here. In our model, the WTP resp. WTA values are initialized through empirical data at municipal-
ity level and therefore, the location specific properties (e.g. building zone prices vary according to the 
location) of TDR are taken into account.
Further, we did not consider imitation effects, special learning mechanisms or a separate perception of 
the environment. The latter could be taken into account through a new variable reflecting the market 
situation as Parker and Filatova (2008) suggest (e.g. inflation or interest rate). This could be a possible 
extension for a further version of our TDR-ABM.
To sum up, the presented TDR-ABM is intended to be a consulting instrument which produces a range 
of possible outcomes (e.g. TDR prices and quantities) and not a forecasting instrument with one cor-
rect value. The advantage of the simulation – compared with a purely analytical solution – is the pos-
sibility to assume specific distributions of uncertain parameters (e.g. psend resp. preceive values) and to 
reduce these uncertainties through thousands of simulation runs. The large number of simulation runs 
should pose no difficulty, as the results of the performance analysis show (cf. section 2.4.1).
When it comes to furthering this work, the TDR-ABM was improved by incorporating further empiri-
cal data (cf. chapters 3 and 4). A survey was carried out to collect data about the behavior regarding 
various landowner categories involved in a TDR program in Switzerland. The results of the survey 
were used to calculate or define:
- landowner specific probabilities for the psend resp. preceive values;
- landowner specific functions for the calculation of WTA resp. WTP values;
- landowner specific adaptation functions (initialization factor i and adaptation factor a) for the 
pbid resp. pask values.
After the calibration of the simulation it was possible to analyze relevant political and economic ques-
tions for Switzerland and so to provide more and better outcomes.
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3 A survey of market participants to inform the 
TDR-ABM
Abstract: Urban sprawl is a common phenomenon in many parts of the world. Switzerland is also affected by 
this phenomenon and its negative consequences. In addition, in Switzerland sprawl is facilitated by an excessive 
supply of building zones far beyond demand for the next 20 years. We propose to reduce these land-use prob-
lems by introducing a limited number of transferable development rights (TDR). As there is little experience 
with this instrument worldwide, we suggest using an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate the trade of TDR. 
For reliable and useful simulation results, the ABM needs to be calibrated with empirical data. For this purpose 
a participant-specific questionnaire survey among four potential landowner categories was conducted. The con-
tacted persons represented either potential sellers or potential buyers of TDR. Each received a questionnaire 
confronting her/him with a unique realistic situation. 
The aim of this paper is to present this questionnaire and more particularly the detailed results of the descriptive 
and analytical analysis of the survey data to be used in a direct calibration of an ABM. The approach to collect 
data with a participant-specific survey to directly calibrate an ABM proved successful. The results show that 
among the differentiated landowner categories there were differences in the willingness to participate in the 
TDR market and that the stated TDR prices were strongly determined by the theoretical TDR value. Further-
more, enterprises behaved differently than other landowner categories during the proposed five auctions.
Keywords: Transferable development rights (TDR), TDR market, Participant-specific questionnaires, Agent-
based model, ABM-calibration
*This chapter is a slightly amended version of the paper “Transferable development rights (TDR) in Switzerland: A survey of 
market participants to inform an agent-based model” written by Gianluca Menghini, Irmi Seidl and Philippe Thalmann. The 
paper has been submitted to the Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning and is currently ‘under review’. The authors 
would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for funding the project (K-21K1-1224) and Claudia Keller for the 
assistance in data preparation. Moreover, we thank two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on an earlier 
version of this paper.
*
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3.1 Simulating a market for TDR with an ABM
3.1.1 Underlying practical problem of land use in general and in Switzer-
land
Urban sprawl is a common phenomenon in widespread parts of the world. European hot spots of urban 
sprawl are located in highly populated coastal areas, such as Porto, Palermo, Istanbul, and Udine 
(EEA, 2006). However, Switzerland is also affected by this phenomenon. Over the last 30 years, the 
Swiss settlement area has increased by 23.5%29 (and the population by 24%). A large part of this ex-
pansion has come at the expense of farmland (IRL, 2003) in common with other hot spots of urban 
sprawl. Compared with development in high-density areas, urban sprawl is associated with more nega-
tive consequences for the environment, higher infrastructure costs, and greater energy consumption 
(Baumgartner, 2005; Ewing, 2008; Brownstone and Golob, 2009).
Good zoning practice may help preventing sprawl, however, it has failed in many countries. Accord-
ing to Brueckner (2000) there are three major drivers of urban sprawl: population growth, increasing 
income, and decreasing costs of commuting. An additional reason is that municipalities may not fol-
low planning regulations strictly enough, or the latter have simply been insufficient. All of these points 
pertain to Switzerland, yet it is the planning practice we highlight here. The municipalities have a 
strong incentive to increase the area of building zones, in particular as new settlements promise new 
tax revenues. Depending on what assumptions are made, between 38,000 and 53,000 hectares (17 to 
24%) of the existing building zone areas have not been developed. According to ARE (2005, 2008) 
and Fahrländer Partner (2008) many of the undeveloped building zone areas are unreasonably large30.
Another problem is the location of these areas. The supply and demand for undeveloped building 
zones is spatially extraordinarily imbalanced: in the next 30 years, the demand in the agglomerations 
of the major centers and along major transport routes is expected to significantly exceed the current 
reserves. However, in the municipalities far away from the centers the situation is completely differ-
ent. There, the area with undeveloped building zones is significantly larger than the expected demand 
(Fahrländer Partner, 2008).
The Swiss problem with the building zones is mainly caused by a lax zoning practice of the municipal-
ities and by the tolerance of this unlawful situation at higher political levels, namely the cantons and 
29 Results of the Areal Statistics 1979/85 – 2004/09 (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/02/03.html ac-
cessed: 2011-11-02).
30 According to Fahrländer Partner AG (2008) and ARE (2005), the undeveloped building zone areas could provide space for 
about two million (additional) people (Switzerland has approximately 8 million inhabitants at present).
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the confederation31. In Switzerland, local governments have considerable planning autonomy, which 
tends to make existing spatial planning systems inefficient. Moreover, Switzerland has approximately 
2500 municipalities, with each having the right to designate the building zones within its area. 
The high land consumption and the imbalanced supply and demand for building zones clearly goes 
against the principles for economical use of land resources as specified in Art. 1 of the Swiss Federal 
Act of 22 June 1979 on Spatial Planning. There is general agreement that the current spatial planning 
instruments are insufficient to overcome this unsustainable growth (ARE 2006; Süess and Gmünder 
2005; Zollinger 2006). Moreover, due to vested interests and possible expropriation costs32 of many 
landowners, it is too late to redo zoning plans from scratch.
A possible instrument to solve these problems are TDR. TDR are a quantity-controlling, economic 
instrument based on the concept of tradable usable resources (or emissions). They are applied and 
discussed for various purposes (e.g. increasing building density, preservation of natural areas, com-
pensation of reduced development possibilities etc.) and in various countries (e.g. USA, Australia, 
New Zealand etc., cf. Janssen-Jansen et al., 2008). Overall, TDR are considered to be an efficient eco-
nomic instrument to counteract the widespread problem of inefficient land-use, in particular urban 
sprawl, as they concentrate development in places with the highest marginal utility. However, there are 
country-specific differences regarding the problems of land-use, the reasons for it, and the political 
and judicial framework. Hence, a TDR concept hast to be country-specific as well (Janssen-Jansen et 
al., 2008).
As TDR have hardly been discussed and so far not been applied in Switzerland, in chapter 2 (first pa-
per) both a concept for a TDR market in Switzerland and an agent-based model (ABM) for simulating 
the proposed TDR market (called TDR-ABM)33 is presented. However, the proposed TDR-ABM can 
only produce reliable and meaningful model results for the political discussion in Switzerland, when it 
is calibrated with realistic data. In order to gather such calibration data, a questionnaire survey has 
been conducted. This survey and its results will be presented in this paper.
After a brief description of the TDR concept for Switzerland and the corresponding ABM (cf. section
3.1.2), we will present in detail the survey (cf. section 3.2). Section 3.1.2 (description of the TDR con-
cept and corresponding ABM) is needed to understand the questionnaire. Afterwards (cf. section 3.3), 
31 For more information about the land use system in Switzerland see: 
http://www.vlp-aspan.ch/sites/default/files/ landusech_7.pdf, accessed: 11-13-2012.
32 According to Swiss law changing the status of building zone land into agricultural land for instance, would mean expropri-
ating the owner, who would then have to be fully compensated.
33 The purpose of the agent-based simulation is to provide useful information (e.g. TDR supply and demand, TDR prices) for 
the political discussion about the implementation of TDR in Switzerland. Without information and research proving its 
worth, both in how it functions and the effects it has, there will be little political willingness to implement such an instrument 
(Gmünder, 2010).
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we present descriptive results of the survey and then different statistical models. We conclude with a 
discussion, a summary of the main findings and a short outlook to the future (cf. section 3.4 and 3.5). 
3.1.2 TDR concept and corresponding agent-based model
TDR concept for Switzerland
In Switzerland, only a few studies on the possible application of TDR programs have been conducted. 
The most elaborate research so far was commissioned by the Federal Office for Spatial Development 
(ARE, 2006), where simple simulations were used to investigate the influence of different TDR set-
tings on land and real estate markets, as well as their spatial and social impacts (for a critical discus-
sion see Zollinger (2006)). 
Further discussions about TDR programs in Switzerland are to be found in Gmünder (2004, 2010), 
Süess and Gmünder (2005), and Zollinger and Seidl (2005). These first studies are all merely concep-
tual, and no calculations or simulations were undertaken. 
Hence, chapter 2 (first paper) presents an improved TDR concept related more to the specific Swiss 
spatial planning situation and including the decision-making by potentially involved agents. 
The proposed concept is designed as a so-called dual-zone program with both a ‘sending’ and a ‘re-
ceiving area’ (cf. Fig. 2-3). In this concept, landowners in so-called ‘sending areas’ (here: municipality 
A) can sell their right to develop a parcel to landowners in ‘receiving areas’ (here: municipality B). 
The former are regions (land parcels) in which there is no or little demand for it or where building 
activities should be prevented in accordance with existing Swiss spatial planning principles; the latter 
are land parcels not designated as building zones, which, however, in accordance with Swiss spatial 
planning principles, should be developed in the future due to high demand.
The TDR market price represents a compensation for the loss of benefits caused by downzoning of 
parcels in the sending area. TDR trade is managed by a ‘TDR bank’, which acts as buying and selling 
mediator and provides a market platform.
The exchange of the development opportunities (TDR) has two major advantages: the overall building 
zone area will be reduced as there might be denser development in the receiving area compared to the 
density in the sending area, or the building zone will at least remain the same. A precondition is setting 
a cap for new building zones. Moreover, the development costs for the society could be reduced be-
cause the receiving area – compared with the sending area – consists of parcels that can be more easily 
provided with infrastructure (e.g. streets, electricity, water) and connected to public transport. 
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Simulation of the TDR market 
The proposed TDR market model (TDR-ABM) simulates the trading of multiple units of TDR at fixed 
package sizes. It distinguishes two agent types representing landowners who submit asks (called send-
er agents or senders; divided into subcategories, see below) or bids (called receiver agents or receivers; 
divided into subcategories, see below) for TDR, and one agent type for the TDR exchange platform 
(called trading agent).
The simulated trading follows the rules of a multi-unit double auction with a uniform price and works 
as follows: Each sender who is willing to participate in the TDR market submits an ask with the de-
sired price per TDR (willingness to accept), and each potential receiver participating in the market
submits a bid with the price he is willing to pay for the needed TDR (willingness to pay).
After the submission of all the asks and bids, that is at the end of the trading period (representing one 
year), the trading agent calculates the market clearing price. For this calculation, the asks are sorted by 
price in ascending, the bids in descending order. The market clearing price is the price at the intersec-
tion of the ask- and bid-curves. 
Successful traders are the senders with an ask price below or equal the market clearing price and the 
receivers with a bid price above or equal the market clearing price. The unsuccessful market partici-
pants have the opportunity to participate in the next auction – probably with adapted ask- respectively 
bid-prices. For the proposed Swiss scheme it is suggested running two rounds of five auctions, with 
one year between each auction. The total time required to organize five auctions (=5 years) gives mu-
nicipalities time to adapt their zoning plans, i.e. designate sending and receiving areas, for the next 
round. Moreover, the municipalities can designate sending and receiving areas at given intervals. This 
should prevent a rampant building boom in the receiving area, which should keep the supply and de-
mand in balance. The main reasons to conduct an auction only once a year are threefold: First, traders 
will be encouraged to bid more truthfully because it would take a long time until the next trading op-
portunity34. Second, according to Evans and Peck (2007) the market participants need to have enough 
time to generate the necessary information for their asking/bidding strategy. Third, a result of two 
34 Note that following the questionnaire after the five auctions – independent of the participation of the landowners – the 
parcels in the sending area will be downzoned. Therefore, there are no financial options other than trying to sell the assigned 
TDR as a compensation for the loss of the development opportunity. Nevertheless, because of possible wishful thinking, 
there are still respondents who are not willing to participate in the TDR market (cf. section 3.3.2 for reasons for not partici-
pating in the TDR market). Also, for the landowners in the receiving area there is no other options than trying to buy TDR, in 
the case they want to develop their parcel. Moreover, at the end of the TDR program (e.g. 90% of the total TDR quantity is 
sold), it is suggested to replace the TDR program with a TPP program (Tradable Planning Permits, cf. e.g. Henger and Bizer, 
2010). In such a follow-up program, a political body (e.g. the Swiss Federal Office for Spatial Development) would define a 
predetermined total permit quantity of TPP for designating new building zones. This total quantity could be distributed –
according to a defined distribution formula – to the municipalities which could then trade the TPP amongst each other.
46
expert workshops35 was that the time between auctions should be approximately equal to the time re-
quired to plan a housing project.
The sender respectively receiver agents are subdivided into four different landowner categories (cf. 
Table 3-2 and Table 3-3) assuming each category behaves differently36. The subdivision into the dif-
ferent categories was done according to existing land registry data of various municipalities in the 
Canton of Grisons, and according to transaction data of undeveloped land parcels of the Cantons of 
Zurich and Fribourg. The identified categories were large enough to enclose a sufficient number of 
actors and to keep the modeling tractable, but detailed enough to allow for fundamental differences in 
priorities. 
To gather realistic data, we conducted a questionnaire survey based on the following research ques-
tions: (1) Do the landowner categories participate in the TDR market with different probabilities? (2) 
What are the most important criteria when determining the TDR price and is there a difference be-
tween the landowner categories? (3) What are the reasons for not participating in the TDR market and 
is it dependent on the landowner characteristics (e.g. experience in land sale or purchase)? (4) Which 
variables (e.g. parcel area) determine the TDR price in the first auction (ask and bid price) and (5) do 
the four landowner categories behave differently? (6) Does the location factor have an influence on the 
price that a landowner asks or pays for the whole TDR bundle37 of a certain parcel? (7) What is the 
adaptation of the TDR price during the proposed five auctions and is there a difference in the adapta-
tion between the landowner categories? 
To address these questions we analyzed the data with descriptive statistics (cf. section 3.3.2) and with 
analytical statistics methods (e.g. regression analysis; cf. section 3.3.3).
3.1.3 Empirical data – a challenge in ABM
Approaches to gain and integrate empirical data
One of the main challenges in agent-based modeling is to simulate individual decision-making. For 
example, it is often difficult to consider the impacts of risk aversion, learning abilities, and the degree 
of individual rationality toward market prices and quantities (Chan et al., 1999; Bădică et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, there is no simple method or solution for determining how agents process information 
and derive their trading rules. Consequently, there is no assurance that any single result is not just an 
artifact of the particular subjects and context. Moreover, the complexity of human behavior forces 
35 The auction design (number of auctions, time between the auctions etc.) has been defined and elaborated in two expert 
workshops: one with spatial planning and real estate experts (participants were experts from local authorities, banks, real 
estate companies, a planning association and academics), and one with auction design specialists.
36 Because of the low response in the category of cooperatives, we merged this category to the category of confedera-
tion/canton/municipality (non-profit institutions).
37 By ’TDR bundle‘ we mean the total number of TDR per parcel.
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agent-based modelers to seek approaches that refine and extend existing theories about human deci-
sion-making (Chan et al., 1999).
There exist several approaches and methods to calibrate ABM (see below for the difference between 
direct and indirect calibration) or in other words combine ABM with empirical data. Janssen and 
Ostrom (2006) provide an overview about various methods to gather empirical data for ABM. They 
distinguish four categories of empirical approaches to gather empirical data to inform agent-based 
models. These are: case studies, stylized facts, role-playing games, and laboratory experiments. Each 
of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages. Whichever approach one chooses depends on 
different aspects, like e.g. data availability, time, financial resources, and most importantly on the goal 
of the study. 
We gathered and combined empirical data generated by a survey to inform an agent-based model 
(TDR-ABM), which, according to the categories of Janssen and Ostrom (2006), belongs to the catego-
ry of case studies38. Combining a survey with an agent-based model is a common approach and there 
are numerous examples (cf. e.g. Brown and Robinson, 2006; Kaufmann et al., 2009; Schwarz and 
Ernst, 2009 or Feola et al., 2011). Alternative approaches to obtain the necessary information would 
have been a role-playing game or an economic experiment. However, the former would have been too 
time-consuming and costly, particularly because participants from all over Switzerland would have 
had to be gathered. The latter approach was not suitable because an experiment would not have al-
lowed the representation of such a complex topic as a TDR trade.
So far there is no ABM for TDR and thus no empirical study to gather data for ABM. However, a 
survey on TDR is known, namely that of Conrad and LeBlanc (1979). Due to the temporal distance, 
the small representative value (sample size = 22), and the survey within a different planning system 
compared to the Swiss one, we cannot use the results.
Using a survey to calibrate an ABM for a TDR market is particularly challenging because (a) so far 
respondents have no experience with TDR, (b) the mechanisms of a TDR market are rather complex to 
explain and to understand, which is a particular challenge for a written survey, and (c) although the 
situation is hypothetical, the questions have to be presented as realistically as possible.
Direct calibration of the TDR-ABM with survey data
In order to calibrate the TDR-ABM, we conducted a survey among representatives (professionals) of 
different landowner categories (cf. Table 3-2). The aim of the survey was to collect data about the 
behavior of the different landowner categories which could then be used to inform the TDR-ABM (cf. 
Table 3-1 for more details about the calibrated parameters). According to Schwarz and Ernst (2009) 
38 According to Janssen and Ostrom (2006) in case studies, the researcher can combine information from different sources, 
such as remote sensing, surveys, census data, field observations, etc..
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this type of calibration is known as direct calibration. A model is directly calibrated when empirically 
derived data are used as values for model parameters or initial calibration. Here, the empirically de-
rived data to inform the TDR-ABM can be divided into two groups: The first group represents pa-
rameters gained with the survey and used without additional econometric calculation (psend and preceive, 
cf. Table 3-1), the second group stands for parameters that are econometrically calculated values (pa-
rameters used for determining the TDR price and the TDR price adaptation functions, cf. Table 3-1). 
The latter parameter group introduces an additional statistical uncertainty.
In contrast, in an indirectly calibrated model empirical data would be compared to model outputs. The 
chosen model parameters would be determined in a way that the model replicates the empirical data 
best. 
For the TDR-ABM, indirect calibration was not feasible for two reasons: First, empirical data for 
model outcomes are not available for the completely new concept of TDR in Switzerland. Second, in 
an indirectly calibrated model many parameter combinations could lead to the same output (Schwarz 
and Ernst, 2009).
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Chosen survey type and development of the questionnaire
According to Häder (2010), the choice of a survey method is mainly driven by the extent of standardi-
zation, the possible types of contact and the number of respondents one wants to reach with the sur-
vey. A basic distinction is made between personal, telephonic, mail and web based surveys. Each of 
these methods has advantages and disadvantages, and there is no ideal method. The most appropriate 
survey type can only be found by an evaluation of the pros and cons of a method to reach a certain 
goal (Dillman et al., 2009; Häder, 2010).
Based on these specifics, we analyzed our objective and choose to conduct a mail and web based sur-
vey among persons, qualified in the field of spatial planning and real estate (called ‘professionals’ in 
what follows) (cf. section 3.2.2). Professionals were chosen instead of a random sample of all existing 
and potential landowners, because of the complex topic of transferable development rights, the lack of 
any public information and debate about this instrument which might have made the questionnaire too 
difficult for the general public; rather it would be an advantage to have previous knowledge in spatial 
planning and real estate. Also the professionals would be a large part of participants in a TDR market 
either because they or their institutions would be involved or because they would represent partici-
pants of the general public.
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The survey was conducted in the form of a questionnaire combining various social theory elements, 
that is qualitative and quantitative elements, to benefit from the advantages of the different methods. 
A purely qualitative survey (e.g. in form of interviews) was not chosen, because this would have led to 
an explorative survey without useful statistical results for implementing in the TDR-ABM. In our case, 
we had previous knowledge on TDR from existing academic discussion and our own exchange with 
experts and therefore, an explorative survey was not needed. Some qualitative elements were intro-
duced, e.g. in questions with an open or semi-open answer possibility to allow the respondents to an-
swer some questions with their personal views and ideas. These answers cannot be statistically as-
sessed, but provide additional information about TDR. Moreover, the open and semi-open response 
categories are an incentive for the respondents to give answers, as they offer an additional and some-
times easier possibility to express their opinions (Dillman et al., 2009).
The quantitative and statistically evaluated elements were the questions with standardized answer pos-
sibilities and the questions in which we ask to valuate (price indication) the TDR. The latter were 
questions that can be categorized as contingent valuation method (CVM) questions (cf. e.g. Mitchell 
and Carson, 1993).
Each single questionnaire stated a unique realistic situation description that suited the contacted land-
owner category. The numbers and details (e.g. parcel area, location etc.) for these descriptions were 
derived from the above mentioned land registry data and transaction data of undeveloped land parcels 
(building and agricultural zones). 
For example, a respondent contacted as a possible landowner in the receiving area was confronted 
with the stated situation that he owns a certain parcel with some properties39: e.g., location (municipal-
ity type) = rich municipality, parcel area = 600 m2, utilization factor40 = 0.3, required number of TDR 
to develop the parcel41 = 180, land price in the building zone (before introduction of the TDR market) 
= 500 CHF and land price in the agricultural zone = 6 CHF. Besides this situation description, the 
questionnaire gave the details about the price formation mechanism in the TDR market, which were 
about the proposed double auction (cf. section 3.1.2, sub-section Simulation of the TDR market). Then, 
after the background information, the respondents had first to answer if they would participate in the 
TDR market or not. In the case that they decided to participate they were asked about their TDR price 
(asks or bids for the 5 auctions) and their criteria for determining the TDR price. In addition, the re-
39 The given values in the questionnaire covered the following range: parcel area (in sqm): 400 to 1,900; utilization factor: 0.3 
to 0.5; building zone price (in CHF per sqm): 60 to 2,760; agricultural zone price (in CHF per sqm): 3 to 6.
40 The utilization factor UF determines – together with the parcel area – the legally allowed floor area per building zone 
parcel and thus the quantity of TDR per parcel.
41 The number of TDR per parcel is defined as a multiplication of the parcel area and the utilization factor. An optional loca-
tion factor might be added additionally in the TDR-ABM.
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spondents who represented a landowner in the receiving area were asked about their price expectations 
(WTP) for the given parcel without TDR. 
The respondents who decided not to participate in the TDR market were asked about their reasons. At 
the end of the questionnaire, we asked personal questions as e.g. the ‘age group’ or ‘experience in land 
purchase or sale’.
We performed a pretest with approximately 20 respondents. The final questionnaire was mailed in 
January and March 2012 (languages: German and French) with the additional possibility to fill it out 
online42. The questionnaire was mailed twice because of the insufficient response rate (17.22%) in the 
first survey round. The final response rate was 16.75%43 (cf. section 3.3.1), however, the overall abso-
lute number of respondents (n=331) was sufficient to carry out statistical models.
Overall, the questionnaire was considered to be complex and demanding. Yet, the time needed to un-
derstand and fill out the questionnaire should not have exceeded 20 minutes. Table 3-1 gives an over-
view about the collected information and the herewith calibrated parameters of the TDR-ABM.
Table 3-1: Collected information and parameters to be calibrated.
Collected information Parameters/functions
a of the TDR-ABM 
Willingness/Probability to participate in 
the TDR market
Parameters psend resp. preceive
Initial (first auction) ask resp. bid price Ask resp. bid price initialization function parameters 
Ask resp. bid price adaptation during 
the five auctions
Ask resp. bid price adaptation function parameters
Influence of the location 
on the TDR price
Location factor LF
Price for the land without TDR
Not yet integrated into the simulation, but useful for
further improvements of the TDR-ABM
Criteria for valuation of the TDR
Not yet integrated into the simulation, but useful for
further improvements of the TDR-ABM
Reasons for not participating in the TDR market
Not yet integrated into the simulation, but useful for
further improvements of the TDR-ABM
Personal data of the respondents (representing sender 
and receiver agents)
Not yet integrated into the simulation, but useful for
further improvements of the TDR-ABM
a The mentioned parameters and functions are described in detail in chapter 2 and 4.
42 The URL of the webpage and login-details were listed on the cover letter of the questionnaire.
43 The slightly lower response rate may be explained by the address database used which was bought form a professional 
address seller. In the first survey round addresses from engaged members from the planning and real estate sector were used.
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3.2.2 Contacted professionals 
A total of 1,976 professionals in all of Switzerland were contacted. These people were contacted to 
represent either landowners in the sending or receiving area. Their personal characteristics are repre-
sented in Table 3-2. 
Among the contacted professionals, four different landowner categories were distinguished, and each 
category was subdivided into two equal parts, one part representing ‘senders’ (suppliers) and one rep-
resenting ‘receivers’ (demanders) of TDR.
The addresses came from different sources based on our own research mainly of addresses of munici-
palities, the address list of an event of cooperatives, address lists of spatial planning and real estate 
events, the address list of alumni in spatial planning, the address list from the CD ‘who is who in the 
Swiss real estate industry’, and addresses from a professional address seller.
The special landowner structure in Switzerland was one of the main reasons for the different number 
of contacted professionals between the four categories (cf. Table 3-3). For example, the statistical 
analysis of the land registry and transaction data (cf. section 3.1.2, sub-section Simulation of the TDR 
market) has shown that on average about 66% of the land in the building zone (here: residential zone) 
is owned by private persons, 19% by enterprises, 11% by the state (municipalities, cantons and con-
federation), and 4% by cooperatives and other social organizations (e.g. associations). These propor-
tions vary considerably depending on the type of municipality44. Another reason for the different num-
ber of contacted respondents was that the number of professionals in the different categories varies. 
Table 3-2: Personal characteristics of the respondents. 
Enterprisesa oper-
ating in commer-
cial real estate 
transaction
Confederation/
Canton/
Municipality
Architects and 
Real Estate 
developersb
Cooperatives
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Language
German
French
56
4
93.3% 
6.7%
88 
20
81.5% 
18.5%
124 
16
88.6% 
11.4%
23 
0
100.0%
0.0%
Age group (years)
20 - 35
36 - 50
>  50 
n/a
3
23
32
2
5.0%
38.3%
53.3%
3.3%
8
47
49
4
7.4%
43.5%
45.4%
3.7%
16
57
63
4
11.4%
40.7%
45.0%
2.9%
1
8
12
2
4.3%
34.8%
52.2%
8.7%
44 For example, land owned by private persons varies from 28% in tourism municipalities to 90% in commuter municipalities 
outside urban areas.
52
Experience in land pur-
chase or sale (years) 
< 5
5 - 9
10 - 14
15 - 19
20 - 24
> 25
n/a
7
5
10
6
8
23
1
11.7%
8.3%
16.7%
10.0%
13.3%
38.3%
1.7%
39
16
16
5
15
13
4
36.1%
14.8%
14.8%
4.6%
13.9%
12.0%
3.7%
37
11
22
8
21
38
3
26.4%
7.9%
15.7%
5.7%
15.0%
27.1%
2.1%
4
5
2
4
3
4
1
17.4%
21.7%
8.7%
17.4%
13.0%
17.4%
4.3%
Previous concern with 
TDR
No
Somewhat
Yes
n/a
40
13
5
2
66.7%
21.7%
8.3%
3.3%
69
29
10
0
63.9%
26.9%
9.3%
0.0%
69
56
12
3
49.3%
40.0%
8.6%
2.1%
19
3
0
1
82.6%
13.0%
0.0%
4.3%
Difficulty completing the 
questionnaire
Easy
Rather simple
Rather difficult
Difficult
n/a
13
27
15
2
3
21.7%
45.0%
25.0%
3.3%
5.0%
18
41
34
6
9
16.7%
38.0%
31.5%
5.6%
8.3%
22
57
50
7
4
15.7%
40.7%
35.7%
5.0%
2.9%
7
10
5
0
1
30.4%
43.5%
21.7%
0.0%
4.3%
Interest in survey results
Yes
No
n/a
42
9
9
70.0%
15.0%
15.0%
57
32
19
52.8%
29.6%
17.6%
104
20
16
74.3%
14.3%
11.4%
6
6
11
26.1%
26.1%
47.8%
a Corporation/Limited Liability Partnership/Bank/Insurance Company etc..
b It was supposed – and mentioned in the questionnaire – that architects and real estate developers should represent the inter-
ests of private persons.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Response rate and quality of responses
Response rate
As mentioned above, the overall response rate of the survey was 16.75%. We assessed the response 
burden according to the calculation in Axhausen and Weis (2010) and obtained a value of around 60 
points. For surveys with such a response burden, Axhausen and Weis (2010)45 would predict a re-
sponse rate of over 20%. The low response rate might be explained in two ways. First by the existing 
scepticism towards TDR. Gmünder (2010) found in his survey that among the environmental econom-
ic spatial planning instruments, TDR have a low level of political acceptance. He explains this as the 
result of very little information and public discussion about this instrument. The second explanation 
may be the long and challenging introduction to the questionnaire (2.5 pages), explaining the instru-
45 Axhausen and Weis (2010) analyzed surveys conducted at the Institute for Transport Planning and Systems, ETH Zurich.
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ment and how to fill out the survey, which probably led potential respondents to ignore the question-
naire. This fact could not be considered in the response burden assessment.
Table 3-3: Contacted professionals and response rate of the different landowner categories.
Landowner category
Number of 
contacted 
professionalsa
Returned ques-
tionnaires 
(senders)
Returned ques-
tionnaires (re-
ceivers)
Enterprises operating in commercial real estate 
transaction (called hereinafter ‘enterprises’)
489 
35
14.3%
25
10.2%
Confederation/Canton/Municipality
(called hereinafter ‘non-profit institutions’, ab-
breviated ‘NPI’)
502
54
21.5%
54
21.5%
Architects and Real Estate developers
(called hereinafter ‘representatives of private 
persons’, abbreviated ‘RPP’)
829
80
19.3%
60
14.5%
Cooperatives 
(merged hereinafter with the category of ‘NPI’)
156
12
15.4%
11
14.1%
Overall 1,976
181
18.3%
150
15.2%
a The contacted professionals were divided in two equal parts: one part had to answer as sender, the other as receiver.
Among the contacted landowner categories (cf. Table 3-3), NPI and RPP were slightly more willing to 
fill out the questionnaire than other categories. However, the differences between the categories are 
too small to be significant. 
Because of the small number of respondents in the category of cooperatives, and the fact that a majori-
ty of those respondents was not willing to participate in the TDR market, we merged the cooperatives 
and the category of NPI for the following calculations.
Quality of responses – plausibility test
Because of the complex topic, the demanding questionnaire and the missing public information about 
TDR we compared the stated prices (asks and bids) with the theoretically expected TDR value (here 
defined as rational behavior) to test whether responses are reliable:
PTDRtheoretical = (PBuildZone - PAgrizone)/UF (3-1)
where PBuildZone represents the building zone price, PAgrizone the agricultural zone price and UF
the utilization factor UF (cf. footnote 40). 
The consideration behind this plausibility test is that, when the price of agricultural land is given to be 
6 CHF/m2, the price of building zone land to be 500 CHF/m2 and UF = 0.3, this means that 0.3 TDR 
are needed to transform land worth 6 CHF into land worth 500 CHF, so the TDR might be worth 
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494/0.3 = 1650 CHF46 (PTDRtheoretical). Note that the given prices of agricultural and building zone land 
are just points of reference – as in a real world people would refer to market prices – and not the prices 
for an outside-option. 
Based on the above, we assumed that a response/questionnaire is reliable and realistic if the stated ask 
price in the first auction is greater than 0.5 of the theoretical TDR value while the corresponding stated 
bid price in the fifth auction is greater than 0.3 of the theoretical TDR value47. 
The criteria of the plausibility test were defined according to the statistical distribution of the stated 
prices in comparison to the theoretical TDR value (cf. Fig. B-1 and Fig. B-2 in the appendix B), and 
were of tantamount important because of other responses that further indicated misunderstanding of 
the questionnaire (e.g. high difficulty in completing the questionnaire combined with unrealistically 
high/low prices, little experience in land purchase or sale combined with unrealistically high/low pric-
es, etc.). 
All responses that did not fit the mentioned criteria were classified as not plausible (outliers) and they 
indicate that (a) the respondent did not correctly understand the questionnaire or (b) the respondent 
gave no effort in answering the questionnaire. As a result, we exclude for the following descriptive 
and analytical results 20 questionnaires of senders (3 of the category of enterprises, 5 NPI and 12 RPP) 
and 15 of receivers (2 of the category of enterprises, 4 NPI (incl. cooperatives) and 9 RPP). The result-
ing number of observations is n=124 (only respondents that stated they would participate in the TDR 
market).
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics results
In this section we present the results of the descriptive statistical analysis. The results of analytical 
statistical analysis including the prices that were stated in the questionnaire survey are reported in sec-
tion 3.3.3.
Participation per landowner category
In the first question we asked the respondents whether they would participate in a TDR market or 
not48. The corresponding results for the senders and receivers are illustrated in Table 3-449.
46 In the questionnaire this calculation was presented in a simple way for participants because the total value of the parcel 
without and with TDR was indicated as well as the number of TDR needed. The indicated prices were realistic values (cf. 
section 3.2.1) for the described situation.
47 Since the participants could think strategically and ask high or bid low prices in the first auctions, we assumed that just the 
first ask respectively fifth bid price should hold the mentioned criteria. However, strategic behavior was only considered to
be realistic in the case that the stated prices were not greater than 5 times the theoretical TDR value.
48 Not to be confused with the general participation in the survey, which was described in section 3.3.1.
49 The participation probability results before the exclusion of possible outliers can be found in the appendix B (Table B-1).
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Among the senders, it is striking that NPI are barely ready to sell. The reason may be that this category 
owns few land reserves (especially cooperatives) in the building zone and they do not want to give up 
any potential development opportunity.
Moreover, the numbers in Table 3-4 indicate that NPI are also hardly willing to buy any development 
rights. The possible reasons may be that NPI are either skeptical towards TDR or feel buying TDR is 
an undertaking for enterprises and RPP. 
The highest willingness to participate is found, for both senders and receivers, in the category of RPP. 
It might be that RPP rely less on strategic considerations than other landowner categories and there-
fore the willingness to participate is higher. More information about the reasons for not participating in 
the TDR market is presented below (sub-section Reasons for not participating in the TDR market).
Table 3-4: Sender and receiver participation probability per landowner category.
Landowner category
Sender Participation Receiver Participation
Yes No Yes No
Enterprises
Number 15 17 12 12
Percent 46.9% 53.1% 50.0% 50.0%
NPI
Number 18 43 10 50
Percent 29.5% 70.5% 16.7% 83.3%
RPP
Number 38 30 31 20
Percent 55.9% 44.1% 60.8% 39.2%
Overall
Number 71 90 53 82
Percent 44.1% 55.9% 39.3% 60.7%
TDR valuation criteria 
The respondents who stated they would participate in the TDR market were asked – after they stated 
their price expectations (bid resp. ask price; cf. section 3.3.3) – about their criteria when determining 
the value of the TDR of the given parcel. Table 3-5 and Table 3-6 summarize the results for the send-
ers and receivers.
It is striking that, following the responses, the ‘building zone price before introduction of TDR’ is for 
both senders and receivers particularly important. The other criteria have been – apart from the ‘price 
for agricultural land’ and ‘other criteria’ – rated quite similarly between the categories. 
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Table 3-5: Sender’s criteria when determining the TDR price (more than one answer possible).
Criteria Enterprises NPI RPP
Price agricultural land 
Number 
Percent
3
7.3%
3
6.7%
6
5.8%
Building zone price before intro-
duction of TDR 
Number 
Percent
13
31.7%
13
28.9%
34
32.7%
Expected loss in value due to 
”non-development” 
Number 
Percent
7
17.1%
8
17.8%
20
19.2%
Location quality 
(e.g. peripheral location) 
Number 
Percent
6
14.6%
7
15.6%
13
12.5%
Compensation of the expenses to 
date 
Number 
Percent
3
7.3%
6
13.3%
8
7.7%
Need/desire to develop the parcel 
(e.g. for own use)
Number 
Percent
7
17.1%
3
6.7%
10
9.6%
Interest in immediately down-
zoning the parcel 
Number 
Percent
1
2.4%
2
4.4%
4
3.8%
Other criteriaa
Number 
Percent
1
2.4%
3
6.7%
9
8.7%
Overall
Number 
Percent
41
100%
45
100%
104
100%
a ‚Other criteria‘ given by the respondents were e.g. ‘long-term shortage of building zone area‘.
Table 3-6: Receivers’s criteria when determining the TDR price (more than one answer possible).
Criteria Enterprises NPI RPP
Price agricultural land
Number
Percent
5
11.6%
4
13.3%
11
9.8%
Building zone price before intro-
duction of TDR
Number
Percent
9
20.9%
6
20.0%
20
17.9%
Expected increase in value 
through the acquisition of 
TDR/expected return
Number
Percent
8
18.6%
3
10.0%
19
17.0%
Location quality (e.g. good pub-
lic transport connections) 
Number
Percent
10
23.3%
6
20.0%
21
18.8%
Need/desire to develop the parcel 
(e.g. for own use)
Number
Percent
2
4.7%
5
16.7%
10
8.9%
Own financial situation
Number
Percent
7
16.3%
5
16.7%
22
19.6%
Other criteriaa
Number
Percent
2
4.7%
1
3.3%
9
8.0%
Overall
Number
Percent
43
100%
30
100%
112
100%
a Other criteria‘ given by the respondents were e.g. ‘time saving by bypassing lengthy negotiations’.
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Reasons for not participating in the TDR market
The respondents who stated they would not participate in the TDR market were asked about their rea-
sons for not participating in the TDR market. For both senders and receivers, two criteria turned out to 
be essential: the seemingly too complicated procedure of the TDR instrument and the high transaction 
costs. Other reasons given by the respondents included ‘intervention in the property rights‘ (sender), 
‘encouragement of land speculation’ (sender and receiver), ‘TDR as a competition distorting instru-
ment’ (sender and receiver) or ‘TDR as a price-raising instrument’ (receiver).
It is worth stating at this point that the responses against participating in the TDR market must be re-
garded with caution given the way the problem was described in the questionnaire, not participating 
amounts to burning money. Hence, here not participating may also be understood either (a) as a gen-
eral opposition against such an instrument, (b) as the expression of expectations that the ‘rules of the 
game’ would change in the future, for example regarding new zoning practices (‘wishful thinking’), 
hence participating now may not actually mean missed opportunities, or (c) as evidence that the ‘rules 
of the game’ were not understood.
Correlation of personal characteristics and TDR market participation 
To investigate whether the participation probability is dependent on the respondents' characteristics, 
we calculated the correlation50 between these variables. Table 3-7 shows that there is no strong correla-
tion between the variables. 
Table 3-7: Correlation of the TDR market participation and personal characteristicsa.
Age group 
Experience in 
land purchase 
or sale
Previous con-
cern with TDR
Difficulty com-
pleting the ques-
tionnaire
Interest in sur-
vey results
Participation -0.171** -0.156** -0.120* 0.265** 0.221**
a Spearman-Rho Correlation. Significance levels (two-tailed): ** 1%, * 5%
50 We choose to calculate the Spearman Correlation coefficient, because – compared to the Pearson coefficient – no linear 
relationship is postulated. 
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3.3.3 Analytical statistics results
Data used for the analytical models
For the analytical statistical models we could only use data of respondents who agreed to participate in 
the TDR market and data that was classified as ‘reliable’ (n=124) (cf. section 3.3.1). 
Because we assume that respondents asking high prices (bidding low prices) in the first auction might 
decrease (increase) their prices in the subsequent four auctions more than other respondents, we calcu-
late a variable ‘AdaptationRate’ that considers this behavior (eq. 3-2 for senders, eq. 3-3 for receivers):
AdaptationRate = (PAsk1 – PAsk5) / (PAsk1) (3-2)
AdaptationRate = (PBid5 – PBid1) / (PBid1) (3-3)
where PAsk1 (PBid1) represents the ask (bid) price in the first auction and PAsk5 (PBid5) the ask (bid) price 
in the fifth auction.
The descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for both senders and receivers are 
illustrated in the Table 3-8 to Table 3-13.
Sender
Table 3-8: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for senders of the category of 
enterprises.
Variable name Description Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
PAsk1
Ask price per TDR in the 
first auction (in CHF) 487.50 2,500.00 1,295.04 602.30
PAskLF
Ask price per TDR –
calculated with the loca-
tion factor – in the first 
auction (in CHF) 
100.00 3,500.00 1,356.92 872.10
ParcelArea a Parcel area (in qm) 600.00 1,600.00 1,120.00 275.68
LocationFactor b Land price index 0.87 1.18 0.97 0.10
PTDRtheoretical
Theoretical TDR value 
(in CHF) 487.50 1,860.00 1,023.22 371.64
AdaptationRate
Adaptation of the TDR 
price (first to fifth ask 
price)
0.00 0.82 0.24 0.22
a values for these variables were given in the questionnaire.
b The location factor represents a land price index at municipality level (for building zones) and so it takes into account the
very different land prices of the various building zones areas.
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Table 3-9: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for senders of the category of 
NPI.
Variable name Description Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
PAsk1
Ask price per TDR in the 
first auction (in CHF) 650.00 3,200.00 1,441.67 671.77
PAskLF
Ask price per TDR –
calculated with the loca-
tion factor – in the first 
auction (in CHF) 
500.00 3,070.00 1,396.47 687.70
ParcelArea a Parcel area (in qm) 450.00 1,350.00 1,016.67 237.64
LocationFactor Land price index 0.91 1.30 0.99 0.09
PTDRtheoretical
Theoretical TDR value 
(in CHF) 735.00 2,553.33 1,167.45 465.51
AdaptationRate
Adaptation of the TDR 
price (first to fifth ask 
price)
0.06 0.90 0.38 0.25
a values for these variables were given in the questionnaire.
Table 3-10: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for senders of the category 
of RPP.
Variable name Description Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
PAsk1
Ask price per TDR in the 
first auction (in CHF) 450.00 3,313.00 1,505.83 798.58
PAskLF
Ask price per TDR –
calculated with the loca-
tion factor – in the first 
auction (in CHF) 
400.00 2,600.00 1,390.17 605.73
ParcelArea a Parcel area (in qm) 450.00 1,250.00 815.80 308.90
LocationFactor Land price index 0.87 1.27 1.02 0.12
PTDRtheoretical
Theoretical TDR value 
(in CHF) 612.50 3313.33 1372.96 763.25
AdaptationRate
Adaptation of the TDR 
price (first to fifth ask 
price)
0.00 0.99 0.40 0.26
a values for these variables were given in the questionnaire.
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Receiver
Table 3-11: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for receivers of the category 
of enterprises.
Variable name Description Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
PBid1
Bid price per TDR in the 
first auction (in CHF) 400.00 1,875.00 916.08 479.25
PBidLF
Bid price per TDR –
calculated with the loca-
tion factor – in the first 
auction (in CHF) 
450.00 1,875.00 932.75 442.57
ParcelArea a Parcel area (in qm) 900.00 1,700.00 1,304.17 227.10
LocationFactor Land price index 0.92 1.31 1.13 0.12
PTDRtheoretical
Theoretical TDR value 
(in CHF) 860.00 2,860 1,714.58 624.32
AdaptationRate
Adaptation of the TDR 
price (first to fifth bid 
price)
0.15 2.49 0.73 0.65
a values for these variables were given in the questionnaire.
Table 3-12: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for receivers of the category 
of NPI.
Variable name Description Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
PBid1
Bid price per TDR in the 
first auction (in CHF) 100.00 1,700.00 640.00 469.52
PBidLF
Bid price per TDR –
calculated with the loca-
tion factor – in the first 
auction (in CHF) 
100.00 1,800.00 617.00 493.33
ParcelArea a Parcel area (in qm) 850 1,550 1,180.00 266.88
LocationFactor Land price index 0.87 1.20 1.02 0.12
PTDRtheoretical
Theoretical TDR value 
(in CHF) 737.50 5,186.67 1,585.08 1,331.92
AdaptationRate
Adaptation of the TDR 
price (first to fifth bid 
price)
0.40 1.50 0.86 0.34
a values for these variables were given in the questionnaire.
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Table 3-13: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the analytical models for receivers of the category 
of RPP.
Variable name Description Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
PBid1
Bid price per TDR in the 
first auction (in CHF) 196.65 2,500.00 965.18 624.60
PBidLF
Bid price per TDR –
calculated with the loca-
tion factor – in the first 
auction (in CHF) 
210.70 1,900.00 934.09 541.27
ParcelArea a Parcel area (in qm) 450.00 1,200.00 769.35 308.94
LocationFactor Land price index 0.86 1.31 1.07 0.15
PTDRtheoretical
Theoretical TDR value 
(in CHF) 492.50 2,860.00 1499.22 688.75
AdaptationRate
Adaptation of the TDR 
price (fifth minus first bid 
price divided by the first 
bid price)
0.08 4.00 0.78 0.77
a values for these variables were given in the questionnaire.
Regression models without interactions
In order to investigate the research questions 4 to 7 (cf. section 3.1.2), we calculated various regression 
models51 to explain the stated bid and ask prices (cf. Table 3-8 to Table 3-13 for the descriptive statis-
tics of the explanatory variables52). 
Since the land registry and transaction data used in the TDR-ABM do not include any information on 
the personal characteristics of the landowners, these variables are not considered in the regression 
models. 
Sender
The first three models for senders (MOD SE, SNPI, SRPP; one model per landowner category) were 
based on the assumption that the stated ask price in the first auction is a linear function of the theoreti-
cal TDR value (cf. eq. 3-1) and other plausible explanatory variables (except for the LocationFactor). 
Because of our small data set and the fact that our sample cannot be considered as fully representative 
for the whole population, we kept explanatory variables in our models that were not statistically signif-
icant. The reason is that for the calibration of the TDR-ABM we wanted to estimate a model with the 
highest possible explanatory power. Moreover, the coefficients are less biased, when many control 
variables are used. They are more accurate, independent of their statistical significance. 
51 The unknown parameters were estimated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
52 Also known as ‘independent variables’.
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In order to check for multicollinearity we calculated the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the ex-
planatory variables. The VIF values (max. 1.293 for PTDRtheoretical in the model MOD SNPI) indicate 
that no multicollinearity exists. 
Table 3-14: Determinants of first ask price of enterprises (MOD SE)a.
MOD SE
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 1332.165* 2.040 -123.089 2,787.419
ParcelArea -1.018* -2.029 -2.136 0.100
PTDRtheoretical 1.075*** 3.163 0.318 1.832
AdaptationRate -154.678 -0.252 -1,523.737 1,214.381
Number of observations 15
R2 0.557
Adjusted R2 0.424
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Table 3-15: Determinants of first ask price of NPI (MOD SNPI)a.
MOD SNPI
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 956.716 1.487 -423.048 2336.480
ParcelArea -0.651 -1.149 -1.867 0.564
PTDRtheoretical 1.090*** 3.667 0.453 1.728
AdaptationRate -333.872 -0.640 -1452.464 784.720
Number of observations 18
R2 0.540
Adjusted R2 0.442
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Table 3-16: Determinants of first ask price of RPP (MOD SRPP)a.
MOD SRPP
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 198.349 0.999 -205.965 602.663
ParcelArea -0.025 -0.128 -0.416 0.367
PTDRtheoretical 0.926*** 12.132 0.771 1.082
AdaptationRate 134.163 0.586 -332.026 600.352
Number of observations 38
R2 0.826
Adjusted R2 0.810
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
The results in the Table 3-14 to Table 3-16 show that seemingly all categories asked for prices very 
close to the theoretical TDR value. The coefficient of this variable is highly significant in all models. 
However, no statistically significant difference between the categories could be found (confidence 
levels of the coefficients overlap). 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the adaptation rate is not significant and therefore the interpretation 
should be treated with caution. Yet, because the results for enterprises and NPI are expected, we pro-
ceed with an interpretation: if a landowner in the category of enterprises reduces the ask price by 50% 
(AdaptationRate =1) then the ask price in the first auction is 154.7 CHF lower compared to landown-
ers with no adaptation. This means in other words that the greater the adaption rate, the lower the first 
ask price. In the category of RPP this effect could not be found. However, as the significance tests and 
the confidence intervals53 of this coefficient indicate, there are no statistically significant differences 
between the categories.
53 Because of few observations, in particular in the categories of enterprises and NPI, we looked at the residuals of the differ-
ent models (calculated a QQ-Plot for both sender and receiver models) and found that they correspond to the OLS assump-
tions (normally distributed). Therefore, we are confident that the data are reliable, and we calculated the confidence intervals 
of the coefficients. However, because of the small sample size, the interpretation of the confidence intervals should be treated 
with caution.
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The coefficient of the parcel area has a negative sign in all models and points to the fact that respond-
ents with a larger parcel, ask – ceteris paribus – reduced TDR prices. This was expected because the 
quantity of TDR increases with the parcel area and accordingly, the price for a single TDR decreases 
(cf. footnote 41).
Receiver
We proceeded in the same way for the receivers (cf. Table 3-17 to Table 3-19). Also here, the 
multicollinearity check (max. VIF value of 1.680 for ParcelArea in the model MOD RE) indicates that 
no multicollinearity exists. 
As expected, the coefficient for the theoretical TDR value is considerably smaller than in the models 
for the senders. This is due to the fact that the landowners will increase the bid price in the subsequent 
auctions. 
Particularly interesting is that there is a statistically significant difference between NPI and RPP (con-
fidence intervals of PTDRtheoretical do not overlap). It is striking that the landowners of the category of 
NPI bid very low prices in the first auction. This might be connected to a skeptical stance towards a 
TDR market (low willingness to participate, cf. Table 3-4).
The variable AdaptationRate is significant in all categories. Seemingly, market participants in the re-
ceiving area behave more strategically than the ones in the sending area. Because of the low value of 
the coefficient of the theoretical TDR value, NPI adapted the bid price most of all.
The best model – for both senders and receivers – could be estimated for receivers in the category of 
NPI (MOD RNPI, R2 of 0.916 and adjusted R2 of 0.865). Although this result is very promising for the 
calibration of the TDR-ABM, it should be treated with caution. The sample size of n=10 is too low to 
be sure that the results are representative for all potential landowners of that category. Concerning the 
sample size, the most accurate representation could be reached in the category of RPP (for both send-
ers and receivers).
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Table 3-17: Determinants of first bid price of enterprises (MOD RE)a.
MOD RE
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 1,561.239* 1.955 -280.239 3,402.718
ParcelArea -0.954 -1.582 -2.344 0.436
PTDRtheoretical 0.577** 3.047 0.140 1.013
AdaptationRate -536.334** -2.658 -1,001.558 -71.109
Number of observations 12
R2 0.611
Adjusted R2 0.466
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table 3-18: Determinants of first bid price of NPI (MOD RNPI)a.
MOD RNPI
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 444.716 1.573 -281.894 1,171.326
ParcelArea 0.445 1.556 -0.290 1.181
PTDRtheoretical 0.211*** 4.298 0.085 0.337
AdaptationRate -706.460** -3.372 -1,245.043 -167.878
Number of observations 10
R2 0.916
Adjusted R2 0.865
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table 3-19: Determinants of first bid price of RPP (MOD RRPP)a.
MOD RRPP
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 347.590 1.193 -251.109 946.289
ParcelArea -0.078 -0.280 -0.652 0.496
PTDRtheoretical 0.596*** 5.515 0.374 0.818
AdaptationRate -263.746** -2.695 -464.887 -62.605
Number of observations 31
R2 0.652
Adjusted R2 0.611
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Regression models with interactions
The tested semi-log54 and double-log models for the senders and receivers did not improve the quality 
of the previous models. For this reason, the results are not illustrated here. 
Next, we tried to improve the models with the introduction of plausible interactions. We considered 
the following interactions to be plausible: interaction between PTDRtheoretical and AdaptationRate, 
PTDRtheoretical and ParcelArea, ParcelArea and AdaptationRate. 
However, we found only for the receivers in the RPP category a plausible and significant interaction 
(ParcelArea and AdaptationRate) that improved the simple linear model (cf. Table 3-20). The expla-
nation behind this interaction is that the parcel area might have an influence on the adaptation rate. For 
example, a landowner with a small parcel area might bid more strategically, that is, the adaptation of 
the bid price during the five auctions might be higher for small parcels.
The structure of the model (MOD RRPP 2) is the same as in the first model (MOD RRPP), except that 
the interaction has been added. The model quality could be slightly improved (adjusted R2 from 0.611 
to 0.655). The significant effect of the interaction allows the definite statement to be made that if the 
parcel area increases by one unit, then the coefficient of the variable AdaptationRate increases by 
0.887. Fig. 3-1 illustrates the marginal effect of the adaptation rate graphically.
54 Once we log-transformed the dependent variable and once the explanatory variables (metric variables).
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Table 3-20: Determinants of the interaction model of first bid price of RPP (MOD RRPP 2)a.
MOD RRPP 2
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 1048.083** 2.398 147.984 1948.181
ParcelArea -0.891* -1.879 -1.868 0.086
PTDRtheoretical 0.570*** 5.551 0.359 0.782
AdaptationRate -1020.932** -2.694 -1801.283 -240.581
AdaptationRate*ParcelArea 0.887** 2.060 0.000 1.774
Number of observations 31
R2 0.702
Adjusted R2 0.655
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Fig. 3-1: Interaction between adaptation rate (AdaptationRate) and parcel area (ParcelArea) for re-
ceivers of the category of RPP.
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Regression models for testing the influence of the location factor 
In the TDR-ABM, an additional factor, the location factor, may be introduced which changes the 
number of TDR per parcel (cf. footnote 41). This factor represents a land price index at municipality 
level (for building zones) and takes into account the variation of land prices in the building zone areas. 
By multiplying it with the parcel area and the utilization factor, it reduces (index values below 1) or 
increases (index values above 1) the number of TDR per parcel. 
In the questionnaire we asked the respondents to offer or bid for the TDR of their allocated parcel, 
once calculated without and once with the location factor. It is assumed that if a landowner considers 
the value of a parcel as a whole, then the location factor would have no influence (cf. research ques-
tion 6 in section 3.1.2). This is because they would have a certain idea of how much to ask (bid) for 
the parcel as a whole and consequently they would ask (bid) more if the number of TDR decreases or 
ask (bid) less if the number of TDR increases. Hence, in total, the same amount of money per TDR 
bundle would result.
This research question was addressed through calculating the same regression models as in sub-section
Regression models without interactions (cf. above), except that the theoretical TDR value has been 
calculated with the location factor. The corresponding results are listed in detail in the appendix B (cf.
Table B-2 to Table B-7). 
Most interesting in this analysis was to investigate whether the coefficient for the theoretical TDR 
value changes or not. The results show that it remained – with very small deviations – the same. As 
mentioned above, the landowners seemingly have an idea of how much to ask (bid) for the parcel as a 
whole and consequently they change their ask (bid) prices according to the number of TDR per parcel. 
Regression models for estimating the bid and ask price adaptation 
In order to estimate the TDR price adaptation during the five auctions we fitted a polynomial func-
tion55 to the stated ask and bid prices. For this purpose, all stated prices were standardized in a way 
that the first price represents 100% and the prices in the subsequent auctions the respective deviation 
from 100%.
Sender
The best results for the senders were obtained with linear functions. The form of these functions is 
described in equation 3-4, and the corresponding coefficients are presented in Table 3-21. Moreover, 
the Fig. 3-2 to Fig. 3-4 show the adaptation functions with the corresponding confidence levels. The 
confidence levels have been calculated in order to compare the results of the three categories. Fur-
55 The following functions (OLS regression models) were tested with the SPSS ‘curvefit algorithm’: linear, logarithmic, 
quadratic, cubic, s-shaped and growth-function.
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thermore, the stated prices and the respondent-specific adaptations are illustrated in separate figures in 
the appendix B (cf. Fig. B-3 to Fig. B-5)
In a practical implementation of the TDR-ABM, the functions would be adapted in a way that the 
price for the first auction equals the determined price in the regression models. This could be easily 
done through replacing the value of the Constant (here: 100) with the estimated price in the first auc-
tion56.
Ask(x) = 100 – b1*x (3-4)
with x=1 for the second ask price, 2 for the third, 3 for the fourth and 4 for the fifth.
Table 3-21: Adaptation functions for senders of different categories.
R2 F p-value b1
Lower level of 
95% confidence 
interval of b1
Upper level of 
95% confidence 
interval of b1
Enterprises 0.264 24.434 0.000 5.909 4.542 7.277
NPI 0.392 56.707 0.000 9.367 7.948 10.786
RPP 0.423 130.358 0.000 9.780 8.806 10.754
The coefficients (b1) in Table 3-21 indicate that the ask price is adapted most (reduced) by RPP, then 
by NPI and least by enterprises. However, RPP and NPI behave almost equally. They adapt the ask 
price by 9.8% respectively 9.4% per auction. Enterprises adapt the ask prices slightly less (5.9% per 
auction) and they behave differently than the other categories (cf. confidence levels).
56 The value f(x=0) would represent the TDR price in the first auction, the value f(x=1) the price in the second auction etc.
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Fig. 3-2: Estimated function and confidence levels for senders of the category of enterprises.
Fig. 3-3: Estimated function and confidence levels for senders of the category of NPI.
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Fig. 3-4: Estimated function and confidence levels for senders of the category of RPP.
Receiver
The best results for the receivers were obtained with exponential functions (cf. Table 3-22 and eq.
3-5). The adaptation functions with the corresponding confidence levels are shown in the Fig. 3-5 to 
Fig. 3-7. The respondent-specific behavior can be found in the appendix B (cf. Fig. B-6 to Fig. B-8).
Bid(x) = 100 * exp(b1*x) (3-5)
with x=1 for the second bid price, 2 for the third, 3 for the fourth and 4 for the fifth.
Table 3-22: Adaptation functions for receivers of different categories.
R2 F p-value b1
Lower level of 
95% confidence 
interval of b1
Upper level of 
95% confidence 
interval of b1
Enterprises 0.572 76.546 0.000 0.103 0.091 0.115
NPI 0.786 194.863 0.000 0.148 0.136 0.160
RPP 0.345 75.414 0.000 0.124 0.106 0.143
The highest price adaptation – restricted to the interval of 5 auctions – can be observed in the NPI 
category, then in the RPP category followed by the enterprises category. Also here a statistically sig-
nificant difference between enterprises and NPI could be found (cf. confidence intervals). However, 
there was no observable difference in the behavior between enterprises and RPP respectively NPI and 
RPP.
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Fig. 3-5: Estimated function and confidence levels for receivers of the category of enterprises.
Fig. 3-6: Estimated function and confidence levels for receivers of the category of NPI.
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Fig. 3-7: Estimated function and confidence levels for receivers of the category of RPP.
The reported findings – and also the one for the senders – should be carefully interpreted: (1) the dif-
ferences of the coefficients (b1) are low for the observed interval of 5 auctions, (2) the sample for the 
categories of enterprises and NPI are relatively small, and (3) in the questionnaire we asked the profes-
sionals to indicate the price for all five auctions under the assumption that they would have no success. 
We did not communicate the resulting market clearing price of each auction. This could not be imple-
mented, because otherwise another kind of survey would have been needed which would have been 
more time-consuming and more complicated. 
3.4 Discussion 
In this paper we describe a questionnaire survey for collecting data to calibrate an agent-based model 
(TDR-ABM). The survey was specifically designed to calibrate the TDR-ABM and each single ques-
tionnaire stated a unique realistic situation that suited the contacted landowner category. This approach 
is special and turned out to be particularly advantageous, because of the implicit data variability that 
allowed the calculation of various linear models. Nevertheless, it is worth stating that the unique situa-
tion description and making the questionnaire available both in printed and online forms, was quite a 
time-consuming procedure. 
Because of the complex topic and the previously lack of public information and debate about transfer-
able development rights, we chose to contact professionals instead of a random sample of all existing 
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and potential landowners. This decision proved to be well justified, because the respondents did not 
seem to have many problems filling out the questionnaire (stated difficulty in completing the ques-
tionnaire was rather low). However, the response rate was quite low. It might be that the low response 
rate could have been raised through special measures or incentives (e.g. prior recruitment through 
telephone survey, cf. e.g. Dillman et al., 2009, Axhausen and Weis, 2010). Such additional efforts 
could not be taken because of cost limitations and partly because of missing information e.g. telephone 
numbers. 
As mentioned above, the questionnaire was distributed in a printed form with the additional possibility 
to fill it out online. Interestingly and unexpectedly only 21.4% used the online form. However, the 
‘online-users’ were more willing to participate in the TDR market then the ‘paper-users’ (‘online-user’ 
participation probability of 62%, compared to 44% of the ‘paper-user’). For this reason, it can be con-
cluded that the combination of a printed and online form turned out to be expedient. 
The quite low willingness to participate in the TDR market should be put into perspective with the fact 
that there could have been considerable scepticism about a new instrument (e.g. because of a lack of 
information, strategic behavior etc.; cf. e.g. Gmünder, 2010). We claim that in a ‘real’ implementation 
of a TDR market the willingness to participate might be higher because of better information through 
the use of additional diffusion or communication instruments (e.g. reports in newspaper, oral presenta-
tions etc.), through self-diffusion effects (target people have an effect – voluntary or not – on the be-
havior of others) (cf. Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001) and the fact that there would be no possi-
bility to get a parcel of land developed without TDR, respectively not selling TDR would be like burn-
ing money.
In the questionnaire we ask the professionals to state the ask / bid price respectively for the TDR of a 
parcel with certain characteristics. Based on the stated prices we calculated different models that pre-
dict the TDR price as a function of the theoretical TDR price, the adaptation rate and the parcel area.
We did not directly ask for the beta coefficients of our explanatory variables, because this would have 
led to a very complex questionnaire with many more questions. Furthermore, the stated coefficients of 
all respondents would have to have been averaged which would not have increased the model quality.
The adaptation of the TDR price during the five auctions has been estimated through fitting a polyno-
mial function to the stated ask and bid prices. An alternative and probably better method would have 
been to analyze the data using time series analysis and to make appropriate models. However, as the 
collected data on price adaptations is not based on the resulting market clearing price of each auction, 
the simple adaptation functions seemed appropriate for the calibration of the TDR-ABM.
A significant disadvantage of a questionnaire survey is that usually there is no possibility to check 
back on potentially wrong responses due to misunderstandings of a complex topic. This might also 
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have been the case in our study57. We excluded possible wrong responses with a plausibility test based 
on the theoretical TDR value (cf. section 3.3.1). This approach prevented model misspecifications, 
biased parameter estimations and incorrect results58. 
Another disadvantage or challenge in this study was the relatively small sample size we were able to 
gather, especially for the landowner categories of enterprises and NPI. Therefore, the interpretation of 
the coefficients and confidence intervals should be treated with caution. Our sample cannot be consid-
ered as representative for all existing and potential landowners and therefore, some conclusions are 
speculative as opposed to definitive. 
A promising approach to address model uncertainties (e.g. not significant coefficients or values for the 
probability to participate in the TDR market) in the TDR-ABM is to vary the calibrated parameters 
within a certain interval of the calculated coefficients (sensitivity analysis). This is a major advantage 
of a simulation approach compared to a pure analytical method and can be implemented without too 
much additional effort.
3.5 Conclusions 
The findings concerning our research questions can be summarized as follows:
(1) The landowner categories participated with different probabilities in the TDR market. Among 
the senders, the NPI were barely willing to sell TDR. The NPI were also largely unwilling to 
buy for any rights. The highest willingness to participate was found, for both senders and re-
ceivers, in the category of RPP.
(2) The most important criteria when determining the TDR price was the building zone price be-
fore introduction of TDR. Other important criteria were: the location quality, the need/desire 
to develop the parcel, the expected loss in value due to ‘non-development’ (sender) or the ex-
pected increase in value through the acquisition of TDR (receiver). There was no substantial 
difference between the different landowner categories.
(3) Two reasons were crucial for respondents who did not want to participate in a potential TDR 
market: the seemingly too complicated procedure of the TDR instrument and the high transac-
tion costs. The landowner characteristics (e.g. experience in land sale or purchase) had no par-
ticular influence on the decision to participate in the TDR market or not.
(4) The TDR price (ask and bid) in the first auction was mostly determined by the theoretical 
TDR value (function of the building zone price, agricultural zone price and utilization factor; 
57 A couple of respondents (5-10%) called to verify their answers.
58 For more information on outlier detection methods see Ben-Gal (2005).
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statistically significant in all models). Furthermore, the parcel area was significant in the mod-
el for senders in the enterprises category and the adaptation rate was significant in all receiver 
models. Additionally, for receivers in the RPP category the interaction between the adaptation 
rate and the parcel area was found to be significant.
(5) The three sender landowner categories did not behave significantly differently when determin-
ing the TDR price in the first auction. Among the receiver categories, NPI and RPP behaved 
with significant difference concerning the theoretical TDR value.
(6) The location factor seemed to have had no or just a very slight influence on the price that a 
landowner asked or paid for the TDR bundle of a parcel. The landowners seemingly had an 
idea of how much to ask (bid) for the parcel as a whole and consequently they changed their 
ask (bid) prices according to the number of TDR per parcel.
(7) The adaptation of the TDR price during the five auctions was partially dependent on the land-
owner category. Among the senders (linear adaptation functions), the ask price was most 
adapted by RPP, then by NPI and least by enterprises. A statistically significant difference 
could be found between enterprises and the other two categories. Among the receivers (expo-
nential adaptation functions), the greatest price adaptation was observed in the NPI category, 
then in the RPP category, followed by the enterprises category. Here, only a statistically sig-
nificant difference between enterprises and NPI could be found.
To conclude, the results show that the approach to collect data with a questionnaire survey to calibrate 
an agent-based model is useful. In particular, it revealed the usefulness of conducting a survey after 
determining the simulation model. This helps designing the questionnaire specifically to the needs of 
the model. Moreover, the comparison of the stated prices with theoretically expected prices allowed 
the detection and exclusion of potential outliers due to misunderstanding or lack of effort in answering 
the questions. This helped to prevent model misspecifications or biased parameter estimations. 
When it comes to furthering this work (cf. chapter 4), the TDR-ABM was calibrated by incorporating 
the results of this study.
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4 Results of the TDR market simulation
Abstract: Transferable development rights (TDR) are discussed or applied in various countries for a wide vari-
ety of purposes, notably to increase building densities, to preserve natural areas, to compensate reduced devel-
opment possibilities, and to control land use in rural areas. In Switzerland, TDR, a market-oriented planning 
instrument, might be used to reduce the land-use problems related to the unsustainable development of the set-
tlement areas and to manage the problems with the spatially imbalanced supply and demand of existing unde-
veloped building zones. 
The aim of this paper is to briefly introduce a TDR market concept for Switzerland, then to present an empiri-
cally calibrated agent-based TDR market simulation and finally analyze the detailed simulation results. We ran 
the simulation with five different settings which allowed the investigation of the impact of different agent be-
haviors and the impact of a change of land prices due to a new law restricting second home construction. 
The results show that the TDR prices were comparable with existing land prices in Switzerland, i.e. prices to 
develop land would not rise. In addition, we are able to show that with the trade of TDR, it would be possible to 
downzone 11.4 km2 of building zone land for which there is no demand and to develop 7.4 km2 new building 
zone land up to the year 2018. Consequently, the defined building zone area would decrease, which would be in 
line with political objectives. Finally, we demonstrate that the popular initiative on second homes might only 
slightly reduce the building zone prices and thus had only a small effect on the TDR market price.
Keywords: Transferable Development Rights (TDR), TDR market, Agent Based Modeling (ABM), market 
simulation, market clearing price
*This chapter is a slightly amended version of the paper “Results of an agent-based market simulation for transferable devel-
opment rights (TDR) in Switzerland” written by Gianluca Menghini, Fabian Gemperle and Kay W. Axhausen. The paper has 
been submitted to the Journal Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design and is currently ‘under review’. The au-
thors would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for funding the project (K-21K1-1224), and Wüest und
Partner AG, the cantons of Zurich, Thurgau and Fribourg for providing various data sets on building and agricultural land. 
Moreover, we thank PD Dr. Irmi Seidl from the Research Unit Economics and Social Sciences at Swiss Federal Institute 
WSL and Prof. Dr. Philippe Thalmann from the Research Group on the Economics and Management of the Environment at 
Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
*
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4.1 Introduction
Transferable development rights (TDR) – a market-oriented planning instrument – have been dis-
cussed since the late 1960s59 and are applied or at least discussed in various countries. The instrument 
is widespread in the USA, and also partially applied in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, Latin America, the Netherlands, South Korea, Spain and New Zealand. The purposes 
range from increasing building density and the protection of monuments in cities to the preservation of 
natural areas, as well as for compensation for reduced development possibilities, and the control of 
land use in rural areas (Chomitz, 2004; Gibson, 1996; Henger and Bizer, 2010; Janssen-Jansen et al., 
2008; Kaplowitz et al., 2008; Micelli, 2002; Pruetz, 2003; Tan and Beckmann, 2010).
In Switzerland, TDR might be applied as an instrument to reduce the land-use problems related to the 
unsustainable development of the settlement areas and to manage the problems caused by an imbal-
anced supply and demand of existing undeveloped building zones. In the last 30 years60 the 23.5% 
increase of the settlement area has been related to population and economic growth, changes in life-
style (e.g. greater demand of living space per person61) and to a formerly lax planning practice (see 
below). It has resulted in an increase of urban sprawl which has many negative consequences (for ex-
amples see e.g. Baumgartner 2005; Brownstone and Golob 2009 or Ewing 2008).
The problem with the spatially imbalanced supply and demand of undeveloped building zones is main-
ly caused by the permissive zoning practice of many municipalities and toleration of unlawful situa-
tions by authorizing public institutions (at canton and federal level). In the past, many municipalities –
mainly in rural areas – have designated too large building zones with low densities. This practice was 
primarily intended to be an incentive for the influx of certain population groups and promised new tax 
revenues. However, this policy ignored the Swiss Federal Law on Spatial Planning62 and led to an 
exceptionally strong imbalance of supply and demand for undeveloped building zones: In urbanized 
areas and along major transport routes the estimated demand in the next twenty years will considera-
bly exceed the current reserves. In contrast, in rural areas the reserve of undeveloped building zones is 
significantly larger than the calculated demand for the next twenty years (ARE, 2008; Fahrländer Part-
ner, 2008).
59 The idea of transferable development rights was first applied in New York City in the late 1960s for the protection of 
historic buildings (Johnston and Madison, 1997). It allowed landowners of protected sites to sell their unused development 
rights to adjacent parcels, which could then exceed their development potential.
60 Results of the Areal Statistics 1979/85 – 2004/09 (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/02/03.html, ac-
cessed: 2012-11-02)
61 The amount of living space per person increased from 34m2 in 1980 to around 50m2 at present. This trend continues and it 
is estimated that in 2030 this space will be 55m2 (http://www.are.admin.ch/dokumentation/01378/04315/index.html?lang=de, 
accessed: 07-28-2012).
62 According to the Swiss Federal Act of 22 June 1979 on Spatial Planning, the designated building zones should not be 
greater than the anticipated demand for the next 15 years.
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In order to solve this imbalance and to reduce the high land consumption, the Swiss population ac-
cepted the revision of the Swiss Federal Spatial Planning law. The revision includes, among others, 
measures for the mobilization of hoarded zones of building land on suitable areas according to Swiss 
spatial planning principles and, more importantly, downzoning63 building zones for which there will 
be no demand in the next 15 years. 
In Switzerland, in most cases the landowners whose parcel is downzoned will have to be fully com-
pensated because changing its status from the building zone to the agricultural zone is a form of mate-
rial expropriation of the owner. Many municipalities and cantons cannot finance this64. For example, 
in the canton of Valais, the building zone reserves are three to four times larger than allowed by the 
Swiss Federal Spatial Planning law. Another example is the Canton of Vaud, where the reserves in 
two third of the municipalities are twice as large as permitted (cf. calculations of Fahrländer Partner, 
2008). Again, it is doubtful whether these municipalities have the financial means to put the proposed 
downzoning into practice. 
A solution to reduce these problems are transferable development rights (TDR). They allow transfer-
ring development rights, and the result of such transfers may be seen as a form of rezoning. In a TDR 
market, landowners in 'sending areas' can sell their right to build to landowners in 'receiving areas'. 
This results in less land consumption in the former and increased density in the latter, since in the re-
ceiving area there might be denser development (higher utilization factor, cf. section 4.2.2) compared 
to the density in the sending area.
In the first paper (chapter 2) both a concept for a Swiss TDR market and an agent-based model for 
simulating the proposed market (called TDR-ABM) is presented. The concept was discussed in a 
workshop65 with spatial planning and real estate experts, and therefore it includes ideas and sugges-
tions of landowners involved in such a potential market. The agent-based simulation was developed to 
assess the demand, supply and prices in such a market and because there may not be any political will-
ingness to implement such an instrument without prior information on its likely effects. 
63 The practice of reducing the zoning of land from building to agricultural zone.
64 BSS (2011) estimate for the whole of Switzerland that with a zoning tax of 25% (tax on planning gains, skimming of plan-
ning surplus values), in the next 20 years, only 36% (10,000 hectares) of the unwanted existing building zones could be 
downzoned. However, there are considerable regional differences. The lowest financial potential to compensate downzoning 
of not demanded building zones exists in the cantons of Valais, Glarus, Ticino, Basle-Land and Jura. Furthermore, following 
the legislation proposals the zoning tax would have to be paid only in the case the planning gain is realized, that is the parcel 
would be developed or sold. This causes a problematic temporal delay in comparison to the immediate compensation of 
landowners whose parcel would be downzoned.
65 Participants were experts from local authorities (Confederation/Canton/Municipality), banks, real estate companies, a 
planning association and academics.
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An agent-based model was chosen – instead e.g. of a pure analytical method – because of the hetero-
geneous participants66 in the TDR market. With an agent-based model it is possible to model individu-
al decision-making and human behavior (e.g. the degree of rationality, risk aversion, learning abilities 
etc.) which is essential for simulating the TDR market. Furthermore, it is possible to consider special 
variables/parameter distribution patterns or to reduce random effects (e.g. probability to participate in 
the TDR market) by running the simulation many times (e.g. 100 times) and then averaging the results 
from all runs. However, up to this point, the simulation (for the model prototype cf. chapter 2, section 
2.3) has not yet been calibrated with empirical data and therefore lacks empirical validation. 
Agent-based models have been successfully applied in several land-use related applications such as 
policy analysis and planning (e.g. Happe et al., 2006), participatory modeling (e.g. D'Aquino et al., 
2003), explaining spatial patterns of land use or settlement (e.g. Parker and Meretsky, 2004), testing 
social and economic science concepts (e.g. Polhill et al., 2001), or for modeling land use functions 
(e.g. An et al., 2005). For more information about agent-based models related to land-use see e.g. 
Filatova et al. (2009), Magliocca et al. (2011) or Matthews et al. (2007).
The aim of this paper is to present the empirically calibrated simulation model of the potential Swiss 
TDR market and the associated results. The results will show the impact of a potential implementation 
of a TDR market and will therefore inform the public and expert debate. Moreover, the impacts of a 
change of land prices due to new law will be analyzed, i.e, the impact of the adoption of the ‘popular 
initiative67 on second homes’ in Switzerland (adopted on 11 March 2012). Since 22 August 2012 an 
ordinance for second homes applies to municipalities with more than 20% of second homes. In those 
municipalities building further second homes68 is no longer allowed. This restriction might have a 
negative effect on the price of building land (cf. Kaufmann and Rieder, 2012; NZZ, 2012) and there-
fore on the TDR price. Such a situation will be analyzed in one of the model settings (cf. section 4.4). 
In the next section we will present in detail the TDR market concept, the data preparation and the cal-
culations for the study area. The research questions will be presented in section 4.2.3. Afterwards (sec-
tion 4.3), the TDR-ABM and in particular the involved agents are described. This is followed by a 
presentation of the results of the various model settings (section 4.4), a discussion of the main findings 
(section 4.5) and conclusions (section 4.6).
66 Here, the market participants (agents) represent landowners of different categories such as enterprises (banks etc.), individ-
ual persons, social organizations (e.g. cooperatives etc.) or the state.
67 This is an instrument of direct democracy, by which, at federal level a minimum of 100,000 voters request to adopt, repeal 
or amend a provision of the constitution.
68 For more information see: http://www.are.admin.ch/themen/raumplanung/00236/04094, accessed: 09-18-2012.
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4.2 Applying TDR in Switzerland
4.2.1 TDR market concept
In the following we present the central features of the proposed TDR market. (A comprehensive de-
scription of the proposed TDR market is presented in chapter 2).
The design of the TDR market focuses on the imbalanced supply and demand of the existing building 
zones in Switzerland and proposes to reduce this problem by trading development rights (TDR), which 
can be transferred from sending to receiving areas. A precondition of this dual-zone program is setting 
an overall cap for new building zones (following the cap-and-trade principle). 
In Switzerland, the designation of appropriate sending and receiving areas would ideally be done by 
the cantons and then in detail by the municipalities. The sending areas are composed of undeveloped 
building zone parcels for which there is no demand and/or which should be downzoned according to 
Swiss law because there is no need for them over the next 15 years. The receiving areas consist of 
parcels not yet designated as building zones, which – according to Swiss law – should be developed in 
the future because of high demand.
After the designation of the sending and receiving areas, the TDR initially need to be allocated. Here, 
a free allocation to the landowners in the sending area (called ‘senders’ or ‘sender agents’) is proposed 
(known as grandfathering principle). Those landowners can then decide to sell their awarded TDR to 
the landowners in the receiving area (called ‘receivers’ or ‘receiver agents’). In the case of a successful 
sale, the corresponding parcel in the sending area will be downzoned to agricultural land. The receiv-
ers need to buy a certain number of TDR to be allowed to develop their parcel. 
The number of TDR per parcel depends – for both senders and receivers – on the parcels’ size and the 
allowed utilization factor (cf. section 4.2.2). Moreover, the TDR per parcel have to be sold or bought 
as a whole (called ‘TDR bundle’). This is an incentive for the receivers to develop the maximum al-
lowable gross floor area69 per parcel (high density development), and the senders are fully compen-
sated for the loss of their development possibility in a single transaction. As a result the number of 
transactions and consequently transaction costs70 will be reduced.
The TDR are traded on a ‘TDR platform’ (called ‘trading agent’) following the rules of a multi-unit 
double auction (MDA) with a uniform price: Each landowner of the sending or receiving area can 
submit (voluntary participation) an ask (sender) with the desired price per TDR, respectively a bid 
(receiver) with the price s/he is willing to pay for the TDR needed. Then, at the end of the trading pe-
riod (representing one year), the trading agent sorts the asks by price in ascending, the bids in descend-
69 Also known as ‘living area’.
70 Costs associated with the exchange of goods or services, including information, negotiation, communication control costs.
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ing order and calculates the market clearing price. The market price is at the intersection of the ask-
and bid-curves. 
All sender agents who asked a price below or equal the market clearing price and all receiver agents 
who bid a price above or equal the market clearing price are successful. The other participating agents 
are unsuccessful and have the chance to participate in the next auction and to adapt their ask or bid 
prices respectively. 
It is suggested that there should be two rounds of five auctions71, with one year between each auction. 
The time for five auctions (=5 years) allows the municipalities to adapt their zoning plans, i.e. desig-
nate sending and receiving areas, for the next round. The auctions are only conducted once a year in 
order to encourage the market participants to bid more truthfully, as it takes a long time until the next 
trading opportunity.
4.2.2 Study area – data preparation and calculations
Switzerland covers an area of 41,284.9 km2 of which 6.8% is settlement area (SFSO, 2010a). The 
greater part (around 82%) of the settlement area consists of building zones, whose area is 2,270 km2 72. 
Of this area, between 378 and 528 km2 (17 to 24%)73 have not been developed. According to ARE 
(2008) and Fahrländer Partner (2008) these undeveloped building zones could provide space for about 
two million additional inhabitants. Switzerland has a present population of approximately 8 million 
inhabitants and current predictions (medium scenario) are that a peak will be reached in 2055 at 9 mil-
lion inhabitants (SFSO, 2010c).
Designation of sending and receiving areas
Following existing analyses of supply (cf. ARE, 2008) and demand (cf. Fahrländer Partner, 2008) for 
building zones, we calculated for each Swiss municipality the quantity of TDR of the potential sending 
and receiving areas for the year 201874. The following assumptions were made: (1) In order to have a 
homogenous market, only residential zones were considered. (2) The demand for building zones by 
Fahrländer Partner (2008) was reduced by considering the development potential not used so far75 (the 
additional gross floor area that can be realized without TDR). According to a study of the Canton of 
71 In the TDR-ABM we simulate only one round with 5 auctions.
72 The residential zone area is 1,054 km2, of which 183 to 277 km2 have not been developed.
73 Because of the fact that this calculation have been made in 2008, we assume for our study that 378 km2 (17%) of the exist-
ing building zone area is undeveloped.
74 We are interested to model the possible impacts of five auctions from 2013 – 2018 (end of 2017). For that purpose we 
calculate the potential sending and receiving area that would be available for the year 2018.
75 In Switzerland, landowners typically do not realize the development density permitted by law. For example, in the Canton 
of Zurich, it is only 66% of the currently permitted gross floor area (Kanton Zürich, 2009). Thus, there is potential to build 
much more densely, and increasing density to the legal limit would not require TDR programs. 
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Zurich, between 1993-2005, 54% of the newly built floor area was realized in already developed 
building zones by using the available development potential (inner densification, Germ: “Innere 
Verdichtung”) (Kanton Zürich, 2007). As the overall pressure for using this potential is rather lower 
outside Zurich, for the whole of Switzerland it was assumed that at maximum 40% of the demand 
could be realized by using the inner development potential76. (3) Since the supply and demand datasets 
are based on different years77, we scaled them linearly78 so that both datasets represent the same year 
of origin. (4) The total sending area (considering all municipalities) has been capped in a way79 that 
the total TDR quantity in both the sending and receiving area is nearly the same. This was done in 
order to designate a total sending area that is only as large as necessary. However, it was not possible 
to calculate the identical TDR quantity in both areas because the parcel sizes had to represent realistic 
distributions regarding the landowner categories and municipality types (cf. sub-section below: Desig-
nation of land parcels).
Based on the above assumptions and calculations, a municipality was assigned to the sending area if 
its existing undeveloped building zone area exceeds the projected demand until 2018. On the other 
hand, a municipality was assigned to the receiving area if the projected demand exceeds the supply of 
undeveloped building land until 2018. 
Designation of land parcels
After having calculated the size of the sending and receiving areas per municipality, those areas were 
divided into realistic parcel sizes. This division was based on empirical data of parcel sizes, which 
were derived from a database of more than 91,000 transactions of building zone parcels over the last 
20 years (Wüest und Partner AG 2011), and digital cadastral data from the Cantons of Zurich and
Thurgau.
Calculation of utilization factor and assignment of landowner categories
The transaction database and the digital cadastral data were also used to calculate the legal utilization 
factor UF per parcel. This factor determines – together with the parcel area – the legally allowed floor 
area and thus the quantity of TDR per parcel (cf. eq. 4-1). 
76 The Institute for spatial development at ETH Zurich (IRL) is about to develop a detailed method to identify inner develop-
ment potentials in settled areas (e.g. unbuilt sections between settled areas). As, so far, the investigation only covers a few 
cantons, we did not use the partial results but made a rough estimation. For more information see: 
http://www.raumplus.ethz.ch, accessed: 10-18-2012.
77 The study by Fahrländer Partner (2008) calculated demand values for the periods 2005 up to 2010, 2015, 2020, 2025 and 
2030. In contrast, the data about the supply of undeveloped building zone areas is from the year 2007 (ARE, 2008).
78 We assumed a linear increase resp. decrease of the aggregated demand resp. supply values over time.
79 In proportion to the area of undeveloped building zone parcels per municipality.
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Finally, we assigned to the individual parcels different landowner categories using proportions found 
in land registry data of various municipalities in the Canton of Grisons, as well as transaction data of 
undeveloped land parcels (building and agricultural zones) of the Cantons of Zurich and Fribourg. The 
following landowner categories are distinguished:
- Enterprises80 operating in the commercial real estate market (‘enterprises’)
- Confederation/Cantons/Municipalities/Social Organizations81 (‘non-profit institutions’, ‘NPI’)
- Individuals/married couples/simple partnerships82 (‘individuals’)
The characteristics of the sending and receiving areas for the year 2018 are summarized in Table 4-1. 
A more detailed description (characteristics per municipality type and canton) can be found in the 
appendix C (cf. Table C-1, Table C-2 and Fig. C-1)
Table 4-1: Characteristics of the sending and receiving areas for the year 2018 (own calculations, data 
basis: ARE, 2008 and Fahrländer Partner, 2008).
Number of 
landowners (parcels) 
Area (in km2) Assigned TDR quantity
Sending area 30,195 31.88 9,174,943
Receiving area 19,264 20.49 9,034,348
4.2.3 Detailed research questions
We formulated the following research questions: (1) What TDR market prices arise and what would be 
the overall financial volume traded? (2) How do TDR market prices evolve over the five auctions? (3) 
How many TDR are traded and how much land could be downzoned in the sending area and devel-
oped in the receiving area? (4) How much land could be downzoned in the canton of Valais? (5) How 
do TDR market prices and traded volumes change if we assume that all agents behave rationally? (6) 
Do the TDR market prices change when the participation rates increase/decrease by 10% or 20%? (7) 
What impact might the ‘popular initiative on second homes’ have on the TDR market? 
80 Corporation, Limited Liability Partnership, Bank, Insurance Company etc.
81 Cooperatives, associations etc.
82 In the TDR survey (cf. chapter 3) it was supposed that architects and real estate developers should represent the interests of 
individuals, married couples and simple partnerships.
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4.3 TDR market simulation model (TDR-ABM)
In the following section the basics of the TDR-ABM are explained. A more detailed description can be 
found in chapter 2 (first paper, section 2.3). The calibration of the model with survey data is described 
in section 4.3.3.
4.3.1 Agents’ description
The simulation model TDR-ABM83 distinguishes three main types of agents: two types representing 
landowners in the sending and receiving area (called sender agents or sender, receiver agents or re-
ceiver) and one type representing the market platform (trading agent). Each agent is characterized by 
different attributes (state variables, e.g. parcel area) and behavior (e.g. price adaption coefficients) 
derived from existing data and from a dedicated questionnaire survey. The questionnaire survey data is 
used to define realistic behavior of the market participants (e. g. participation probability psend and 
preceive per landowner category). An overview of the most important variables of the sender and receiv-
er agents is provided in Table 4-284. The data basis used is illustrated in Fig. 4-1, the central variables 
of the trading agent are listed in section 4.3.4.
Moreover, Fig. 4-285 illustrates all agent’s states and transitions, actions and communication for itera-
tion t.
Table 4-2: State variables of sender and receiver agents (differing variables of sender and receiver 
agents are highlighted in grey).
Sender agents Receiver agents Data sourcea
Parcel-ID: ID ∈ ℕ Parcel-ID: ID ∈ ℕ Own calculation
Landowner category: LC ∈ {„Enterprises”, 
“NPI”, “Individuals”}
Landowner category: LC ∈ {„Enterprises”, 
“NPI”, “Individuals”}
Own calculation 
based on (B)
Parcel area (in sqm): A ∈ ℝ  Parcel area (in sqm): A ∈ ℝ  Own calculation 
based on (A), (B)
Utilization factor: UF ∈ ℝ  Utilization factor: UF ∈ ℝ  Own calculation 
based on (A), (B)
Building zone price in CHF per square meter 
(in municipality): BLP ∈ ℝ 
Building zone price in CHF per square meter 
(in municipality): BLP ∈ ℝ 
Own calculation 
based on (A)
83 The simulation has been programmed in Java with use of the free and open source agent-based modeling and simulation 
platform Repast Simphony (http://repast.sourceforge.net, accessed: 2012-09-15). 
84 Note that Table 4-2 is slightly different from Table 2-1.
85 Note that Fig. 4-2 is slightly different from Fig. 2-6.
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Agricultural land price in CHF per square meter 
(in municipality): ALP ∈ ℝ 
Agricultural land price in CHF per square meter 
(in municipality): ALP ∈ ℝ 
Own calculation 
based on (B)
Current sender agent state:
ss ∈ {„notyetsending“, „sending“, „sent“}
Current receiver agent state: 
sr ∈ {„notyetreceiving“,„receiving“, received“} Own calculation
Quantity of TDR to sell: qs ∈ ℕ  Quantity of TDR to buy: qr ∈ ℕ  Own calculation 
based on (A), (B)
Probability to enter into the sending and 
trading process: psend ∈ [0,1] ⊂ ℝ   Probability to enter into the receiving and trad-ing process: preceive ∈ [0,1] ⊂ ℝ   Own calculation based on (C)
Current ask price in CHF per TDR (CHF per 
saleable square meter of building area that po-
tentially can be developed): pask∈ ℝ 
Current bid price in CHF per TDR (CHF per 
purchasable square meter of building area that 
potentially can be developed): pbid∈ ℝ 
Own calculation 
based on (C)
Ask price initialization coefficients: βaski ∈ ℝ , 
where i ∈ {“ParcelArea”, “PTDRtheoretical”}
Bid price initialization coefficients: βbidi ∈ ℝ , 
where i ∈ {“ParcelArea”, “PTDRtheoretical”}  
Own calculation 
based on (C)
Ask price initialization constant: Cask ∈ ℝ  Bid price initialization constant: Cbid ∈ ℝ  Own calculation 
based on (C)
Ask price adaptation coefficient: aask ∈ ℝ  Bid price adaptation coefficient: abid ∈ ℝ  Own calculation 
based on (C)
Surplus of realized trade in CHF: sur ∈ ℝ  Surplus of realized trade in CHF: sur ∈ ℝ  Own calculation
a Data sources: (A) Database of building zone parcels (based on 91,000 transactions over the last 20 years) (Wüest und Part-
ner AG 2011), and digital cadastral data from the Cantons of Zurich and Thurgau. (B) Land registry data of various munici-
palities in the Canton of Grisons, as well as transaction data of undeveloped land parcels (building and agricultural zones) of 
the Cantons of Zurich and Fribourg. (C) Results of a questionnaire survey among potential landowners (cf. chapter 3).
Fig. 4-1: Overview of the data basis of the TDR-ABM.
4.3.2 The calibration of the agents’ behavior
In order to simulate behavior of potential market participants realistically, the sender and receiver 
agents have been calibrated with results of a survey (‘TDR survey’) among professional representa-
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tives of the above mentioned landowner categories. In the survey, the respondents had – among others 
– to state their willingness to participate in a TDR market and their price expectations (TDR ask and 
bid prices during five auctions). Based on this, it was possible to calculate agent-specific participation 
probabilities (cf. Table 4-3), functions for the TDR price setting (asks and bids; cf. eq. 4-2 and 4-3, 
Table 4-4 and Table 4-5) and functions for the TDR price adaptation (cf. eq. 4-7 and 4-8, Table 4-6). 
Regressions models with different explanatory variables (e.g. theoretical TDR price, landowner cate-
gory etc., cf. chapter 3, section 3.3.3) were calculated.
4.3.3 Sender and receiver agents: The supply and demand side of the TDR 
market
As described in section 4.2.1, both sender and receiver agents decide first whether they want to partic-
ipate in the TDR market or not (cf. Fig. 4-2)86. The assigned probability rates for each agent and land-
owner category are presented in Table 4-3 (cf. chapter 3).
Table 4-3: Sender and receiver participation probability per landowner category.
Variable name Enterprises NPI Individuals
psend 51.4% 34.8% 62.5%
preceive 53.8% 21.9% 66.7%
In the case of an agent deciding to participate, s/he submits a first ask (sender) or bid price (receiver) 
for the number of TDR s/he disposes of (sender) or needs (receiver) for her/his parcel. The quantity of 
TDR per parcel (qs, qr) is calculated as follows: 
q = A * UF (4-1)
where A represents the parcel area in square meter and UF the utilization factor.
The general form of the functions87 for the initialization of the TDR price are given in equations 4-2
(sender) and 4-3 (receiver). The corresponding coefficients are listed in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5. 
pask = Cask +βaskA * A + βaskPTDRtheoretical * PTDRtheoretical (4-2)
86 Note that the decision to participate in the TDR market or not can only be made in the first auction.
87 Note that the explanatory variable ‘AdaptationRate’ (cf. chapter 3, section 3.3.3) could not be considered here because the 
input data (cf. table B.1 in the appendix) of the TDR-ABM do not allow a calculation of agent-specific values of this varia-
ble. It would only be possible to calculate an average value per agent type and landowner category, which however, would 
not increase the model quality because it would be no more than an additional constant. For this reason, the regression func-
tions in chapter 3 (section 3.3.3) have been recalculated without the variable ‘AdaptationRate’. In the rare case the dependent 
variables (pask, pbid) become negative, the theoretical TDR value is used instead.
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pbid = Cbid +βbidA * A + βbidPTDRtheoretical * PTDRtheoretical (4-3)
where Cask (Cbid) is the landowner specific ask (bid) price initialization constant, βaskA (βbidA) the 
landowner specific ask (bid) price initialization coefficient for the parcel area (A), βaskPTDRtheoretical
(βbidPTDRtheoretical) the landowner specific ask (bid) price initialization coefficient for the theoretical 
TDR value (PTDRtheoretical). The theoretical TDR value is calculated as follows:
PTDRtheoretical = (BLP – ALP)/UF (4-4)
All variables are defined in Table 4-2. The theoretical TDR value can be explained as follows: When 
the price of agricultural land is 6 CHF/sqm for instance, the price of building zone land 500 CHF/sqm 
and UF = 0.3, then 0.3 TDR are needed to transform land worth 6 CHF into land worth 500 CHF, so 
the TDR might be worth 494/0.3 = 1,650 CHF/TDR (=PTDRtheoretical) (cf. chapter 3). To extend 
this example, let us further assume that a sender agent of the landowner category ‘enterprise’ owns a 
parcel of 1000 sqm with the above mentioned properties and coefficients of Table 4-4. In that case, the 
ask price would be: 1263.685 - 0.978*1000 +1.063*1,650 = 2,040.64 CHF/TDR. This price is above 
the theoretical value – which is expected – because the sender agents might think strategically and try 
to enhance their surplus88 in the first auction. 
Table 4-4: Coefficients of the three landowner categories for initialization of the ask price.
Variable name Enterprises NPI Individuals
Cask 1263.685 735.616 243.811
βaskA -0.978 -0.613 -0.013
βaskPTDRtheoretical 1.063 1.139 0.925
Table 4-5: Coefficients of the three landowner categories for initialization of the bid price.
Variable name Enterprises NPI Individuals
Cbid 242.961 439.372 88.068
βbidA -0.008 -0.237 -0.148
βbidPTDRtheoretical 0.398 0.303 0.667
After the submission of all asks and bids in the first auction (first iteration), the trading agent calcu-
lates the market clearing price (cf. section 4.3.4), and informs the agents about their success. The suc-
88 The difference between the market clearing price and the actual bid (willingness to pay) respectively ask price (willings-
ness to accept). 
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cessful agents ‘finalize’ (cf. Fig. 4-2), change their state to ‘sent’ respectively ‘received’ and calculate 
their surplus (eq. 4-5 for senders, eq. 4-6 for receivers, cf. also Fig. 2-7):
sur = (pclear – pask) * qs + εs (4-5)
sur = (pbid – pclear) * qr + εr (4-6)
where pclear represents the market clearing price (cf. section 4.3.4), pask (pbid) the current ask (bid) price, 
qs (qr) the sold (bought) TDR quantity and εs (εr) the error term of the respective calculation.
In the case of failure (too high ask price or too low bid price), the sender agents decrease their ask 
price and the receiver agents increase their bid price (‘adapt’ in Fig. 4-2).
Based on data fitting in chapter 3 (section 3.3.3) the sender agents adapt their ask prices linearly (cf. 
eq. 4-7 and Table 4-6) and the receiver agents exponentially (cf. eq. 4-8 and Table 4-6):
pask(x) = (pask – aask * x) *1.009 (4-7)
pbid(x) = pbid * exp(abid * x) *1.009 (4-8)
where x represents the auction number, pask (pbid) the ask (bid) price in the first auction and aask (abid) 
the landowner specific ask (bid) price adaptation coefficient.
Table 4-6: Adaptation coefficients of the sender and receiver agents.
Variable name Enterprises NPI Individuals
aask 5.909 9.367 9.780
abid 0.103 0.148 0.124
In order to take into account increasing land prices over time, we implement the Consumer Price Index 
(CIP) in the adaptation functions. This factor represents the change in prices of goods and services 
which are representative of the private household consumption in Switzerland. For our simulation we 
calculated the factor by using the average value of the last 20 years (1993-2012)89, 0.9% per year.
89 We have chosen the CIP (cf. http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/05/02/blank/key/basis_aktuell.html , 
accessed: 2012-09-02) and not a land price index as calculated in Bourbassa et al. (2010). The reason is that the land price 
index has a high volatility and depending on the time period considered the results could be significantly different. Moreover, 
in the long term the increase of land prices (land price index) seems to be closely related to the CIP development.
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Fig. 4-2: Agents’ states and transitions, actions and communication for some iteration t.
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4.3.4 Trading agent: the operator of the TDR market platform
The trading agent organizes the communication between the sender and receiving agents and calcu-
lates the market clearing price for each auction. It (trading agent) is characterized by various auxiliary 
variables for intermediate calculation steps and by four variables of particular importance since they 
represent the macroeconomic outcome of each trading cycle: 
- Market clearing price in CHF/TDR: pclear ∈ ℝ 
- Total quantity of TDR supply: qsupply ∈ ℕ 
- Total quantity of TDR demand: qdemand ∈ ℕ 
- Total quantity of TDR sold (traded): qtrade ∈ ℕ 
In each auction the trading agent sorts the asks in ascending price, the bids in descending price order 
and calculates the market clearing price pclear in accordance with the principle of an MDA. The price is 
at the intersection of the cumulated ask and bid price curves (cf. Fig. 2-7). Since the traded TDR bun-
dles have different sizes, in most cases, the TDR bundle of the last successful agent90 has to be split 
(for more information about all split cases, cf. Fig. A-2 in appendix A). The affected agent participates 
automatically in the subsequent auction with the leftover TDR of the TDR bundle and with an adapted 
ask or bid price. In the case it is the last auction, then the leftover TDR are bought or sold by the oper-
ator of the TDR market platform (e.g. government).
After each trading period, the trading agent informs the sender and receiver agents about their trading 
result (pclear and qtransfer, cf. Fig. 4-2). The successful receiver agents all have to pay the same (uniform) 
market clearing price.
90 In the case that more than one TDR bundle could be split (multiple agents with the same price), the order of the TDR bun-
dles is determined by the submission time (here: randomly chosen) of the bids and asks. 
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4.4 Results
In the following section, we present five different model settings matching our formulated research 
questions (cf. section 4.2.3), with the particular aim of calculating the resulting prices and traded quan-
tities of TDR.
Note that with ‘rational behavior’ we mean that the ask and bid prices are calculated in accordance
with the theoretical TDR value (cf. eq. 4-4).
- Model setting 1: Participation probability and behavior of sender and receiver agents according to 
the TDR survey;
- Model setting 2: Participation probability according to the TDR survey and rational behavior of 
sender and receiver agents;
- Model setting 3: Participation probability of 100% and rational behavior of sender and receiver 
agents;
- Model setting 4: Participation probability according to the TDR survey is varied by +/- 10% and 
+/- 20%, behavior of sender and receiver agents according to the TDR survey;
- Model setting 5: Participation probability and behavior of sender and receiver agents according to 
the TDR survey; changed building zone prices in municipalities affected by the ‘popular initiative 
on second homes’.
In order to reduce random effects and to reach market clearing prices close to the equilibrium, the 
TDR-ABM was run 100 times and the following results represent the overall average of all runs. 
4.4.1 Results of setting 1
In this section we calculated the results for Switzerland and specifically for the canton of Valais.
Results for Switzerland
Table 4-7 and Fig. 4-3 illustrate that in auction 1 there is a supply of approximately 5.6 million TDR 
corresponding to 19.5 km2, and a demand of approximately 5.8 million TDR corresponding to 13.3 
km2. Approximately 2.7 million TDR are successfully traded, which means that after the first auction 
it would be possible to downzone 8.9 km2 building zone land in the sending area and to develop 5.8 
km2 new building zone land in the receiving area. The smaller area in the receiving area is due to the 
denser development in this area (the utilization factor in the receiving area is higher than in the send-
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ing area). The clearing price in the first auction is 1,165 CHF/TDR, leading to an overall transaction 
volume of 3.1 billion CHF. 
In the successive four auctions the quantity of traded TDR decreases significantly (by 93% between 
first and second auction) and the clearing price increases on average by 5.1% per auction. 
After five auctions, a total of approximately 3.4 million TDR are traded, which means that it would be 
possible to downzone 11.4 km2 building zone land in the sending area (36% of the total sending area) 
respectively to develop 7.4 km2 new building zone land in the receiving area (36% of the total receiv-
ing area).
Table 4-7: TDR market results for Switzerland (setting 1).
Au. 
No.
TDR supply TDR demand TDR traded
Clear.
price
Total 
Vol.
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Receiving 
area (in 
km2)
TDR
Quantity
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
Receiving
area (in 
km2)
TDR Quanti-
ty
CHF/
TDR
Mio. 
CHF
1 19.51 5,583,324 13.27 5,767,167 8.88 5.76 2,661,468 1,165 3,101
2 10.63 2,921,856 7.51 3,105,699 0.64 0.42 184,659 1,221 225
3 10.00 2,736,391 7.09 2,921,040 0.50 0.37 139,221 1,269 177
4 9.49 2,597,170 6.72 2,781,819 0.62 0.37 188,131 1,345 253
5 8.87 2,409,039 6.35 2,593,688 0.73 0.44 180,029 1,423 256
All ∑ 11.37 ∑ 7.36 ∑ 3,353,508 Ø 1,196a ∑4,012
a weighted average (with traded TDR quantity).
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Fig. 4-3: Supply (blue) and demand (red) for TDR in the first auction (setting 1).
Results for the canton of Valais
Because of extraordinarily high supply of undeveloped building zones and low demand for building 
zones in the canton of Valais (reasons are explained in the introduction of this paper) we analyze the 
impact of the TDR market here in detail. The model settings are the same as in section above (Results 
for Switzerland).
Table 4-8 illustrates that of the overall trading volume (approximately 3.4 million TDR), 1 million 
TDR are sold from the canton of Valais, which means that it would be possible to downzone 4 km2 of 
building zone land in the sending area of this canton. This is equivalent to around 35% of the total 
sending area that can be downzoned in Switzerland up to 2018 and 43% of the sending area of the 
canton of Valais.
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Table 4-8: TDR market results for the canton Valais (setting 1).
Au. 
No.
TDR supply TDR demand TDR traded
Clear.
price
Total 
Vol.
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Receiving 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
Receiving
area (in 
km2)
TDR Quanti-
ty
CHF/
TDR
Mio. 
CHF
1 6.18 1,478,357 0.00 
(4,477 sqm)
1,025 3.19 0.00 838,697 1,165 977
2 2.99 639,660 0.00 
(4,477 sqm)
1,025 0.30 0.00 72,715 1,221 89
3 2.69 566,945 0.00 
(4,477 sqm)
1,025 0.05 0.00 9,564 1,269 12
4 2.64 557,381 0.00 
(4,477 sqm)
1,025 0.25 0.00 47,156 1,345 63
5 2.39 510,225 0.00 
(4,477 sqm)
1,025 0.20 0.00 40,612 1,423 58
All ∑ 3.99 ∑ 0.00 ∑ 1,008,744 Ø 1,196a ∑1,199
a weighted average (with traded TDR quantity).
Note that the potential supply and demand values for participation probabilities of 100% are presented 
in the Table C-1 and Table C-2 in the appendix C.
4.4.2 Results of setting 2
In order to compare the results with agents who behave completely rationally, we simulated the TDR 
market with the same participation rates as in section 4.4.1, however, with sender and receiver agents 
who ask, respectively bid the theoretical TDR value. We only present the results of the first auction 
because it did not seem useful to assume hypothetical adaptation functions91 for the successive 4 auc-
tions.
The simulation shows that the traded TDR quantity increases with agents behaving rationally (Table 
4-9 compared to Table 4-7). It would be possible to downzone approximately 39% more land in the 
sending area and to develop approximately 39% more land in the receiving area. However, the clear-
ing price would also increase by approximately 25%. The overall money transaction volume would be 
5.3 billion CHF.
91 We did not assume the same adaptation functions of the TDR survey, because these functions are based on lower ask and 
higher bid prices in the first auction (possible strategic behavior in the first auction).
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It is not surprising that the traded TDR quantity increases with rational agents. In such a market, the 
agents do not behave strategically in the first auction (e.g. ask high prices in order to maximize the 
surplus) and therefore the supply and demand curves are not as steep.
Table 4-9: TDR market results for Switzerland (setting 2)a.
Au. 
No.
TDR supply TDR demand TDR traded
Clear.
price
Total 
Vol.
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Receiving 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
Receiving  
area (in 
km2)
TDR Quanti-
ty
CHF/
TDR
Mio. 
CHF
1 19.40 5,572,193 13.06 5,723,953 12.34 7.99 3,635,210 1,453 5,282
a Note that the numbers in the first four columns (TDR supply and demand) are not exactly the same as in Table 4-7 because 
of the randomly chosen agents when considering the agents’ participation probabilities.
4.4.3 Results of setting 3
To further investigate the impact of rational behavior in the first auction, we additionally simulated the 
TDR market with participation probabilities of 100%. The corresponding results are illustrated in Ta-
ble 4-10 and Fig. C-2 (appendix C). As expected, the traded TDR quantity and the corresponding 
sending and receiving areas increase. In such a market, 64% (approximately 5.9 million TDR) of the 
total supply and demand are traded in the first auction. 
The resulting clearing price of 1,397 CHF/TDR can be interpreted as the ‘theoretical market clearing 
price’.
Table 4-10: TDR market results for Switzerland (setting 3).
Au. 
No.
TDR supply TDR demand TDR traded
Clear.
price
Total 
Vol.
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Receiving 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
Receiving
area (in 
km2)
TDR Quanti-
ty
CHF/
TDR
Mio. 
CHF
1 31.88 9,174,943 20.49 9,034,348 19.80 12.82 5,856,074 1,397 8,181
4.4.4 Results of setting 4 
In order to take into account the uncertainties in the estimation of the participation probability parame-
ters psend and prerceive, we increased respectively decreased these parameters by 10% and 20%, and ana-
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lyzed the effect of this change on the clearing price and the quantity of TDR traded. We chose to ana-
lyze the sensitivity of our results to the participation rates because that parameter is particularly uncer-
tain. In existing TDR programs the participation rate is highly variable and the participation rate ob-
tained from the TDR survey is also uncertain. We know from Pruetz (2003) that the participation rate 
has a significant impact on the success or failure of a TDR program.
Fig. 4-4 shows the effect of changed participation probabilities on the clearing price (upper number) 
and the sold TDR quantity (lower number) in the first auction. As expected on ‘typical’ market, the 
clearing price increases with an increased participation on the demand side and a decreased participa-
tion on the supply side. The reverse reaction can be observed with decreased demand and increased 
supply. Interestingly, the clearing price remains quite ‘stable’ when the participation probabilities are 
varied by the same percentage (cf. matrix diagonal in Fig. 4-4). 
As expected, with increased participation probabilities the sold TDR quantity increases as well. Fur-
thermore, it is interesting to note that with an increased receiver participation probability of 20% and a 
decreased sender participation probability of 20%, the sold TDR quantity is close to the quantity sold 
without changing the participation probabilities. 
Fig. 4-4: Effect of a percentage change of parameters psend and preceive on the clearing price (in 
CHF/TDR, upper number) and the TDR sold quantity (lower number) in the first auction.
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Additional figures on the effect on the clearing price and the TDR quantity sold over five auctions are 
provided in the appendix C (Fig. C-3 to Fig. C-6).
4.4.5 Results of setting 5 
In order to investigate the possible impact of the ‘popular initiative on second homes’ on the TDR 
market (research question 7), we calculated a regression model to estimate the change of building zone 
prices due to the new restricted percentage of second homes in about 573 of 2,495 municipalities (cf. 
section 4.1). The reason for our investigation is that different studies (cf. Kaufmann and Rieder, 2012; 
NZZ, 2012) claim that the building zone prices will decrease due to the initiative, however these stud-
ies do not quantify the exact price decline. This might impact on trading prices and quantities.
Excursus: Regression model for building zone prices
As dependent variable for the regression model92 we chose the price of zones of building land, and as 
explanatory variables the percentage of second homes and various other socio-economic and topo-
graphical variables (including interactions among some variables). The results (descriptive statistics of 
the variables and model coefficients) are presented in the Table C-3 and Table C-4 in the appendix C
and are not further described here. 
Based on the estimated model coefficients, we recalculated the building zone price in municipalities 
affected by the initiative (n=573) by fixing the values of the variable ‘percentage of second homes’93
to 20%. Then, to take into account the variability in the original building zone prices, we added to the 
newly calculated building zone prices the model residuals. The estimated effect is shown in Table 
4-11. On average the building zone price in municipalities affected by the initiative decreases by 9.4 
CHF/sqm. A histogram of this effect (change of building zone prices relative to the original building 
zone prices) is provided in the appendix C (cf. Fig. C-7).
Table 4-11: Change of building zone prices due to the popular initiative on second homes.
Minimum 
(in CHF/sqm) 
Maximum
(in CHF/sqm)
Mean
(in CHF/sqm)
S.D.
(in CHF/sqm)
-31.47 +8.52 -9.39 +7.75
After having estimated the effect on the prices, we simulated the TDR market with the newly calculat-
ed prices. Table 4-12 shows the results of the five auctions and Table 4-13 the differences compared to 
setting 1. 
92 The unknown parameters were estimated with the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. 
93 We assume that in the longer term the percentage of secondary residences will decrease to 20%.
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The popular initiative on second homes has an effect on the building zone prices and consequently on 
the TDR market price. However, the effect – especially on the TDR market price – is relatively small 
and does not significantly change the market results.
Table 4-12: TDR market results for Switzerland (setting 5)a.
Au. 
No.
TDR supply TDR demand TDR traded
Clear.
price
Total 
Vol.
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Receiving 
area (in 
km2)
TDR 
Quantity
Sending 
area (in 
km2)
Receiving  
area (in 
km2)
TDR Quanti-
ty
CHF/
TDR
Mio. 
CHF
1 19.48 5,586,989 13.13 5,764,488 8.90 5.80 2,693,607 1,148 3,092
2 10.52 2,893,074 7.33 3,070,881 0.58 0.39 164,410 1,211 199
3 9.94 2,728,664 6.94 2,906,471 0.48 0.34 140,731 1,259 177
4 9.46 2,587,933 6.60 2,765,740 0.76 0.45 204,034 1,331 272
5 8.70 2,383,899 6.15 2,561,706 0.64 0.39 177,754 1,399 249
All ∑ 11.4 ∑ 7.4 ∑ 3,380,536 Ø 1,180b ∑3,989
a Note that the numbers in the first four columns (TDR supply and demand) are not exactly the same as in table 7 and 9 be-
cause of the randomly chosen agents when considering the agent’s participation probabilities.
b weighted average (with traded TDR quantity).
Table 4-13: Change of market clearing price in setting 5 compared to setting 1.
Auction 
number
Clearing price 
setting 1 
(in CHF/TDR)
Clearing price 
setting 5
(in CHF/TDR)
Absolute difference 
(in CHF/TDR)
Percentage difference
1 1,165 1,148 -17 -1.5%
2 1,221 1,211 -10 -0.8%
3 1,269 1,259 -10 -0.8%
4 1,345 1,331 -14 -1.1%
5 1,423 1,399 -24 -1.7%
100
4.5 Discussion 
The results showed that the ‘rationality’ (cf. definition in section 4.4) of the agents regarding their 
participation and their offered and bid prices influences the market clearing price and the TDR quanti-
ty sold. In a TDR market with agents behaving according to the TDR survey, which differs from 
(purely) rational, the clearing price in the first auction was on average approximately 25% lower than 
in a market with rational agents. However, both market clearing prices (with rational and limited ra-
tional behavior) were in the range of currently existing land prices94 and indicated that the model pro-
duced realistic outcomes. This comparison of prices resulting from the simulation and market prices 
may be considered as one validation of our model. We have resorted to this form of validation, as val-
idating agent-based models that represent social systems is extraordinarily difficult (Louie and Carley, 
2008; Schutte, 2010) or indeed impossible (Oreskes et al., 1994) due to a lack of physical laws.
Since the selection process of both sender and receiver agents is random – except for the simulation of 
100% participation probabilities, different agents participate in the TDR market. For this reason, we 
chose to run each simulation setting 100 times. This helped to reduce random effects and to reach 
prices close to the equilibrium. 
In order to consider the uncertainties of the stated probability to participate (TDR survey), we varied 
them by 10 and 20%. This is justified by highly varying participation probabilities in existing TDR 
programs (cf. e.g. Pruetz, 2003) and by the fact that in a ‘real’ implementation of a TDR market the 
willingness to participate might be higher because of better information through the use of additional 
diffusion or communication instruments, or through self-diffusion effects (cf. e.g. Kaufmann-Hayoz 
and Gutscher, 2001). Moreover, the variation of these parameters (psend and preceive) can be seen as a 
form of sensitivity analysis of the model95.
We did not implement any learning processes of the agents. According to Duffy (2006), learning pro-
cesses are a function of the agents’ information and their cognitive abilities. Applied to our case, an 
example of learning would be that the agents determine the TDR price as a function of the market 
clearing price in the previous auctions. Due to the TDR survey which asked simultaneously for all 
prices of asks and bids in all five auction rounds, we had no empirical data to quantify and verify the 
learning process regarding the market clearing prices. Another learning example would be imitating 
94 We compared the market clearing prices with current land prices, that is, the prices that take into account the building area
that potentially can be developed on a parcel. According to Wüest and Partner (2011) current prices for Switzerland are in the 
range of 1,150 to 1,600 CHF/sqm. This value has been calculated by dividing the building zone prices (average price residen-
tial zone (single and multiple-family houses)) by realistic average utilization factors (e.g. 0.25 to 0.35) (cf. definition of TDR 
quantity per parcel in section 4.3.3).
95 A more detailed sensitivity analysis of the parameters psend and preceive can be found in chapter 2 (section 2.4.2).
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the behavior of other agents in the ‘neighborhood’. However, in economics there is – in contrast to 
psychology – no general model that describes imitation (Brenner, 2006). Because of this lack and the 
challenges related to implementing imitation models from psychology, we did not consider imitation 
or other learning processes in this version of the simulation96. 
Moreover, it should be noted that the TDR survey did not consider the opportunity costs97 of both 
senders and receivers, and therefore these costs are ignored in the simulation as well.
When it comes to political implications of the simulation, the following points should be made: In 
Switzerland at present two ideas to reduce the existing large and undesirable building zone areas (for 
which there is no demand) are discussed: 1) introducing a zoning tax on newly designated building 
zones and using the income to compensate for downzoning; 2) introducing a TDR market as proposed 
in this paper.
The TDR market provides a number of advantages compared with a zoning tax98. The main advantage 
is that it would be applied for the whole of Switzerland involving the same conditions for all landown-
ers and people intending to develop a parcel of land. The zoning tax, on the contrary may vary and be 
levied separately in each canton, possibly even in each municipality. Also the political will to 
downzone might vary. Nevertheless, in a TDR market an additional financial compensation between 
the cantons and municipalities should be organized as there will be quite unequal financial flows, i.e. 
flows from urban areas to rural areas in those places where the authorities (with administrations that) 
did not follow the Swiss planning rules and hence are now disposing of too large building zones.
Another advantage of the TDR market relative to the zoning tax is that the landowners who benefit 
from zoning up their parcel (receivers) would hardly benefit from the windfall gains of zoning, where-
as in a system of zoning tax only a part (e.g. min. 20% of the planning gain following a new national 
law proposal) of the planning gain would be captured. Hence, the TDR market concept might be a 
stronger incentive for high density development, as TDR have to be bought according to the set utili-
zation factor which gives land owners an incentive to build more densely. 
In a further difference to the zoning tax, the TDR market mechanism allows for a ‘direct’ financial 
flow between the sending and receiving area, whereas, with a zoning tax, the state would have to ad-
vance money in order to compensate the downzone of a parcel (e.g. in the form of a compensation 
fund) because the tax would be levied only when the parcel is sold or developed following the national 
law proposal.
96 For more information about behavior models with learning processes see e.g. Brenner (2006) and Duffy (2006).
97 The opportunity costs for the senders would be the value of the parcel as agricultural land and for receivers the value of the 
parcel as building zone land without TDR.
98 Also known as tax on planning gains.
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In order to analyze the possible effect of the popular initiative on second homes on the TDR market, 
we estimated a regression model of land prices, including as explanatory variable the proportion of 
second homes. In order to recalculate the building zone prices we assumed that, in the longer term, in 
municipalities affected by the initiative the percentage of second homes will decrease to 20%. It is 
worth stating that this assumption introduced an additional uncertainty in the simulation results. 
To facilitate social housing – which is repeatedly discussed in Switzerland – in a practical implemen-
tation of a TDR market, housing cooperatives could be favored by reducing the number of TDR need-
ed to develop a parcel in the receiving area. This could easily be implemented by a ‘reduction factor’ 
of e.g. 0.5 in the calculation of the TDR quantity needed per parcel (e.g. eq. 4-1). The effect of such a 
reduction might be relatively small regarding the TDR price since cooperatives and other social organ-
izations own only a small percentage (4%) of land in the building zone (cf. chapter 3, section 3.2.2; 
Gerheuser, 2004) and will continue to do so in the future based on our assumed extrapolation of own-
ership.
In the TDR-ABM we did not consider the recently adopted99 ‘popular initiative on agricultural (cultur-
al) land’ in the canton of Zurich. Following this initiative it is no longer possible to designate new 
building zones for the cultural land classes 1-6 or land that is classified as ecologically valuable. For 
our simulation, this implies that we should theoretically cap the whole demand (receiving area) in the 
canton of Zurich. However, we did not implement this restriction for two main reasons: a) we assume 
that a large part of the demand in the canton of Zurich will shift to surrounding cantons, and in this 
case – because of the increased demand – most agents will probably behave similarly as in the canton 
of Zurich, and b) the exact implementation as a law is currently still under way.
4.6 Conclusions
The main contributions of this paper in relation to previous work on TDR in Switzerland (e.g. cf. 
ARE, 2006; Gmünder, 2004, 2010) are that we analyzed the impact of a potential TDR market with 
realistic data and behavior of landowners collected in the TDR survey. Moreover, as far as we know, it 
is the first agent-based model that simulates a TDR market. 
The findings concerning our research questions can be summarized as follows: (1) Depending on the 
market participation probability and the rationality of the agents, the TDR market price was in the 
range of 1,165 to 1,453 CHF/TDR. The TDR prices were all comparable to current land prices in 
Switzerland (market prices)94. The overall money transaction volume would be approximately 4 bil-
99 Adopted on 17 June 2012. For more information see:
http://www.zh.ch/internet/de/aktuell/news/medienmitteilungen/2012/185_kulturlandinitiative.html, accessed: 2012-09-27.
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lion CHF. (2) Under the assumption that the agents behave according to the TDR survey, the TDR 
market prices increased on average by 5.1% during the five auctions. (3) After five auctions and under 
the assumption that the agents behaved according to the TDR survey, a total of 3.4 million TDR were 
traded. This would allow the downzoning of 11.4 km2 building zone land in the sending area100 and the 
development of 7.4 km2 new building zone land in the receiving area101 up to 2018. Hence, the overall 
building zone area would decrease. (4) Under the same assumption as in (3), in the specific canton of 
Valais it would be possible to downzone 4 km2 of building zone land of its sending area until 2018102
which is equal to 43% of the sending area of the canton of Valais. (5) If the agents behaved fully ra-
tionally, the TDR market price would increase to a) 1,453 CHF/TDR with participation probabilities 
according to the TDR survey and b) to 1,397 CHF/TDR with participation probabilities of 100%. In a) 
the traded TDR quantity in the first auction would be 3.6 billion TDR, in b) 5.9 billion TDR. (6) The 
TDR market price remained quite stable when both sender and receiver participation probabilities 
changed with the same rate. In contrast, the market price increased with higher receiver participation 
probabilities (more demand than supply) and decreased with higher sender participation probabilities 
(more supply than demand). (7) The popular initiative on second homes had a slightly negative effect 
on the building zone price (decrease on average: -9.4 CHF/sqm) and consequently influenced the TDR 
market price to a small degree. The TDR market price decreased on each of the five auctions on aver-
age by 1.2%.
100 11.4 km2 are approximately equivalent to the total area of the city of Kreuzlingen (second largest city in the canton of 
Thurgau) or to the total building zone area of the city of Sion (largest city in the canton of Valais).
101 7.4 km2 are approximately equivalent to the total residential zone area of the canton Basel-Town.
102 4 km2 are approximately equivalent to the total building zone area of the city of Baden or Delémont.
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5 General conclusions
The thesis is presented in three chronologically and thematically linked scientific papers. Its main 
findings and research caveats are summarized in this chapter. In addition, ideas for further research, as 
well as general recommendations and factors for success for the implementation of a TDR market in 
Switzerland are provided.
The first paper (Chapter 2) presented a possible design for a TDR market in Switzerland and based 
that on an agent-based model for simulating the TDR market. The concept for the market design was 
defined and elaborated in two expert workshops. The workshops took into account both the unique 
Swiss situation and experience in other countries. Due to the fact that a conceptual design alone cannot 
assess the impact of a practical implementation, a simulation framework for the TDR market was de-
veloped. 
The discussion in the two expert workshops, as well as the literature study on existing TDR programs 
(cf. e.g. Janssen-Jansen et al., 2008; Kopits et al., 2005; Pruetz, 2003), have shown – among other 
details of the TDR market concept – that the TDR instrument should be implemented as a dual-zone 
program, specifying both a ‘sending’ and a ‘receiving area’, and capping the existing building zones 
(following the cap-and-trade principle). Regarding the sending and receiving areas, the experiences in 
the TDR programs in the USA have demonstrated that the designation of appropriate sending and re-
ceiving areas is essential for the success of a TDR market (Pruetz, 2003). In Switzerland, the designa-
tion of these areas respective parcels would ideally be done by the cantons and in detail by the munici-
palities. In order to prevent a rampant building boom in the receiving area and to keep the supply and 
demand in balance, it is recommended to designate the sending and receiving areas at given intervals. 
The market area should cover the whole country, because of the considerable differences in supply and 
demand of building zones. 
Following another recommendation by Swiss planning experts, the number of TDR per parcel was 
defined as the building area that can be potentially developed on a parcel (parcel area multiplied by the 
utilization factor103). In addition, the TDR per parcel can only be sold or purchased as a whole package 
(fixed TDR bundle). This restriction should promote high density development in the receiving area104
103 Assuming an identical definition of  the utilization factor (Germ: „Ausnützungsziffer”) throughout Switzerland.
104 The receivers have to buy TDR for the maximum allowable gross floor area. This is an incentive for high density devel-
opment.
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and compensate the loss of the development possibility in the sending area. Also, it should reduce the 
numbers of transactions, and consequently the transaction costs105.
Furthermore, the experiences in other TDR programs have shown that the success of a TDR market is 
related to the existence of a trading platform (also known as ‘TDR bank’; cf. Kaplowitz et al., 2008). 
Such a platform facilitates the trade of TDR and the transaction costs can be kept low. Another ad-
vantage is that the trust in such a program will be significantly higher (Kaplowitz et al., 2008; 
Machemer and Kaplowitz, 2002; Pruetz, 2003). In Switzerland, most likely the Federal Office for 
Spatial Development would operate the trading platform, as well as monitor the system, define the 
detailed trading rules and also act as a ‘market maker’ or search for a private one. The latter would 
ensure the liquidity of the market and offset any market imbalances (e.g. lack of TDR demand; cf. 
Radcliffe, 1997). 
The analysis of the theoretical discussions and experts’ opinions led to the conclusion that an auction 
is an ideal price determination mechanism, and this for one main reason: There is no previous infor-
mation about the willingness to pay or price expectations of the potential market participants. Accord-
ing to Krishna (2002) such uncertainties of both sellers and buyers are an inherent characteristic of 
auctions. In an auction both the allocation of the traded good and price determination are based on the 
bids of the market participants. Auctions are flexible pricing mechanisms to determine the market 
price by exhausting the willingness to pay and reflecting price expectations of the participants
(McAfee und McMillan, 1987; Skiera und Revenstorff, 1999). 
For the TDR market, a multi-unit double auction (MDA) with a uniform price turned out to be appro-
priate. In this type of auction, the landowners in the sending area (TDR supply) can submit asks (of-
fers) with the desired price per TDR, and the landowners in the receiving area (TDR demand) can 
submit bids with the price they are willing to pay for the needed TDR. According to the rules of the 
MDA (cf. chapter 2, section 2.2.3), the asks are sorted price ascending, the bids price descending, and 
a uniform TDR market price is calculated. It is the price at the intersection of the ask- and bid-curves. 
An essential advantage of this double (two-sided) auction, compared to a one-sided auction with a 
fixed supply, is that the ‘sensitivity’ to the so-called demand reduction problem (also known as bid 
shading; cf. e.g. Ausubel and Cramton, 2002; Krishna, 2002) is reduced. That is, the market clearing 
price would decrease less rapidly in the case of bid shading. 
Following further results of the two experts’ workshops and literature findings, for the Swiss TDR 
market it is useful running two rounds of five auctions, with one year between each auction. The total 
time required to organize five auctions (=5 years) gives municipalities time to adapt their zoning plans, 
105 We mean costs associated with the exchange of goods or services, including information, negotiation, communication and 
control costs.
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i.e. designate sending and receiving areas, for the next round. It should be noted that in a practical 
implementation of a TDR market this proposal might be adapted, dependent on the practical experi-
ence that will be made.
Regarding banking and borrowing of TDR, in the Swiss TDR market this should not be allowed. 
Banking and borrowing might have a negative impact on both the cost-effectiveness (Henger and 
Bizer, 2010) and market liquidity. Moreover banking and borrowing might be an incentive for strate-
gic behavior and decrease the public confidence in a TDR market. 
Based on the TDR market concept, a suitable agent-based simulation model was developed (TDR-
ABM). The model simulates a ‘true order book’ in which agents (here landowners) submit asks and 
bids for the ‘good’ TDR. The main advantage of the ABM is that rational behavior of the agents need 
not to be assumed as is usually the case in economic models. Here, three different agent types with 
specific state variables, behavior and adaption rules were implemented. For the two agent types repre-
senting landowners (sender and receiver agents) four106 landowner categories (e.g. enterprises) were 
distinguished, with the assumption that each would behave differently. 
Since the TDR bundles would be traded at fixed and different package sizes, in the TDR-ABM a quite 
unique price determination procedure was implemented: the last successful order (ask or bid) at the 
intersection of the supply and demand curve needed – in most of the cases – to be split. However, be-
cause at maximum one TDR bundle would be affected, the resulting efficiency loss would be insignif-
icantly small. The loss by implementing another option, e.g. a two-sided Vickrey auction (cf. chapter
2, section 2.2.3), would be on the assumption that a market participant can own more than one parcel –
considerably higher. In addition, it should be noted here, that overall there is no efficient107 and at the 
same time budget-balanced108 market (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Huang et al., 2002; Myerson and 
Satterthwaite, 1983). 
First tests on the suitability of the TDR-ABM were conducted through a computational performance 
analysis and a sensitivity analysis of selected parameters. These tests, as well as an additional face 
validation (cf. e.g. Klügl, 2008; North and Macal, 2007), have shown that the model is fit to be further 
developed by incorporating empirical data. 
The second paper (chapter 3) presents a questionnaire survey that was specifically designed to cali-
brate the TDR-ABM. Therefore, a special approach was chosen: Each single questionnaire stated a 
106 Because of the small sample size for the category of cooperatives (cf. statistical analysis in the second paper), in the final 
agent-based model, only three landowner categories were distinguished.
107 An efficient market favors neither buyers nor sellers, and aims to maximize the collective profit (surplus of buyers and 
sellers).
108 In a budget-balanced market, the sum of payments of buyers are equal to the revenues of sellers.
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unique realistic situation description that was based on existing land registry and transaction data of 
building zone parcels. The objective was to calculate for each distinguished agent type and landowner 
category separate statistics (e.g. probability to participate, regression model for TDR price determina-
tion etc.). A central and important advantage of this approach was the implicit data variability that 
allowed the calculation of various regression models. However, a drawback of the questionnaire sur-
vey, compared to e.g. economic experiments, was that the resulting market clearing prices in each of 
the auctions could not be considered in the questions regarding the asks (bids) of the successive auc-
tions. Therefore, it was only possible to calculate simple functions for the adaptation behavior during 
the five auctions. For a first calibration of the TDR-ABM this seemed to be appropriate, however, in a 
later version of the model this simplification could be improved (cf. section 5.1). Another disad-
vantage was that in a questionnaire survey there is no possibility to check back on potentially wrong 
responses due to misunderstandings of a complex topic.
For the survey it was decided to contact spatial planning and real estate professionals, instead of a 
random sample of all existing and potential landowners. The reasons were the complex topic and the 
previous lack of public information and debate about TDR. A total of 1,976 professionals – divided 
into four landowner categories – throughout Switzerland were contacted. Since the number of each 
contacted landowner category was based on the landowner structure from existing land registry and 
transaction data, the sample size varied considerably between the distinguished landowner categories 
(e.g. small sample size for cooperatives). Furthermore, the response rate (16.75%) was quite low and 
pointed to a possible scepticism towards the new instrument (e.g. because of lack of information, stra-
tegic behavior etc., cf. e.g. Gmünder, 2010). It might be that the response rate could have been raised
through special measures or incentives (e.g. prior recruitment through a telephone survey). However, it 
may be assumed that in a ‘real’ implementation of the TDR market the willingness to participate might 
be significantly higher. Possible reasons are: use of additional diffusion or communication instruments 
(e.g. reports in newspaper) or self-diffusion effects (target people have an effect – voluntary or not –
on the behavior of others, cf. Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001).
A plausibility test was carried out in order to eliminate possible wrong answers and therefore to pre-
vent model misspecifications, biased parameter estimations and incorrect results. Although such a test 
was undoubtedly necessary to obtain reliable results, it further decreased the sample size. Therefore, 
the results – especially the ones for the landowner categories of enterprises and non-profit institutions 
(NPI) – should be treated with caution. 
The main findings of the questionnaire survey can be summarized as follows: The willingness to par-
ticipate in the TDR market varied among the distinguished landowner categories. It is striking that the 
NPI (cantons, municipalities and cooperatives) were barely willing to participate (29.5% as sender; 
108
16.7% as receiver), in contrast to the representatives of private persons (RPP) who were most willing 
to participate (55.9% as sender; 60.8% as receiver) in the TDR market. The most important reasons for 
not participating were, according to the replies, the overly complicated TDR instrument and the high 
transactions costs.
Regarding the criteria when determining the ask (bid) price for the TDR, for all owner categories the 
building zone price prior to the introduction of TDR seemed to be the most important one. This result 
was also reflected in the regression model for determining the TDR price (ask and bid) in the first 
auction: it was mostly determined by the theoretical TDR value which in turn is a function of the 
building zone price, agricultural zone price and the utilization factor. Differences in determining the 
TDR price among the landowner categories could only be found in the receiver categories NPI and 
RPP. However, because of the above-mentioned small number observations in the NPI category, this 
finding should be treated with caution.
In the workshop with spatial planning and real estate experts, it was recommended to consider a loca-
tion factor in the calculation of the number of TDR per parcel. Depending on the location of the par-
cel, this factor would then increase or decrease the number of TDR. Interestingly, in the questionnaire 
survey the location factor – reflected in the proposed prices – had no or just a slight influence on the 
price that a landowner would ask or pay for the TDR bundle of a parcel. It can be concluded that the 
landowners seemingly had an idea of how much to ask (bid) for the parcel as a whole, and as a result 
they changed their prices according to the number of TDR per parcel. Although the location factor was 
ignored in the final simulation runs, it is worth stating at this point that such a factor would reduce the 
variance between the asks and bids, and therefore also the corresponding sender and receiver surpluses 
(cf. Fig. 2-7 in chapter 2). This might be advantageous, especially regarding the problem of rewarding 
so-called ‘planning errors in the past’ (oversupply of building zone areas (and therefore TDR) in rural 
municipalities caused by permissive zoning practices, cf. section 2.1) 
Concerning the price adaptation during the five auctions, it was found that the landowners in the send-
ing area (senders) adapt their ask prices linearly and the landowners in the receiving area (receivers) 
exponentially. Among the senders, the ask price was most adapted (reduced) by RPP, then by NPI and 
least by enterprises. A statistically significant difference could only be found between enterprises and 
the other two categories. The greatest adaptation (increase) among the receivers was found in the NPI 
category, then in the RPP, and the lowest adaptation was observed by enterprises. Here, only a statisti-
cally significant difference between enterprises and NPI was found. What is striking on both sides of 
the market is that seemingly the enterprises adapt their prices during the five auctions least.
The third paper (chapter 4) presents the empirically calibrated agent-based TDR market simulation 
(TDR-ABM) and the results of five different simulation settings. The calibration was done through 
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integrating the detailed survey results, i.e. the identified probabilities to participate in the TDR market 
and the calculated regression models for the ask (bid) price determination and adaptation. The five 
different model settings allowed an analysis of relevant political and economic questions for Switzer-
land. 
The simulation results showed that the ‘rationality’ of the agents influenced the market clearing price 
and the TDR quantity sold. It was found that in a TDR market with agents behaving according to the 
TDR survey, which differs from rational agents, the clearing price in the first auction was on average 
approximately 25% lower than in a market with (purely) rational agents. However, it was also shown 
that both market clearing prices – with rational (1,397 CHF/TDR) and limited rational behavior (1,165 
CHF/TDR) – were in the range of currently existing land prices. Therefore, a major criticism by 
Schläpfer (2007), who claimed that TDR might result in negative societal impacts, e.g. scarcity and 
higher prices for land, could be disregarded.
Due to the fact that existing TDR programs (cf. e.g. Pruetz, 2003) observed highly varying participa-
tion rates, and that in a ‘real’ implementation of a TDR market the willingness to participate might be 
higher compared with the survey (cf. explanations above), one model setting investigated the impact 
of varying participation rates (+/- 10 and +/- 20%). The most important result for this setting was that 
the TDR market responded as expected in a ‘typical’ market (e.g. increasing clearing price with in-
creasing demand). In addition, it could be demonstrated that the market price remained quite ‘stable’ 
when participation probabilities of sender and receiver agents were varied by the same percentage. 
Moreover, it could be shown that – under the assumption that the agents (landowners) behave accord-
ing to the TDR survey – it would be possible to downzone approximately 11.4 km2 building zone land 
in the sending area and to develop 7.4 km2 new building zone in the receiving area up to the year 
2018. As a consequence, the absolute area of building zone land would decrease (because of the dens-
er development in the receiving area). The greatest reduction of the building zone area (4 km2) would 
be reached in the canton of Valais. 
Under the same agents’ behavior assumption, the overall transaction volume would be in the first auc-
tion approximately 3.1 billion CHF, and after five auctions approximately 4 billion CHF. The small 
increase of the transaction volume from the first to fifth auction results from the quite small price ad-
aptations (asks, bids) during the five auctions. This might also be a reason for the slight increase of the 
market clearing price during the five auctions (on average approximately 5% increase).
In comparison, if all agents participated in the TDR market with participation probabilities of 100% 
and behave rationally (ask/bid the theoretical TDR value), it would be possible to downzone approxi-
mately 19.8 km2 building zone land in the sending area and to develop 12.8 km2 new building zones in 
the receiving area after the first auction. The so obtained market clearing price – which can be inter-
110
preted as the ‘theoretical market clearing price’ – was 1,397 CHF/TDR, and the overall transaction 
volume in the first auction increased to approximately 8.2 billion CHF. Note that the simulation covers 
the period up to 2018 and the quantity of supplied and demanded TDR is based on various calculations 
and demand extrapolations from Fahrländer Partner (2008).
Finally, in the fifth model setting, it was investigated whether the ‘popular initiative on second homes’ 
might impact on TDR trading prices and quantities. For this purpose, a regression model that estimat-
ed the change of building zone prices due to the newly restricted percentage of second homes was 
calculated. The TDR market was simulated with the newly calculated land prices and it could be 
demonstrated that the ‘popular initiative on second homes’ would only have a slight influence on the 
TDR market price.
Two major caveats of the findings presented in chapter 3 might be important to note: First, the agents’ 
behavior was calibrated quite simplistically, for instance no learning algorithms were included or any 
strategic behavior. Second, the data used for the calculation of the number of agents and the agents’ 
properties was slightly outdated109.
To conclude, the thesis presented the first agent-based model that simulates a TDR market. The simu-
lation results demonstrated that in Switzerland, the market-based instrument of transferable develop-
ment rights could be a useful instrument to both reduce the building zone area and address the problem 
of the spatial imbalances in supply and demand for these zones. However, it should not be forgotten, 
that the TDR market is ‘supplementary to planning’. A TDR market program depends on established 
planning measures, namely the designation of the sending and receiving areas, which should be in 
accordance with planning criteria.
5.1 Further research 
In what follows, a brief outline of possible ideas for developing this work is presented: First, the cali-
bration of the TDR-ABM could be improved by collecting more information about the behavior of the 
agents. For example, a role playing game or economic experiments might be appropriate approaches to 
investigate the influence of past market clearing prices on the asks (bids) at following auctions. These 
approaches might also be used to explore whether there are imitation effects among the agents or other 
learning processes. 
109 In order to calculate the supply and demand of TDR, data from 2007 (ARE, 2008; Fahrländer Partner, 2008) were used, 
because no newer data were available. Also other data used (e.g. for calculating the agents’ properties) could be updated in 
the meantime.
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Second, the quality of the data used to calculate the number of agents and their properties (e.g. parcel 
area) could be enhanced as well. In January 2013, the newest Swiss statistics on building zones (Ger-
man: “Bauzonenstatistik”) were published110. The integration of these data, as well as other data on 
building zone parcels (e.g. newest building zone prices, cf. Wüest und Partner AG, 2012), could fur-
ther update the TDR-ABM simulation results.
Third, in the proposed TDR market concept, the sending area needs to be designated by the municipal-
ities in accordance with existing Swiss spatial planning principles. All parcels in this designated send-
ing area are defined for downzoning which means that landowners in this area receive TDR which, 
however, they lose at the end of the trading period (the duration of the auction) if not sold. An alterna-
tive that could be further investigated would be to place the complete undeveloped building zone into 
the sending area, to allocate TDR to all landowners and to let them decide who wants to sell and who 
wants to keep the development rights. This would have the advantage of letting the market decide 
which parcels will be downzoned and would avoid discrimination between the landowners in the un-
developed building zone. However, the disadvantage of this alternative might be that unbuilt sections 
between settled areas result. Furthermore, a mechanism would have to be devised to make sure that the 
desired share of the undeveloped building zone is downzoned. 
Fourth, in the thesis the exact implementation of the potential TDR market within the existing Swiss 
law was only briefly addressed111. Therefore, an in-depth legal investigation (incl. possible taxation of 
the TDR) is needed before the TDR instrument could actually be implemented. 
Fifth, beyond the legal investigation, the research could be further extended by outlying all details of a 
possible monitoring system and by estimating the transaction costs112 incurred in trading the TDR. 
Concerning the latter, it could e.g. be analyzed whether it is useful to weight potential TDR-fees rela-
tive to the value of a transaction or not.
Sixth, in order to take into account the unequal financial flows between municipalities and cantons due 
to TDR transactions, it could be investigated whether TDR program-flows could be taken into account 
in existing financial compensation schemes and how or whether a separate solution might be more 
appropriate, and if so, which.
Seventh, instead of a trade between individual landowners, the effect of restricting the TDR trade to 
municipalities could be analyzed. In such a market, the municipalities would sell (buy) all TDR and 
110 For more information see: http://www.are.admin.ch/themen/raumplanung/00236/04878, accessed: 16-01-2013.
111 According to Epiney (2003), TDR are in principle compatible with the Swiss legal system, however, at least the Swiss 
Federal Law on Spatial Planning has to be revised.
112 Costs associated with the exchange of goods or services, including information, negotiation, communication and control 
costs.
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the individual landowners would be compensated (charged) with the theoretical TDR value (cf. section 
3.3.1, eq. 3-1). Assuming that the municipalities would sell the TDR at a price above the price they 
have paid, such an approach would generate revenues for the municipalities (and cantons), especially
in the regions with low land prices. However, the TDR-market price might increase.
To conclude, in chapter 2 (section 2.5.1) it is suggested that at the end of the TDR program it could be 
replaced by a TPP (Tradable Planning Permits) program. In such a follow-up program, the Federal
Office for Spatial Development would define a predetermined total permit quantity of TPP for desig-
nating new building zones. This total quantity would be distributed – according to a defined distribu-
tion formula – to the municipalities which could then trade the TPP amongst each other. Here, further 
research would be e.g. required for the calculation of such a distribution formula. 
5.2 General recommendations and factors for success for
the implementation of a TDR market in Switzerland
In what follows, general recommendations and factors for success for the implementation of a TDR 
market in Switzerland are outlined. The points proceed from the main findings of the thesis and are 
additional to conclusions in the existing literature (cf. Janssen-Jansen, 2008; Machemer and 
Kaplowitz, 2002; Pruetz, 2003)113. 
1) The results of the TDR survey showed a low willingness to participate in the TDR market. Rea-
sons were the complex topic and possibly the previous lack of public information and debate 
about TDR. Therefore, in a practical implementation of a TDR program, the public respectively 
the potentially involved landowners need to be fully informed and instructed for their participa-
tion.
2) In order to consider the whole of Switzerland as a market area – which will be necessary due to 
the imbalanced supply and demand for undeveloped building zones – sending and receiving areas 
need to be designated in all regions. Only in such a case would it be possible to transfer develop-
ment rights, i.e. TDR, from regions with low utility of land to regions with high utility. The send-
ing and receiving areas should first be designated by the cantons, and then in detail by municipali-
ties following overall uniform criteria. All political authorities should consider the same planning 
principles.
113 In the introduction of the first paper (chapter 2) some factors for success from the existing literature are mentioned.
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3) The simulation results showed that in order to keep the TDR market price stable, the TDR supply 
and demand should be approximately equal. That is, the differences between supply and demand 
– due to variations in the willingness to participate of the landowners or due to differences in the 
designation of parcels by the municipalities – should not exceed 10-15%. In the simulation the 
supply and demand of TDR was determined by the demand for building zones in the next five 
years.
4) Furthermore, the simulation results confirmed that the proposed multi-unit (fixed package sizes) 
double auction with a uniform price is particularly suitable as a price formation mechanism for 
the trade of TDR. The resulting market clearing prices were comparable to existing land prices 
and they did not over- or undershoot. Hence, this kind of auction may be adopted.
The next points could not be considered in the simulation, however, in a practical implementation of a 
TDR market, they might be important.
5) In order to encourage the market participants to bid more truthfully, it was suggested to run one 
auction per year. In a practical implementation of a TDR market this proposal might be adapted, 
depending on the practical experience that will be made. 
6) At the beginning of the TDR trade, it is suggested to support the trade with a public (e.g. Federal
Office for Spatial Development) or private ‘market maker’. To run the simulation a ‘market mak-
er’ was not needed, however, in practice, a ‘market maker’ could ensure the liquidity of the mar-
ket and offset any market imbalances (e.g. lack of TDR demand).
7) Practical experiences (e.g. auctioning rights to vehicle ownership in Singapore114 or auctioning 
tariff quotas of agricultural products in Switzerland115) have shown that an ‘electronic account’ 
might be useful for a functioning trading system and to increase the public confidence. Therefore, 
it is suggested that all landowners who are willing to participate in the TDR market need to open 
a ‘TDR-account’. After opening the ‘TDR-account’, the landowners in the sending area would re-
ceive their TDR to sell (free allocation), and the landowners in the receiving area would be al-
lowed to buy the TDR they need. The ‘TDR-account’ might be incorporated into the future na-
tional electronic property information system eGRIS116.
114 For more information see: https://ocoe.lta.gov.sg, accessed: 12-06-2012 or  Chu, S. (2002).
115 For more information see: http://www.blw.admin.ch/themen/00007/00059 or https://eversteigerung.ssl.admin.ch, ac-
cessed: 12-06-2012.
116 For more information see: http://www.egris.info, accessed: 11-27-2012. eGRIS stands for “elektronisches Grundstück-
Informationssystem” (electronic property information system).
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8) In order to increase market efficiency, the transaction costs should be kept as low as possible117. 
This might be achieved with simple and clear trading rules, and through a centralized provision of
information. Good information might also reduce the need for ‘brokers’ or other ‘advisers’ help-
ing to trade the TDR, which in turn reduces the overall costs. Moreover, the trade could be made 
free of charge. A fee might be levied however for opening the ‘TDR-account’ in order to make 
sure only serious agents (landowners) participate.
9) Because of the quite unequal financial flows between the cantons and municipalities additional 
financial compensation could be considered (e.g. consideration of the TDR trade in the existing 
federal compensation scheme).
10) At the end of the TDR program (e.g. when 90% of the TDR are sold), the political authorities 
should have a solution or at least a proposal for a follow-up program (e.g. TPP program).
117 For more information about the effect of transaction costs on the market efficiency in double auctions see e.g. Jamison and 
Plott (1997) or Noussair et al. (1998).
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Example of input data
Table A-1: Example of input data.
Parcel-ID Agent type Landowner category
Parcel area 
(sqm)
Agricultural zone 
price (CHF/sqm)
Building zone 
price (CHF/sqm)
Utilization 
factor
1 S A 427 6 300 0.4
2 S B 628 5 250 0.3
3 R B 500 5 860 0.7
4 R C 325 4 1,050 0.4
… … … … … … …
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A.2 Screenshot Repast Environment
Fig. A-1: Screenshot Repast Environment.
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A.3 Special cases in the calculation of the clearing price 
TDR bundle of last successful receiver is split TDR bundle of last successful sender is split
Equal prices at intersection, TDR bundle of last suc-
cessful receiver is split
Equal price at intersection, TDR bundle of last suc-
cessful sender is split
Equal price and TDR quantity at intersection (v.1) Equal price and TDR quantity at intersection (v.2)
128
Equal quantity at intersection, no splitting Little demand, no splitting
Little demand, TDR bundle of last successful sender is 
split
Little supply, no splitting
Little supply, TDR bundle of last successful receiver 
is split
No trade (ask prices are too high, bid price too low)
Fig. A-2: Special cases in the calculation of the market clearing price.
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A.4 Effect of different psend and preceive values on the clear-
ing price over 5 auctions
psend changes; preceive constant at 10% psend changes; preceive constant at 20% psend changes; preceive constant at 30%
130
psend changes; preceive constant at 40% psend changes; preceive constant at 50% psend changes; preceive constant at 60%
psend changes; preceive constant at 70% psend changes; preceive constant at 80% psend changes; preceive constant at 90%
131
psend changes; preceive constant at 100%
Fig. A-3: Effect of different psend and preceive values on the clearing price over 5 auctions.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Histograms for plausibility test 
Fig. B-1: Histogram of the ratio of first ask price and theoretical price.
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Fig. B-2: Histogram of the ratio of fifth bid price and theoretical price.
B.2 Participation probability per landowner category be-
fore exclusion of outliers
Table B-1: Sender and receiver participation probability per landowner category before exclusion of 
outliers.
Landowner category
Sender Participation Receiver Participation
Yes No Yes No
Enterprises
Number 18 17 14 12
Percent 51.4% 48.6% 53.8% 46.2%
NPI
Number 23 43 14 50
Percent 34.8% 65.2% 21.9% 78.1%
RPP
Number 50 30 40 20
Percent 62.5% 37.5% 66.7% 33.3%
Overall
Number 91 90 68 82
Percent 50.3% 49.7% 45.3% 54.7%
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B.3 Regression models for testing the influence of the loca-
tion factor 
Sender
Table B-2: Determinants (model with location factor) of first ask price of enterprises (MOD SE 2)a.
MOD SE 2
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 2,612.353* 2.232 -34.789 5,259.495
ParcelArea -1.975** -2.708 -3.625 -0.325
PTDRtheoretical 1.048 1.353 -0.704 2.799
AdaptationRate -275.123 -0.295 -2,385.321 1,835.074
Number of observations 15
R2 0.493
Adjusted R2 0.324
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Table B-3: Determinants (model with location factor) of first ask price of NPI (MOD SNPI 2)a.
MOD SNPI 2
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 1,139.818 1.602 -396.910 2,676.547
ParcelArea -0.771 1.191 -2.169 0.628
PTDRtheoretical 1.000*** 3.236 0.332 1.668
AdaptationRate -378.593 -0.673 -1,594.704 837.517
Number of observations 18
R2 0.487
Adjusted R2 0.368
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
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Table B-4: Determinants (model with location factor) of first ask price of RPP (MOD SRPP 2)a.
MOD SRPP 2
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 135.295 0.732 -241.851 512.441
ParcelArea 0.120 0.701 -0.229 0.469
PTDRtheoretical 0.947*** 10.072 0.755 1.139
AdaptationRate -199.188 -0.929 -636.713 238.337
Number of observations 38
R2 0.777
Adjusted R2 0.755
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Receiver
Table B-5: Determinants (model with location factor) of first bid price of enterprises (MOD RE 2)a.
MOD RE 2
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 1,657.015 1.604 -725.833 4,039.863
ParcelArea -.0965 -1.268 -2.720 0.790
PTDRtheoretical 0.503 1.325 -0.373 1.379
AdaptationRate -288.811 -1.120 -883.622 306.000
Number of observations 12
R2 0.492
Adjusted R2 0.242
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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Table B-6: Determinants (model with location factor) of first bid price of NPI (MOD RNPI 2)a.
MOD RNPI 2
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 325.527 1.068 -458.267 1,109.321
ParcelArea 0.495 1.669 -0.267 1.258
PTDRtheoretical 0.219*** 4.574 0.096 0.342
AdaptationRate -674.622** -2.994 -1,253.772 -95.472
Number of observations 10
R2 0.916
Adjusted R2 0.865
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Table B-7: Determinants (model with location factor) of first bid price of RPP (MOD RRPP 3)a.
MOD RRPP 3
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Lower level of 95% 
confidence interval
Upper level of 95% 
confidence interval
Constant 402.555 1.257 -255.577 1,060.688
ParcelArea -0.129 -0.467 -0.696 0.439
PTDRtheoretical 0.629*** 4.020 0.307 0.951
AdaptationRate -265.835*** -2.760 -463.799 -67.870
Number of observations 31
R2 0.547
Adjusted R2 0.495
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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B.4 Ask and bid price adaptation per landowner category
Fig. B-3: Ask price adaptation of senders of the category of enterprises.
Fig. B-4: Ask price adaptation of senders of the category of NPI.
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Fig. B-5: Ask price adaptation of senders of the category of RPP.
Fig. B-6: Bid price adaptation of receivers of the category of enterprises.
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Fig. B-7: Bid price adaptation of receivers of the category of NPI.
Fig. B-8: Bid price adaptation of receivers of the category of RPP.
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Characteristics of the sending and receiving area
Table C-1: Characteristics (municipality type level) of the sending and receiving areas for the year 
2018 (own calculations, data basis: ARE, 2008 and Fahrländer Partner, 2008).
Municipality type118
Sending area Receiving area
Area (in km2) Assigned TDR quantity Area (in km2)
Assigned 
TDR quantity
Large cities (Basle, Berne, Geneva, 
Lausanne, Zurich) 0.00 0 3.09 2,335,194
Medium-sized cities
(e.g. Winterthur, Olten)
1.13 564,034 1.07 603,919
Small cities
(e.g. Lenzburg, Herisau) 1.70 574,068 1.17 444,961
Rich municipalities
(e.g. Cologny, Wollerau) 1.15 314,576 2.01 671,519
Tourist municipalities
(e.g. Flims, Saas-Fee)
6.32 1,576,527 0.25 95,146
Inner agglomeration belt of large 
cities (e.g. Gland, Horgen) 2.41 860,391 6.03 2,491,414
Outer agglomeration belt of large 
cities (e.g. Bonstetten, Coldrerio) 1.98 606,051 2.69 987,389
Inner agglomeration belt of medium-
sized cities (e.g. Amriswil, Horn)
2.21 741,939 1.18 440,013
Outer agglomeration belt of medium-
sized cities (e.g. Felsberg, Magliaso) 3.22 828,616 0.54 193,569
Commuter municipalities outside 
agglomerations (e.g. Adlikon, Vinelz) 3.30 869,935 1.58 490,053
118 According to the municipality type definition of Wüest & Partner AG (2011). The definition is based on the municipality 
type definition of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. For more information see: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/infothek/nomenklaturen/blank/blank/gemtyp/01.html, accessed: 2012-08-13.
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Industrial municipalities
(e.g. Erlach, Vionnaz) 4.49 1,238,771 0.32 116,390
Agricultural municipalities
(e.g. Lauenen, Yens) 3.97 1,000,035 0.55 164,781
Overall (whole Switzerland) ∑ 31.88 ∑ 9,174,943 ∑ 20.49 ∑ 9,034,348
Table C-2: Characteristics (canton level) of the sending and receiving areas for the year 2018 (own 
calculations, data basis: ARE, 2008 and Fahrländer Partner, 2008).
Canton
Sending area Receiving area
Area (in km2) Assigned TDR quantity Area (in km2)
Assigned 
TDR quantity
Zürich 1.58 640,082 5.23 2,751,866
Bern / Berne 0.76 231,376 4.33 1,761,932
Luzern 0.86 299,286 0.51 262,332
Uri 0.06 18,242 0.08 31,999
Schwyz 0.14 55,412 0.65 266,763
Obwalden 0.07 24,970 0.00 834
Nidwalden 0.08 29,678 0.23 89,660
Glarus 0.00 0 0.02 8,468
Zug 0.12 62,131 0.32 131,434
Fribourg / Freiburg 2.71 702,542 0.28 106,360
Solothurn 1.56 487,791 0.02 6,728
Basel-Stadt 0.01 4,468 0.30 221,568
Basel-Landschaft 0.55 190,230 1.10 454,228
Schaffhausen 0.24 85,578 0.13 53,659
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 0.05 14,842 0.12 40,559
Appenzell Innerrhoden 0.03 8,335 0.06 22,948
St. Gallen 0.85 261,362 0.50 167,716
Graubünden / Grigioni / Grischun 1.18 408,396 0.10 39,864
Aargau 1.84 631,325 1.45 577,612
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Thurgau 1.11 360,562 0.04 12,733
Ticino 2.63 942,180 0.32 130,161
Vaud 4.82 1,157,783 2.35 961,932
Valais / Wallis 9.41 2,249,384 0.01 1,545
Neuchâtel 0.60 165,286 0.41 179,867
Genève 0.13 38,691 1.92 749,169
Jura 0.49 105,012 0.01 2,411
Overall (whole Switzerland) ∑ 31.88 ∑ 9,174,943 ∑ 20.49 ∑ 9,034,348
Fig. C-1: Spatial distribution of sending and receiving areas in Switzerland.
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C.2 Additional results of setting 3
Fig. C-2: Supply (blue) and demand (red) for TDR in the first auction (setting 3).
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C.3 Additional results of setting 4
Fig. C-3: Effect of percentage change of parameters psend and preceive on the variance of the clearing 
price in the first auction.
Fig. C-4: Effect of percentage change of parameters psend and preceive on the average clearing price over 
5 auctions.
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Fig. C-5: Effect of percentage change of parameters psend and preceive on the TDR quantity sold in the 
five auctions.
Fig. C-6: Effect of percentage change of parameters psend and preceive on the variance of the clearing 
price over 5 auctions
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C.4 Additional results of setting 5
Table C-3: Descriptive statistics of the data used in the regression model for estimating the building 
zone price per municipality.
Variable 
name
Descriptiona Sourceb Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
BLP
Building zone price in 
CHF per square meter 
(median price of munic-
ipality) (2010)
A 60.00 3,430.00 497.20 454.87
SecondRes Percentage of second homes (2011) B 0.00 93.53 18.48 17.03
Income
Total net income of 
natural persons in mil-
lion CHF (2008)
E 0.34 15,819.69 111.40 427.05
Accessibility
Average (private motor-
ized transport) 
accessibilityc (logarith-
mic transformed values) 
(2005)
F 4.66 13.81 9.47 0.98
GFloorA Median gross floor area in square meter (2010) A 0.00 325.2 111.57 58.91
OccDens
Occupation density 
(number of residences 
divided by population) 
(2011)
B 0.00 21.60 0.50 0.59
InCommuter Inward commuters (2000) D 0.00 214,788.00 1,014.69 6,013.30
PerSec1
Percentage of full-time 
equivalents in sector 1 to
all other sectors (2008)
C 0.00 100.00 20.60 21.48
PerSec2
Percentage of full-time 
equivalents in sector 2 to
all other sectors (2008)
C 0.00 100.00 31.24 19.50
PerSec3
Percentage of full-time 
equivalents in sector 3 to
all other sectors (2008)
C 0.00 100.00 48.17 21.52
Altitude
Altitude of settlement 
center in meters above 
sea level (2010)
B 196.00 1954.00 621.42 271.63
Radiation
Mean of global radiation 
in watt per square meterd
(2010)
G 38.79 87.11 55.30 10.93
MunType1
Dummy for municipality 
type 1: Large cities A, B 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.04
MunType2
Dummy for municipality 
type 2: Medium-sized 
cities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.09
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MunType3
Dummy for municipality 
type 3: Small cities A, B 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.16
MunType4
Dummy for municipality 
type 4: Rich municipali-
ties 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.18
MunType5
Dummy for municipality 
type 5:Tourist munici-
palities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.23
MunType6
Dummy for municipality 
type 6:Inner agglomera-
tion belt of large cities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26
MunType7
Dummy for municipality 
type 7: Outer agglomera-
tion belt of large cities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29
MunType8
Dummy for municipality 
type 8: Inner agglomera-
tion belt of medium-
sized cities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22
MunType9
Dummy for municipality 
type 9: Outer agglomera-
tion belt of medium-
sized cities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.26
MunType10
Dummy for municipality 
type 10: Commuter 
municipalities outside 
agglomerations
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.41
MunType11
Dummy for municipality 
type 11: Industrial mu-
nicipalities 
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.32
MunType12
Dummy for municipality 
type 12: Agricultural 
municipalitiese
A, B 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44
a All variables are on municipality level. The year is noted in parentheses.
b Data sources: A: Wüest und Partner (2011); B: Federal Statistical Office (2011); C: Federal Statistical Office (2008); D: 
Federal Statistical Office (2000); E: Federal Tax Administration (2008); F: Federal Office for Spatial Development (2005); 
G: Federal Office of Meteorology and Climatology (2010).
c Sum of the weighted opportunities (here: population). For more information see: 
http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:28945/eth-28945-01.pdf, accessed: 10-19-2012.
d The values represent mean daily, monthly and yearly quantities of Surface Incoming Shortwave (SIS) radiation in watt per 
square meter (also known as global radiation). For more information see: Dürr et al. (2010).
e This municipality type 12 is not listed in Table C-4 because it was chosen as reference for the estimation of the coefficients 
of the other municipality types.
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Table C-4: Determinants of the regression model for estimating the building zone price per 
municipalitya.
Variable name Coefficients t-values
Constant -744.667*** -6.845
SecondRes 0.423 0.588
Income 0.543*** 10.972
Accessibility 60.663*** 6.348
GFloorA 1.194*** 7.585
OccDens -11.256 -1.114
InCommuter -0.026*** -5.625
PerSec2 -1.701*** -4.609
PerSec3 0.808** 2.127
Altitude -0.167*** -5.055
Radiation 9.326*** 13.959
MunType1 -1,222.876 -1.530
MunType2 -262.008 -1.533
MunType3 89.745 1.126
MunType4 1,274.228*** 23.153
MunType5 89.643 1.125
MunType6 582.986*** 10.540
MunType7 380.661*** 10.394
MunType8 49.045 1.020
MunType9 -75.456** -2.179
MunType10 74.020*** 3.103
MunType11 44.016 1.381
SecondRes *MunType1 157.782*** 3.126
SecondRes *MunType2 28.442** 2.483
SecondRes *MunType3 -9.765** -2.054
SecondRes *MunType4 -3.495 -1.084
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SecondRes *MunType5 1.878 1.284
SecondRes *MunType6 2.119 0.418
SecondRes *MunType7 5.118* 1.793
SecondRes *MunType8 -0.228 -0.066
SecondRes *MunType9 1.944 1.293
SecondRes *MunType10 -2.649** -2.340
SecondRes *MunType11 -2.252** -1.991
GFloorA*OccDens -0.817*** -3.238
Number of observations 2,585
R2 0.673
Adjusted R2 0.669
a Significance levels (two-tailed): *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. 
Fig. C-7: Histogram of the change of building zone prices (differences compared to the original build-
ing zone prices) due to the ‘popular initiative on second homes’.
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